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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation integrates concepts from three bodies of literature: police use of 
force, neighborhood/ecological influence on police, and police culture.  Prior research has 
generally found that neighborhood context affects police use of force.  While scholars 
have applied social disorganization theory to understand why neighborhood context 
might influence use of force, much of this theorizing and subsequent empirical research 
has focused exclusively on structural characteristics of an area, such as economic 
disadvantage, crime rates, and population demographics.  This exclusive focus has 
occurred despite the fact that culture was once an important component of social 
disorganization theory in addition to structural factors.  Moreover, the majority of the 
theorizing and subsequent research on police culture has neglected the potential influence 
that neighborhood context might have on officers’ occupational outlooks.  The purpose of 
this dissertation is to merge the structural and cultural elements of social disorganization 
theory in order to shed light on the development and maintenance of police officer culture 
as well as to further specify the relationship between neighborhood context and police 
use of force.  Using data from the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN), I address 
three interrelated research questions: 1) does variation of structural characteristics at the 
patrol beat level, such as concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the percentage 
of minority citizens, predict how an officer views his/her occupational outlook (i.e., 
culture)?; 2) do officers who work in the same patrol beats share a similar occupational 
outlook (i.e., culture) or is there variation?; and 3) does the inclusion of police culture at 
the officer level moderate the relationship between patrol beat context and police use of 
force?  Findings suggest that a patrol beat’s degree of concentrated disadvantage and 
	 ii 
homicide rate slightly influence officer culture at the individual level.  Results show  
mixed evidence of a patrol beat culture.  There is little support for the idea that 
characteristics of the patrol beat and individual officer culture interact to influence police 
use of force.  I conclude with a detailed discussion of the methodological, theoretical, and 
policy implications as well as limitations and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Central and Controversial Role of Force in the Police Function 
The use of non-negotiable force by police officers is a core function of law 
enforcement (Bittner, 1970; Klockars, 1985).  This mandate to use force is essential and 
necessary for police to perform their jobs effectively, especially when individuals pose a 
serious or deadly threat to officers or other citizens.  Despite its critical purpose, use of 
force is arguably one of the most controversial aspects of police work.  Citizens’ beliefs 
that officers are employing unnecessary or excessive levels of force can quickly erode 
police legitimacy (Brunson, 2007; Gau & Brunson, 2010) and can result in far-reaching 
consequences: from loss of life and civil disorder to criminal prosecution and large civil 
judgments (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).  And because police rely on the support and 
cooperation of the public to function effectively (e.g., reporting crimes, assisting with 
investigations, serving as witnesses), citizens’ perceptions of police as illegitimate can 
prove detrimental to departments and their efforts towards crime control and public 
safety.  A large and growing body of literature has confirmed the corollaries of police 
legitimacy, including enhanced citizen compliance with officer commands during 
encounters, greater cooperation with police (i.e., reporting crimes, providing information, 
etc.), and obedience to the law in general (Hinds, 2009; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Tyler, 
1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  But the impact of negative police-citizen encounters extends 
far beyond the initial contact between the original parties involved.  Also of particular 
salience is how vicarious experiences influence citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy, 
either directly through first-hand observation or indirectly from exposure to friends, 
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family members, neighbors, and/or media sources (Flexon, Lurigio, & Greenleaf, 2009; 
Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005).  
 The controversial nature of police use of force and the associated issues of 
legitimacy have recently emerged once again.  In the last year and a half there has been a 
number of high profile deaths of minority citizens at the hands of the police.  This list has 
come to include Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Eric Garner in Staten Island, New 
York, Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio, Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina, 
and Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland.  These incidents have propelled American 
police further into the public view, spurring discussion from justice system professionals, 
civil rights advocates, and academics alike on topics such as police use of force, training, 
minority representation in law enforcement, and officer body-worn cameras.  In light of 
the recent events, Barack Obama in December of 2014 convened the President’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing: the first national-level committee directing attention 
towards law enforcement since the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(i.e., the Kerner Commission) dating back to 1967-1968.  The goal of the Task Force is to 
foster stronger, more collaborative relationships between local law enforcement agencies 
and the communities that they serve.   
 In the wake of these current deadly force incidents, much of the public discourse, 
sentiment of politicians and scholars, and recommendations from the Task Force’s final 
report echo the conclusions reached by the Kerner Commission nearly fifty years ago.  
Analyzing the violence that erupted in many urban cities in the 1960s, Illinois Governor 
Otto Kerner, chair of the Commission, surmised, “Our nation is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white –separate and unequal” (National Advisory Commission 
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on Civil Disorders, 1968, pg. 1).  Institutionalized racism, inequality in matters of 
employment, housing, and social services, and injustices at the hands of the law were 
identified as the underlying causes of the riots.  The Commission also cited police actions 
–specifically 1) poor police conduct (e.g., brutality/ excessive force, harassment, and 
abuses of power), 2) inadequate training and supervision, 3) hostile police-community 
relationships, and 4) insufficient minority representation in law enforcement– as another 
contributing factor to the unrest.  In fact, many of the “sparks” or “triggers” in the violent 
demonstrations in places like Harlem, Watts, Newark, and Detroit were attributed to 
routine encounters between police and minority citizens that went awry. 
 Looking at these similarities, it might appear as if little progress has been made 
over the last several decades regarding police-community relations and police violence.  
After all, the mere assembling of President Obama’s 21st Century Task Force 
acknowledges the fact that substantial problems still exist and require attention.  
Moreover, protestors’ demands and calls for change, eerily similar to those voiced in the 
1960s, have been expressed in recent demonstrations in cities across America, some of 
which have turned violent (e.g., Ferguson, MO and Baltimore, MD).  Such broad-brushed 
criticisms of the police, however, are unfair, and law enforcement agencies have made 
considerable strides throughout the years to right some of their past wrongdoing; much 
progress has been made (White & Fradella, 2016).  For example, departments have 
implemented more restrictive administrative policies on the use of deadly force, high-
speed vehicle pursuits, and responses to domestic violence incidents (Walker, 1993).  The 
Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), created in 
1979, has been dedicated to increasing levels of police professionalism, and agencies 
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have adopted philosophies like community- and problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 
1979; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990) in order to better incorporate citizens as “co-
producers” of crime control and public safety.  We now also have a growing body of 
knowledge regarding evidence-based policing practices (e.g., Sherman and colleagues’ 
“What Works”; CrimeSolutions.gov, Smart Policing Initiative).  Nevertheless, strained 
and tenuous relationships between police and citizens in many communities, particularly 
inner-city minority neighborhoods, persist (Brunson, 2007; Weitzer, 2000a).  
 Our understanding of issues related to police use of force –the primary source of 
the current controversy– also remains under-developed.  Although a substantial amount 
of empirical attention has been devoted to the topic since the 1970s and a robust body of 
knowledge has been established, policing scholars are still left intellectually unsatisfied 
about the known correlates and underlying processes that lead to police use of force.  
Contributing to this issue is the lack of national-level data on use of force by police –
deadly or otherwise (Klinger, 2008).  Such data limitations prevent rigorous empirical 
assessments of use of force, whether it be testing organizational/department-level features 
(e.g., indicators of professionalism, the socio-demographic makeup of officers) or 
neighborhood characteristics.  Additionally, research is largely devoid of adequate theory 
to explain police behavior and use of force more specifically (Terrill, 2014).  This may be 
due to the often discussed (Fradella, 2014; Laub, 2004) and empirically confirmed 
(Dooley & Rydberg, 2014) academic divide between “criminology” (i.e., theoretically-
based focus on the etiology of criminal behavior) and “criminal justice” (i.e., practitioner-
based responses to crime from police, courts, and corrections).  Both theory and practice 
must be studied and considered in concert, mutually aiding each other in order to better  
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address complex phenomena like police use of force.   
Efforts to Explain Police Use of Force 
Scholars have set out to explain police behavior, specifically use of force, since 
the high levels of discretion of justice system actors were first “discovered” through the 
systematic social observation of the American Bar Foundation Survey in 1956 (Walker, 
1993).  Researchers have focused attention toward the law, situational features of police-
citizen encounters (e.g., suspect disrespect and resistance) as well as individual 
characteristics of both parties involved, and the organizations where officers are 
employed (Friedrich, 1980).  Neighborhoods, albeit emerging more recently, represent 
another fruitful context in which to study police behavior.  While early policing scholars 
(Reiss & Bordua, 1967; Rubinstein, 1973; Werthman & Piliavan, 1967) proposed and 
ethnographically observed that neighborhood context influenced discretionary police 
actions, there has been relatively little empirical examination of such a relationship 
compared to the research conducted in the other aforementioned contexts.  Still, the 
majority of studies that have tested this association generally find that neighborhood 
characteristics do, indeed, impact the way police perform their jobs (Kane, 2002; Lee, 
Jang, Yun, Lim, & Tushaus, 2010; Lee, Vaughn, & Lim, 2014; Smith, 1986; Terrill & 
Reisig, 2003).  For example, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found that officers used more force 
on suspects in high-crime neighborhoods and areas with a greater degree of concentrated 
disadvantage.  This relationship persisted after controlling for officer and suspect 
characteristics as well as situational factors (e.g., suspect resistance).  It is less clear, 
however, why neighborhood context appears to influence police behavior like use of  
force. 
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 Policing scholars have turned to Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization 
theory and the larger Chicago school tradition of community ecology to understand why 
neighborhood context might affect police behavior.  Klinger’s (1997) “social ecology of 
policing”, perhaps one of the most detailed theoretical frameworks in the policing 
literature, posits an inverse relationship between levels of crime and deviance in 
communities and the degree of formal social control exerted by officers.  The problem, 
however, is that quantitative research in this area, and among the field of criminology 
more broadly, has focused almost exclusively on objective structural characteristics, such 
as levels of poverty and unemployment and other population demographics (Kirk & 
Papachristos, 2011; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, 2013).  Shaw and McKay (1942) 
once argued that culture was an important component in their theoretical perspective in 
addition to structural characteristics.  Yet, Kornhauser’s (1978) critique of existing social 
disorganization theory became instrumental in persuading researchers to retreat from 
cultural explanations.  A small body of literature has since moved beyond this exclusive 
focus on structural characteristics of neighborhoods to also incorporate elements of 
culture that emerge in neighborhoods, specifically examining issues of legal cynicism 
(Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998) and “codes of the street” 
(Anderson, 1999; Stewart & Simons, 2006; 2010; Stewart, Simons, & Conger, 2002).  
These studies have found that legal cynicism -defined as a cultural orientation in which 
the law and the agents of its enforcement (i.e., police, courts) are viewed as illegitimate, 
unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety- and “codes of the street” originate 
as an adaptation to neighborhood structural characteristics (e.g., concentrated  
disadvantage).  Many prominent criminologists have advocated for renewed attention  
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toward culture in ecological perspectives in their suggestions for future research (Kubrin 
& Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, 2013).  Given these developments in criminology, policing 
scholars might miss the “big picture” while applying social disorganization theory and 
other ecological perspectives to police behavior when they fail to also include or consider 
officer culture.   
 Culture is certainly no stranger in the policing literature and it may play a role 
during use of force incidents.  Though it garnered a wealth of attention from early 
policing scholars such as Jerome Skolnick (1966), William Westley (1970), and James Q. 
Wilson (1968), the concept of culture is quite abstract and varied.  To some academics 
and practitioners, police culture is poorly conceptualized and instead simply embodies a 
negative connotation –often criticized as being an impediment to positive transformation 
in departments undergoing reform (Chan, 1996).  In terms of variation, culture can be 
viewed from multiple units of analysis: as a function of the police occupation as a whole 
(Skolnick, 1966), specific departments (Wilson, 1968), type of rank (i.e., front line staff 
versus supervisors versus upper management; Manning, 1994; Reuss-Ianni, 1983), and 
individual officer styles or outlooks (i.e., attitudinal measures regarding the importance 
one places on aggressive crime control versus public service; Brown, 1981; Muir, 1977).  
The vast majority of the scholarship in this area has either been theoretical or qualitative 
in nature; only recently have scholars applied quantitative methods to test hypotheses 
regarding police culture, focusing almost exclusively on policing styles using individual 
officers as the unit of analysis.  Thus far, a sizeable body of research has found 
significant dissimilarity in how officers perceive their occupational roles, the citizens 
they serve, and their supervisors and upper management in the department (Haarr, 1997; 
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Jermier Slocum, Fry, & Gaines, 1991; Paoline, 2001; 2004; Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 
2000).  Put differently, this growing body of work has cast doubt on the idea of a 
monolithic police culture.  Terrill, Paoline, and Manning (2003) uncovered that 
individual officer outlooks (i.e., perceptions of their occupational role as well as 
perceptions of citizens) were significantly associated with levels of coercion.  Officers 
who adhered to traditional notions of police culture –those holding unfavorable views of 
citizens and positively oriented toward aggressive crime fighting patrol tactics– tended to 
use higher levels of verbal and physical force during interactions with citizens. 
 Using the recent integration of structural and cultural elements in constructs such 
as legal cynicism and “codes of the street” as a model for guidance, research on police 
culture might benefit from the incorporation of neighborhood characteristics.  At this 
point, scholarly discussion of police culture has occurred with little explicit mention of 
the larger structural or neighborhood context (for exceptions see Chan, 1997; Crank, 
2004).  Although research acknowledges that policing is territorially-based (Bittner, 
1967; 1970; Rubinstein, 1973), much of the writing and quantitative examination of 
police culture has omitted the potential influence that neighborhoods might have on how 
officers perceive their occupational role and the citizens they serve.  A high degree of 
variation exists across neighborhoods in terms of crime rates, levels of incivility and 
disorder, and the socio-demographic characteristics of residents (e.g., race/ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, substance abuse, mental illness) (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; 
Peterson & Krivo, 2012; Sampson, 2012) in addition to variation in neighborhood stigma 
and how negative perceptions are subsequently attributed to the citizens residing within 
certain areas (Besbris, Faber, Rich, & Sharkey, 2015).  Because officers are embedded 
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within communities and regularly interact with the citizens who live there, there is sound 
reason to hypothesize that neighborhoods will influence officers’ cultural orientations.  
Merging the focus on structural characteristics from social disorganization theory with 
the current work on police culture has the potential to further advance both bodies of 
literature that seem to be progressing separately.  More specifically, neighborhood 
context has the opportunity to shed light on the development and maintenance of police 
culture, while, at the same time, police culture might provide insight into why 
neighborhoods and communities appear to influence police behavior, such as use of 
force.  Future research on police use of force must include multiple levels of analysis 
(e.g., cities, neighborhoods, and officers). 
 Policing research broadly and the work on use of force more specifically, to date, 
has largely taken a piecemeal approach to studying and understanding officer behavior.  
Figure 1 on the next page illustrates the extant research on police use of force.  For the 
most part, each of these contexts (i.e., individual, situational, organizational, and 
ecological) is examined separately with little interaction between them.  This siloed 
approach impedes our ability to fully understand police use of force.  An exclusive focus 
on a single context, such as individuals, neglects how officers might be influenced by the 
organization, the community, and/or the collective group culture of the officers’ peers.   
 Two prominent problems or gaps in the police use of force literature have 
emerged.  The first centers on the fact that not enough scholarly attention has been 
directed towards ecological/neighborhood factors.  As previously discussed, initial 
studies have found evidence that neighborhood context impacts police behavior, such as 
 
officer disrespect toward citizens (Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002) and use of 
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Figure 1 
 
Factors that Influence Use of Force (Traditional View) 
 
  
force by officers (Lee et al., 2014; Smith, 1986; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  Officers are 
more likely to use disrespectful speech and gestures and employ higher levels of verbal 
and physical force in neighborhoods that are more economically disadvantaged.  Second, 
the topic of police culture is nearly absent from the discussion and empirical testing of 
the ecological/neighborhood perspective.  Terrill et al. (2003) have found that officer 
culture was significantly associated with levels of coercion and force against citizens; 
however, the authors employed individual officers as the unit of analysis without 
considering the potential influence that neighborhood characteristics might have on 
officer culture.  The observed relationships from each of these sub-areas can be combined 
to arrive at a more complete theoretical framework for studying police behavior like use 
of force. 
The Current Dissertation 
 This dissertation seeks to address each of the aforementioned shortcomings and  
limitations of prior work on neighborhoods, police culture, and use of force.  Following  
Individual Situational Organizational Ecological 
Police Use of Force 
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the lead of other scholars (Kane, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003), I integrate social 
disorganization theory and other contextual/ecological perspectives (i.e., the Chicago 
school) while studying police culture and the controversial issue of police use of force.  
More specifically, it merges cultural and structural elements of social disorganization 
theory, as Shaw and McKay (1942) originally intended, with the aim of shedding light on 
the development and maintenance of police culture as well as further specifying the 
relationship between neighborhood context and police use of force.  This will be 
accomplished by examining multiple units of analysis: neighborhoods, officers, collective 
officer culture, and police-citizen interactions.  Figure 2 below depicts the proposed 
model that this dissertation assesses. 
Figure 2 
 
Proposed Factors that Influence Use of Force 
 
 
 “Ecological” is a broad term that could refer to a number of higher-order social 
contexts, including cities/municipalities and neighborhoods as well as department-
designated divisions such as precincts/districts and patrol beats.  For the purposes of this 
Ecological 
Police Use of Force 
Cultural Individual 
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dissertation, I focus on the neighborhood-level –using the patrol beat as a proxy measure.  
Situational factors of the police-citizen encounter are certainly important for explaining 
use of force; however, these factors are controlled for in the analyses in order to more 
effectively isolate the potential impact that neighborhood characteristics and individual 
officer culture has on use of force.  Additionally, the data do not include measures of 
organizational-level factors of the departments under study, although the characteristics 
of leadership, training, and administrative policy have been shown to be candidates 
worthy of empirical examination.  As a result, Figure 2 omits the situational and 
organizational terms that were included in the “traditional” view of use of force in Figure 
1.   
 Three main research questions are addressed.  First, I examine whether 
neighborhood context, specifically concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the 
racial/ethnic composition of citizens, influences police officer culture at the individual-
level.  Police culture, in this sense, is originally studied as the first outcome of interest 
with neighborhood context, via the patrol beat as a proxy measure, serving as the key 
independent variable.  Does variation of structural characteristics at the patrol beat level, 
such as concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the percentage of minority 
citizens predict how an officer views his/her occupational outlook (i.e., culture)?  Second, 
I examine whether a “patrol beat police culture” exists among officers who patrol specific 
geographic areas together.  Do officers who work in the same patrol beats share a similar 
occupational outlook (i.e., culture) or is there variation?  Third, I examine whether the 
inclusion police culture at the individual officer level moderates the relationship between 
patrol beat characteristics -such as concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the 
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percentage of minority residents- and police use of force.  In this case, individual police 
officer culture is used as a moderating variable and police use of force becomes the 
second outcome of interest.  Do officers who work in specific patrol beats and who 
possess a particular cultural outlook intensify/magnify the association between patrol 
beats characterized by concentrated disadvantage/high crime and higher levels of police 
use of force?   
 This dissertation uses data from the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN): a 
large-scale multi-method study examining police-community interaction in Indianapolis, 
Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida.  The rich nature of the data set includes systematic 
social observation of police officers during the course of their shifts, officer interviews, 
citizen surveys across selected neighborhoods, and contextual measures from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  As a result, POPN provides a wealth of information across multiple units 
of analysis: patrol beats, officer attitudes and perceptions, and police use of force 
incidents that are witnessed first hand by trained third-party observers.  Such a variety of 
measures makes POPN the ideal data set for testing neighborhood influence on police 
officer culture and, in turn, whether officer culture moderates neighborhood influence on 
police use of force.   
 The dissertation proceeds in the following manner.  Chapter Two includes an 
exhaustive overview of the relevant literature on police use of force, police culture, and 
the neighborhood and ecological influences on police.  Chapter Three provides an in-
depth discussion of the data, measures, and analytical strategy.  The results for each of 
the three research questions are presented in Chapter Four.  Chapter Five concludes with 
a contextualized discussion of the findings, particularly in terms of methodological 
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theoretical, and policy implications; limitations and directions for future research are also 
included. 
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Chapter 2 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
 This chapter is broken down into five sections.  The aim of the first section is to 
illustrate that any examination of the police must place officers in their larger social 
context(s) in time and space.  The second section outlines the known correlates of police 
use of force.  It shows that previous work has tended to take too narrow of a view on the 
topic, and that future research must study use of force through a larger conceptual lens.  
Police culture (section three) and neighborhood and ecological influences on the police 
(section four) are two promising avenues with the potential to further advance our 
knowledge on use of force.  Yet, these two bodies of literature have each developed 
separately from one another.  A case is made to integrate them together by applying both 
to the study of police use of force.  The chapter concludes with a refocusing on the 
purpose of the dissertation and its specific research questions. 
The Role of the Police: History and Evolution 
Police administration is not applied mechanics, but a living, breathing organism shaped 
by political, social, and economic trends of time and place.  –Repetto (1978) 
Police roles, activities, and functions have evolved over time, essentially 
mirroring changes in the social structure.  Even the very creation of “modern day” police 
departments in places like London and New York City in the early 19th century can be 
traced to large-scale societal transformations.  During the colonial era in early America 
(i.e., the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), communities were small, tightly knit, and 
culturally homogenous.  The need for formal police was minimal because communities 
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were capable of exerting informal social control through mechanisms such as religion and 
rituals of public shaming.  County sheriffs, constables, and night watch systems were all 
in existence at the time; however, these groups provided minimal law enforcement 
functions.  For instance, sheriffs’ primary duties involved collecting taxes (Monkkonen, 
1981).   
 The development of modern police forces in America was slow and cautionary.  
Modeled after Sir Robert Peel’s London Metropolitan Police, which was approved by 
Parliament in 1829 (Critchley, 1967), the creation of departments in the United States 
lagged behind England by about twenty years.  Structural changes, such as 
urbanization/industrialization and increases in population heterogeneity, in the early 19th 
century led to higher rates of crime and disorder in cities like Philadelphia, New York 
City, St. Louis, and Boston.   Despite a sense of chaos and loss of control across urban 
areas in the US, political forces precluded the acceptance and establishment of formal, 
London-style police organizations –reflecting a deep public uncertainty with granting 
governments this type of power and control (Walker, 1977).  Eventually, growing crime 
problems and urban disorder gave way to Americans’ indecision and hesitation.  The 
New York Police Department was officially created in 1845, and American police 
systems became much more popular from the 1860s onward (Monkkonen, 1981).   
 Early American police departments selectively adopted characteristics from the 
London model (Miller, 1977; Uchida, 2010).  Whereas Peel’s department was 
centralized, based on institutional authority, and insulated from political influence, early 
US departments were just the opposite.  Agencies were decentralized at the 
local/municipal level, highly influenced by political leaders in wards/precincts, and their 
	 17 
officers exercised individual authority.  In addition, American police officers were less 
limited by legal restraints and were given a higher degree of discretion compared to their 
British counterparts.  In a number of notable aspects, the style of policing that emerged in 
America was quite different from Peel’s initial vision –underscoring the fact that policing 
systems vary quite a bit from place to place.  Many of these differences would come to 
create substantial problems during the first fifty years of formal policing in the US. 
 Modern day (i.e., 1840s and beyond) police in the US have significantly evolved 
over time.  Kelling and Moore (1988) have highlighted three distinctive eras in American 
policing: 1) the “political era”, 2) the “reform era”, and 3) the “community era” (see also 
Walker, 1998).  In addition, they provide a framework for studying policing across these 
different eras.  Kelling and Moore specified seven dimensions of their framework, which 
include legitimacy/authority, function, organizational design, relationships to citizens, 
demand put on the police, tactics, and outcomes.  It is within these seven dimensions that 
the distinguishable characteristics between each of the eras are made clear.  The dominant 
view of the police role also differed according to its respective era in time.  Throughout 
the following sub-sections, an effort is made to relate the concepts of culture, ecology, 
and use of force to each of the historical periods. 
Policing in the “Political Era” 
 The “Political Era” ranged from the 1840s to the early portion of the 20th century.  
As the name of the era accurately indicates, officers derived their legitimacy and 
authority from local politicians.  Patrolmen were essentially selected for employment in 
exchange for their political services; officers’ allegiances stood to the boss/captain that 
chose them for the job.  As such, police departments and their officers tended to engage 
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in large-scale corruption.  Due to the turbulent nature of the political system with 
elections occurring every few years, officers had abysmal job security.  For example, in 
the early 1880s Cincinnati lost nearly its entire patrol force as a result of new politicians 
coming into office (Uchida, 2010).  Personnel standards were non-existent and officers 
received little training or instruction.  They were simply handed badges and told to hit the 
streets where they frequently used force against citizens (i.e., “street justice”) –largely 
attributed to the fact that there were no systems of accountability to keep officers in 
check.  Tactics involved foot patrol with limited supervision from department leaders.  
Officers enjoyed tremendous discretion because no technology existed that allowed 
supervisors to come in contact with the patrol officers under their command.   
 The role of the police during the political era was broad.  Being that they 
exclusively walked their respective beats, patrol officers in the political era fostered close 
and personal relationships with citizens.  They were well integrated into communities and 
performed a wide array of functions, from crime-prevention to order maintenance to 
providing social services.  In regard to the latter, Monkkonnen (1981) explains how 
officers assisted the poor, took in overnight lodgers, and returned lost children to their 
parents or local orphanages.  Officers handled problems in an informal manner, as arrest 
was not usually their primary method of solving problems. 
 The social context during this era may have affected police culture, ecological 
influence on the police, and use of force.  It is possible that both the broad function of the 
police role and the intimate contact with citizens could have prevented officers from 
developing “traditional” occupational outlooks.  Given that much of their work revolved 
around maintaining order and assisting the public, it is unlikely that most officers would 
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have become preoccupied with crime-fighting duties.  Constant, close-quarters 
interaction with residents might have served to allow officers to view the public in a more 
positive light.  Ecology probably had more of an impact on the police since service 
delivery was decentralized with a geographic focus on neighborhoods and precincts.  
However, the social climate was probably detrimental to police use of force.  Lack of 
supervision and accountability, coupled with few standards for hiring and training, 
allowed officers to operate with near impunity.   
Policing in the “Reform Era” 
 Many of the problems of modern police forces in the US during these first few 
decades can be attributed to a general lack of professionalism (e.g., no hiring standards or 
training, political influence).  As such, both external and internal groups/movements 
attempted to correct the issues that plagued the political era.  The “Reform Era” has been 
viewed as two separate efforts.  The first effort took place between 1890 and 1920 and 
was headed by outsider progressives (i.e., upper class social elites) – a group not focused 
solely on the police but dedicated to much broader societal transformations (e.g., 
Prohibition, women’s suffrage rights).  These progressives sought to root out large-scale 
corruption, which stemmed from the political patronage system previously discussed, by 
centralizing departments in an attempt to remove political influence (Fogelson, 1977).  
The progressives’ efforts, however, were futile as political machines proved too strong.  
A second reform effort took place between 1910-1960, spurred by the leadership of a 
small number of chiefs of police like August Vollmer, O.W. Wilson, and Richard 
Sylvester (Walker, 1977).  Because this reform came from within the field and was led by 
actual police practitioners, the reform efforts achieved a higher degree of success. 
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 The reform era focused on police professionalism, largely through organizational 
and personnel changes.  Organizational changes led to higher levels of bureaucratization 
with clearer hierarchical divisions, and departments became more centralized under the 
control of police executives.  Departments created a number of specialty units to deal 
with specific types of crime (e.g., robbery, gangs, juveniles, vice).  This transformation 
reflected broader trends of the time (e.g., 1910-1960) that swept the Western world, 
influenced by Max Weber’s (1946) classical school of organizational theory and 
Frederick Taylor’s (1916) principles of scientific management.  Hiring standards (e.g., 
educational requirements and background investigations) were created and departments 
attempted to increase the accountability of their officers.   
 One of the most pronounced changes was the shift in the official function of 
police.  The police role was narrowed as departments attempted to focus almost 
exclusively on crime fighting/crime control responsibilities –marginalizing all other work 
that was not crime control related.  Police executives became predominately concerned 
with outcomes or activity –like arrests, tickets/citations, and response times to calls for 
service– and imparted the importance of these measures onto supervisors and front-line 
staff.  Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) have termed this the “numbers game.”  New 
technologies, such as the automobile, telephone, and two-way radio, contributed to 
profound changes in police tactics.  Police officers, as a result, drove around in their 
patrol cars and waited to be dispatched for calls.  This led to officers becoming more 
detached from the communities that they served.  Policing during this era became 
reactive in nature, and officers utilized a “triage” approach of simply responding to calls 
as quickly as possible in order to get back on patrol in preparation for the next call.   
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 Police culture, neighborhood ecology, and use of force may have been altered 
based on social context during this era.  For one, the narrowing of the police role and the 
focus on the “numbers game” might have caused officers to view themselves more like 
crime fighters –patrolling aggressively while engaging in the selective enforcement of 
only serious offenses.  It is certainly reasonable to assume that officers began to perceive 
citizens in a more negative light, especially since the automobile created more social 
distance between them and the public.  The importance of neighborhood ecology on the 
police may have waned due to departments becoming more centralized with decisions 
coming from headquarters instead of a precinct-by-precinct basis.   
 Speculating on what impact the reform era might have had on police use of force 
is more difficult.  On the one hand, it is possible that the professionalism movement 
resulted in a higher caliber of officers in terms of integrity and the ability to manage the 
corrupting nature of authority (Muir, 1977).  However, conclusions from the Wickersham 
Commission highlight the widespread, systemic abuses by police, particularly regarding 
the use of violence to coerce suspect confessions (i.e., the “3rd degree”) (Walker, 1998).  
These findings suggest that problems of police use of force were clearly not solved 
during this era.  Additionally, the near exclusive focus on crime control as the primary 
responsibility of the job might have caused officers to adopt a “siege mentality” 
(Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993), making the use of coercive force more acceptable among 
officers.   
The 1960s and its Impact on American Policing 
 American policing encountered a serious crisis in the 1960s when the institution 
became the focus of intense scrutiny and discourse.  Overall crime rates and violent 
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crime, in particular, increased at the same time that public expectations and demand for 
police services also rose –the latter largely a result of the emergence of the telephone and 
the automobile.  During the heart of the Civil Rights movement, many protests/ 
demonstrations led to direct confrontations between the public and the police.  Black 
Americans’ frustrations with discrimination by the police, and the larger society in 
general, erupted into violence and riots in almost every major city between 1964 and 
1968 –most of which were initiated by routine police-citizen encounters.  Some of the 
most costly and deadly riots occurred in Harlem, Watts, Detroit, and Newark, New 
Jersey.  The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) (better known as 
the Kerner Commission), appointed by then-President Lyndon Johnson, cited police 
action and the unequal treatment of minorities by the law as salient contributing factors to 
the unrest.  More specifically, the Kerner Commission characterized police conduct at the 
time to include brutality, harassment, and abuses of power.  Inadequate training and 
supervision of officers, poor police-community relationships in minority neighborhoods, 
and the lack of black representation in police departments were also mentioned as 
problems within law enforcement by the Commission.  Clearly, the reform era and its 
push toward professionalism were not entirely successful. 
 The aforementioned dilemma of the 1960s led police, politicians, and scholars to 
reassess the state of law enforcement in the United States.  Also occurring around the 
same time period was the “discovery” of discretion in the criminal justice system through 
a research project conducted by the American Bar Foundation (Walker, 1992; 1993).  
This research project was the first systematic field observation to shadow criminal justice 
actors at work.  Like the urban riots and Kerner Commission’s report, the study’s 
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findings placed American police at the center of national attention (Walker, 1998).  These 
developments, taken together, spurred a massive reexamination of the criminal justice 
system.  President Lyndon Johnson created the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1965, while Congress created the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) a year later.  The LEAA provided 
considerable funding to police departments, some of which were allocated for research 
and evaluation purposes (Walker, 1993).  This marked a new beginning into the journey 
to discover whether criminal justice practices and polices were achieving their desired 
goals. 
 Two empirical examinations of police practices would prove to be instrumental in 
challenging the conventional wisdom of the time as well as changing the future of 
American policing.  Police during the reform era utilized strategies/tactics from the 
traditional “professional” model, which focused primarily on random preventative patrol 
and rapid response to calls for service.  In 1974, Kelling and colleagues conducted their 
famous Kansas City preventative patrol experiment which randomly assigned patrol beats 
one of three experimental conditions: 1) “business as usual” random preventative patrol 
(the control condition), 2) saturated preventative patrol (two to three times more police 
presence), and 3) no patrol or police presence.  Kelling and colleagues found that crime 
was unaffected by patrol levels; saturated preventative patrol did not reduce crime while 
the absence of preventive patrol did not result in an increase in crime.  They also found 
that most crimes were not susceptible to a quick response time.  In addition, Pate’s (1981) 
Newark foot patrol experiment, using similar experimental methods, uncovered that 
crime levels were unaffected by foot patrol, although increases in police visibility was  
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shown to reduce citizens’ fear of crime and increase their satisfaction with police.   
 Results from both of these rigorous research projects, essentially exposing the 
ineffectiveness of the current policing practices, helped lead to the demise of the Reform 
era.  Kelling et al. (1974) discovered that the dominant method of policing over the last 
several decades, random preventative patrol, did not reduce crime or fear of crime and 
often went unnoticed by citizens.  The research provided tangible evidence that the 
traditional model was ineffective and in serious trouble.  By challenging these underlying 
assumptions of the professional model, the findings contributed to the formulation of new 
ways of thinking about police with an emphasis on a community policing approach 
(Kelling & Moore, 1988; Uchida, 2010).     
Policing in the “Community Era”  
 The “Community-Oriented Era” of policing was ushered in during the 1970s with 
the transition to a number of innovative philosophies and tactics.  Goldstein’s (1979) 
“problem-oriented policing” and Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) “broken windows 
policing” called for officers to proactively intervene in communities, as opposed to 
simply react, in order to improve residents’ quality of life.  Goldstein’s new philosophy, 
in particular, challenged the reform era’s “means over ends” syndrome, which placed 
more of an emphasis on organizational characteristics and operating methods (e.g., rapid 
response to calls for service) than on the substantive outcomes of what officers were 
actually doing once they arrived on the scene of said calls.  Goldstein likened this to bus 
drivers so focused on keeping up with their timetables that they neglect to stop for 
passengers for fear of falling behind schedule.  Although there are a number of 
explanations for what this new era entailed (Maguire, Kuhns, Uchida, & Cox, 2007), 
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most policing scholars have reached a consensus that community policing represented a 
shift from the traditional view of the police role from one of crime control to one of 
community problem-solving and empowerment (Goldstein, 1990). 
 Departments returned to many of the philosophical, tactical, and organizational 
tenets that they had retreated from during the reform era.  In terms of philosophy, it was 
believed that officers should view and include citizens as “co-producers” of public safety; 
the community has a role to play in helping to identify specific problems as well as 
determining what the police should be focusing their resources toward.  This was a 
complete about-face from the professional model where police viewed themselves as the 
sole authority on crime, which is perhaps illustrated by the Dragnet character Joe Friday’s 
famous statement, “Just the facts ma’am.”  Tactics and strategies tended to vary based on 
the style of community policing being implemented.  For example, agencies that targeted 
low-level disorder and “quality of life” offenses (e.g., loitering, panhandling) were 
significantly different from those agencies that focused on creating positive partnerships 
with community organizations and problem solving.  Some of the more common 
practices included increased use of foot patrol and police visibility and officers attending 
town/community meetings.  Organizationally, community policing flattened out the 
hierarchical structure while decentralizing departments.  This tended to place more 
decision-making authority into the hands of precinct and beat commanders. 
 Again, it is difficult to assess the type of influence the community era may have 
had on police culture, ecology, and use of force.  This is partly due to the differences in 
strategies and tactics that departments employed during this era.  There might have been 
a positive impact on police culture and officers’ perceptions of the public if departments 
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emphasized problem solving (Goldstein, 1979) and community empowerment while 
being dedicated to mending its relationship with the public.  But departments that utilized 
aggressive tactics (e.g., more visible police presence, the targeting of low level crime and 
disorder) more in line with broken windows/order maintenance policing (Wilson & 
Kelling, 1982), however, may have had a negative effect on police culture and officers’ 
perceptions of citizens.  These disparities across strategies and tactics might have had 
similar influences on police use of force.  This era also witnessed the emergence and 
accumulation of a wealth of research on police use of force, particularly how strict 
administrative policies control deadly force (Fyfe, 1979), which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section.  In terms of ecology, there is also sufficient reason to believe 
that neighborhood characteristics became much more salient during this era as 
departments returned to a decentralized method of service delivery with a focus on 
specific precincts and beats. 
A New Era of Policing?  
 Given that Kelling and Moore’s classification system was published in 1988 and 
scholars have not categorized the state of policing since then (see White & Fradella, 2016 
for an exception), it remains unclear whether American police have entered into a new 
era over the last two decades.  An argument came be made that policing has changed in 
the wake of emerging technologies as well as the ever-present threat of terrorism.  
Looking back to Kelling and Moore’s (1988) framework, there are a number of 
innovations, in terms of both strategy and philosophy, which have the potential to 
transform departments.  Ratcliffe (2008) has coined the term “intelligence-led policing” 
but other names synonymous with this concept include “data-driven policing” or 
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“evidence-based policing”; these terms refer to the focus on data and evidence to guide 
police decision-making for day-to-day operations and interventions.  Police departments, 
in increasing numbers, now use sophisticated computer systems and information 
technology to assist in the recognition of specific problems/issues facing their 
communities as well as the appropriate responses, while also utilizing these resources to 
aid in the management and accountability of their officers.  Some of these 
technologies/software systems include COMPSTAT (Walsh, 2001), geographic 
information systems/mapping programs (Pelfrey, 2010), and early intervention/warning 
systems (Walker, 2003).  There are now a number of organizations (e.g., Smart Policing 
Initiative, Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, and Campbell Collaboration) and 
outlets (e.g., Crimesolutions.gov) dedicated to the evaluation and synthesis of 
programs/policies that “work” and are effective.   
 In addition, departments have recently placed a significant focus on perceived 
legitimacy and how citizens view the police, moving beyond the simple effort towards 
improved “police-community relations.”  Tyler’s (1990) normative framework, whereby 
people obey the law because they believe it is right and just in contrast to instrumental 
perspectives (e.g., deterrence), has provided the foundation for police to increase 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy is conceptualized as “the perceived obligation to comply with the 
directives of an authority, irrespective of the personal gains or losses associated with 
doing so” (Tyler, 1990, p. 27).  According to the procedural justice framework, 
attributions of legitimacy result from the way police perform their job, such as treating 
people fairly, allowing citizens to voice their opinions, and showing respect (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  The link between procedurally-just encounters and 
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citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy has been well established in the literature 
(Engel, 2005; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Tyler, 2003; 2004).  As such, one of the six 
recommendations (i.e., “Pillar One”) made by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing is “Building Trust and Legitimacy.”  The Task Force elaborates on Pillar One:  
 “Law enforcement culture should embrace a guardian— rather than a warrior—
 mindset to build trust and legitimacy both within agencies and with the public. 
 Toward that end, law enforcement agencies should adopt procedural justice as the 
 guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their 
 interactions with rank and file officers and with the citizens they serve.” (Ramsey 
 & Robinson, 2015, pg. 1) 
Conclusion 
 As discussed throughout this section, policing has been shown to vary across time 
and space.  The creation and subsequent evolution of the police has reacted to changes in 
the larger social structure.  These transformations were particularly evident in the early to 
mid 19th century when communities in both the United States and England transitioned 
from small rural villages to large urbanized and industrial cities.  Although departments 
in America initially modeled themselves after Peel’s London Metropolitan Police 
Department, policing in the United States emerged to become drastically different when 
the two countries are compared across Kelling and Moore’s (1988) framework.  Features 
of the police role, tactics used, sources of legitimacy/authority, and organizational 
designs –while just considering agencies in America– have all undergone substantial 
changes over the years.  Among the many factors that have influenced policing are the  
political nature and climate of the time, technological innovations, and the engagement of  
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the research community and the use of empirical evaluation.   
Police Use of Force 
Since the requirement of quick and what is often euphemistically called aggressive action 
is difficult to reconcile with error-free performance, police work is, by its very nature, 
doomed to be often unjust and offensive to someone. –Bittner (1970) 
The capacity to use non-negotiable coercive force is one of the defining features 
of the police role (Bittner, 1970; Klockars, 1985).  Police represent the government’s 
right to use coercion and force in order to guarantee certain behaviors from citizens, and 
officers enjoy this right almost exclusively.  However, the delegation of the right to use 
force is acceptable only when police use force in an appropriately lawful and legitimate 
fashion.  In line with this distinct feature of the police role is the utilitarian concept of the 
social contract.  The public surrenders its right to use force and loans that right to the 
police to use it in the name of the group and to protect each member of the group against 
the use of force by other members (Reiman, 1985).  Klockars’ (1984) described four 
elements of police control: authority, power, persuasion, and force; however, the first 
three elements function, in part, due to the underlying threat of force.   
Overall/General Statistics 
Although police use of force is a statistically rare event occurring in about 1.4 
percent of all police-citizen encounters (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011), the large 
volume of these encounters in a given year (approximately 40 million) translates into an 
estimated 560,000 use of force incidents per year –or more than 1,500 each day.  Use of 
force by officers is much more common while making arrests, and research has found 
that about one in every five arrests involves some level of force exerted by police 
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(Hickman, Piquero, & Garner, 2008).  Moreover, research indicates that the vast majority 
of incidents involve lesser forms of force, such as grabs or control holds, with the use of 
weapons use being much less common and deadly force even rarer (Alpert et al., 2011; 
Hickman et al., 2008).  Statistics on raw numbers or rates of police use of force also 
differ based on the methods used to measure the phenomenon (e.g., systematic social 
observation versus official police records versus citizen complaints of police use of 
force).  
Defining and Measuring Police Use of Force 
Unlike deadly/lethal force, a number of definitional and methodological issues 
obscure what is known about less-lethal police use of force.  Variation in how the act is 
defined (i.e., whether “coercion” like verbal threats should be included as “force”; Terrill, 
2014), measured, and the how the data are collected create disparities in even basic 
frequencies with which police use of force occurs (Terrill, 2003).  Scholars have recently 
acknowledged and reached a consensus that simple dichotomous measures differentiating 
between “force” and “no force” inadequately capture the complexity of behavior in 
police-citizen interactions (Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995).  Because some 
official department policies and training manuals refer to a “continuum of force” (see 
Desmedt, 1984 for a example of the International Association of Chiefs of Police’s 
escalating-force scale), researchers commonly use ordinal-level indicators in their 
conceptualization and operationalization of police use of force.  However, this is the 
extent to which agreement and uniformity exists.  Studies include different 
levels/gradients of officer actions with increasing levels of seriousness or severity.  For 
example, Terrill and Reisig (2003) constructed a 4-point scale (“no force”, “verbal 
	 31 
force”, “restraint techniques”, and “impact weapons”) while Lawton (2007) used a much 
different 4-point scale (“control holds”, “strikes/punches”, “mace/electronic Taser”, and 
“baton”).  Some measures even take citizens’ behavior and resistance into account 
(Alpert & Dunham, 1997). 
There are also inconsistencies regarding whether “handcuffing” should be 
included in use of force measures (Klahm, Frank, & Liederbach, 2014).  Both Terrill and 
colleagues (2003) and Terrill and Reisig (2003) employed the following scale to measure 
police use of force: 1 = “no force”, 2 = “verbal force”, 3 = “restraint techniques” (which 
includes handcuffing), and 4 = “impact weapons.”  The inclusion of “handcuffing” in the 
restraint techniques category would mean that officers use force every time that they 
arrest a suspect.  As previously mentioned, this contradicts research from Hickman et al. 
(2008).  Employing comparable use of force measures from two nationally representative 
data sources among members of the general (Police-Public Contact Survey) and jail 
populations (Survey of Inmates in Local Jails), Hickman and colleagues estimate that 
police use or threaten to use force in only 20% of all arrests.  Scholars still appear to be in 
disagreement about the placement of “handcuffing” in use of force scales/categories.  
More attention will be dedicated to this controversial issue as well as the overall 
conceptualization and operationalization of police use of force in both the methods and 
discussion sections. 
Implications 
Officers’ use of force is, arguably, one of the most controversial aspects of police 
work.  Use of force incidents that are perceived by citizens to be excessive or unjustified 
can erode police legitimacy, which can undermine the police’s ability to fight crime and 
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provide public safety functions (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  Given these 
consequences, researchers have devoted significant scholarly attention to the 
identification of correlates of police use of force over the last forty years.  A sizeable 
body of literature has developed with regard to the individual, situational, organizational, 
and, to a lesser extent, neighborhood-level factors that increase the risk of police coercion 
(Adams, 2010; Brooks, 2010).  In fact, there have been four narrative reviews (Klahm & 
Tillyer, 2010; National Research Council, 2004; Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Sherman, 
1980) and a recent meta-analysis (Bolger, 2015) dedicated to police use of force.  The 
following sub-sections will detail the extant research on these individual-, situational-, 
and organization-level correlates; however, the empirical status of neighborhood-level 
factors will be described in the “Neighborhood and Ecological Influences on Police” 
section later on in the chapter.  The discussion that follows will tend to focus 
predominately on non-lethal police force, as this type of force occurs much more 
frequently than lethal/deadly force.   
Individual-level Correlates  
 Individual-level correlates have been the focus of the majority of research on 
police use of force, especially during the early years when studies focused on more 
micro-level units of analysis.  Many of these early studies fail to control for 
neighborhood characteristics and other factors of the larger social context.  Individual-
level correlates can be broken down into personal characteristics of officers and suspects.  
Both have received a considerable degree of empirical inquiry.  In regard to the former, 
an officer’s level of education is most often investigated as a correlate of decisions to use 
force.  Officers with higher levels of education are less likely to use force (Paoline &  
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Terrill, 2004; 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002); however, it is  
important to note that all four of these studies used the same data source: the Project on 
Policing Neighborhood (POPN).   
 Research is less conclusive regarding other officer demographic characteristics.  
Empirical tests of officers’ experience levels are mixed (Klahm & Tillyer, 2015): some 
studies suggest that more experienced officers use less force (Kaminski, DiGiovanni, & 
Downs, 2004; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010), while others show no 
relationship between the two (Lawton, 2007; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey, 
Terrill, & Paoline, 2005; Terrill et al., 2008).  A similar pattern of inconsistent findings 
has emerged for the role of officer gender.  Research has shown that male officers use 
force more frequently (Johnson, 2011; Kop & Euwema, 2001; Morabito & Doerner, 
1997) as well as more severe levels of force (Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002; Terrill, 
Leinfelt, & Kwak, 2008).  On the other hand, some studies have found no relationship 
between officer sex and use of force (Lawton, 2007; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005).  
However, the likelihood of use of force might be contingent on the level of force severity 
and the sex of the suspect.  Paoline and Terrill (2004) found that male officers used more 
and higher levels of force against male suspects, but female officers’ decisions to use 
force did not seem to be influenced by the sex of the suspect. 
 Most studies have found that an officer’s race/ethnicity has no influence on use of 
force (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Friedrich, 1980; Geller & Karales, 1981; Lawton, 2007; 
McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; 
Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Paoline & Terrill, 2004; 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).  
Sun and Payne (2004), however, uncovered that black officers were more likely to use 
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more coercion while resolving conflicts with citizens relative to white officers.  The 
racial difference became insignificant once neighborhood characteristics were included as 
controls.  Relevant to this finding, Fyfe (1980) discussed the importance of considering 
an officer’s broader social context when examining individual officer characteristics.  
After discovering evidence that black officers had higher shooting rates than white 
officers in the NYPD, Fyfe found that these differences were largely attributable to patrol 
areas: black officers were more likely to work in higher crime areas throughout New 
York City.  Some policing scholars have also advocated for the study of officer and 
suspect race/ethnicity interactions (i.e., taking both officer and citizen race/ethnicity into 
consideration) (Brown & Frank, 2006; Close & Mason, 2006; Rojek, Rosenfeld, & 
Decker, 2012), although these studies did not examine use of force as an outcome.  Such 
developments make it more difficult to determine and isolate the impact of officer 
race/ethnicity on use of force.  
 A few suspect characteristics have consistently been associated with use of force.  
For example, suspects run a greater risk of having force used against them when they 
have lower socioeconomic status (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007) 
and when they appear under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol (Engel, Sobol, & 
Worden, 2000; Terrill et al., 2008).  In terms of impairment, early studies did not 
differentiate between drugs or alcohol and instead tended to combine the two factors 
together.  Once the type of impairment was further specified, research has found that 
suspects under the influence of alcohol were more likely to have force used against them; 
drug impairment has not been found to be associated with increased levels of force 
(Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980; Garner et al., 1995).   
	 35 
 There is less certainty regarding whether a suspect’s sex contributes to the 
likelihood of police use of force.  Many studies have found that males are more likely 
than females to have forced used against them (Garner et al., 2002; McCluskey et al., 
2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003).  Yet, there are other studies 
that suggest the relationship between suspect sex and use of force is not as consistent as 
previously believed –finding no significant association between the two (Engel et al., 
2000; Lawton, 2007; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Mulvey & White, 2014; Schuck, 2004).  
Still, research points to the complexity of the issue: the need to examine whether a 
suspect’s sex influences certain forms of use of force severity.  Kaminski and colleagues 
(2004) found no differences between the likelihood of lower levels of police force; 
however, male suspects were more likely than females to be the recipients of higher  
levels of use of force.  
 The empirical literature on suspect race/ethnicity is contentious.  Focusing on the 
more sophisticated statistical analyses (i.e., multivariate models compared to early 
research using bivariate correlations), some studies have found that the police are more 
likely to use deadly (Fyfe, 1982; Geller & Karales, 1981; Meyer, 1980) and less-than-
lethal force (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Smith, 1986; Worden, 1995b;) on minority 
citizens.  Fyfe (1982), for example, found enough evidence to conclude that the Memphis 
Police Department was engaged in the discriminatory practice of using deadly force 
against black citizens.  Still, other tests have produced null findings, as the results 
uncover that officers are no more likely to employ lethal (Alpert, 1989; Blumberg, 1982; 
Fyfe, 1980; 1981; Milton, Halleck, Lardner, & Abrecht 1977) or less-than-lethal force 
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(Engel et al., 2000; Friedrich, 1980; Garner et al., 1992; 2002; Kavanagh, 1994) on 
minorities relative to whites.  Scholars who have aimed to synthesize the existing 
research suggest suspect race/ethnicity effects are “inconclusive” and “highly contingent” 
based on the each study’s research design, the control variables included, etc. (see 
National Research Council, 2004, pg. 125).  Again, drawing conclusions might be more 
difficult when the officer’s race/ethnicity is also taken into consideration. 
 Suspect demeanor is a characteristic that also requires some attention.  The notion 
that police use more coercive force on disrespectful citizens or those who fail to show 
officers deference was first proposed by William Westley (1970) during early social 
observation of police behavior (see also Van Maanen, 1978).  Research for decades 
consistently found that suspect demeanor toward police influenced the likelihood that 
officers would employ both arrests and physical force against them (Black & Reiss, 1970; 
Sykes, Fox, & Clark, 1974; Worden, 1989).  However, more recent analyses have called 
this finding into question.  Examining officers’ decisions to arrest, Klinger (1994; 1996) 
attempted to tease out the impact of demeanor (i.e., “legally permissible behavior”) from 
suspect resistance and actual criminal conduct, which may have been confounding the 
earlier findings.  Klinger discovered that demeanor no longer influenced arrest decisions 
after controlling for law violating resistance/criminal conduct.  More relevant to this 
dissertation, and after taking a similar approach of including relevant control variables, 
Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) found no evidence that a suspect’s antagonistic demeanor 
affected officer coercion (i.e., both verbal and physical force); yet, Garner et al. (2002) 
did find suspect disrespect and failure to show deference increased the likelihood of 
police use of physical force.  This new body of literature suggests that the effect of  
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demeanor on officer behavior is more complex than previously recognized.   
 Only a limited number of studies have examined the relationship between 
suspects with mental illness and use of force.  Most of these preliminary tests have found 
that officers are no more likely to employ force against suspects who exhibit these 
characteristics (Kaminski et al., 2004; Mulvey & White, 2014; Terrill & Mastrofski, 
2002).  Similar to the process described for other individual-level correlates, research is 
beginning to examine whether the impact of mental illness on use of force in contingent 
on the type or level of force severity.  Mulvey and White (2014), for example, discovered 
that officers were more likely to use higher levels of force, such as batons, OC spray, and 
Tasers, on mentally ill suspects compared to those without mental illness.  The small 
amount of studies precludes scholars from reaching any firm conclusions as of yet. 
Situational Correlates 
 Egon Bittner (1970: 46) provided perhaps the most comprehensive description on  
situational correlates when he stated, “the role of the police is best understood as a 
mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force employed in accordance 
with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies” (emphasis added).  Not 
surprisingly, there are a substantial amount of studies that have examined the situational 
correlates (i.e., aspects of the police-citizen encounter) of police use of force decisions.  
This is due, in large part, to a number of research projects that have employed the 
systematic social observation design to study the police (see Worden & McLean, 2014 
for a review).  Again, it is important to reiterate that much of this empirical research 
stems from a small number of data sources, such as the Police Services Study (PSS) and 
the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN) in particular.   
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 A handful of factors have been found to consistently increase the likelihood that 
officers will use force against suspects.  For one, officers are more likely to utilize deadly 
force (Binder & Fridell, 1984; Binder & Scharf; 1982; Fyfe 1980; 1982; White, 2000; 
2001) and nonlethal force (McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Sun & 
Payne, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002) when a suspect is armed or in the possession of 
a weapon.  More specifically, the impact of a suspect possessing a firearm on police use 
of deadly force is particularly strong and robust.  In addition, research has generally 
found that police are more likely to use force on suspects who resist or attempt to resist 
authority (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Garner et al., 1995; Johnson, 2011; McCluskey & 
Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Mulvey & White, 2014; Paoline & Terrill, 2004; 
2007; Schuck, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008).  
Some scholars have even gone so far as to conclude that suspect resistance is one of the 
most influential correlates of police use of force (Garner et al., 1995; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002). 
 A few other consistent situational characteristics have been identified.  Police are 
more likely to use force during the course of a suspect’s arrest (McCluskey & Terrill, 
2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2004; 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; 
Terrill et al., 2003), and Hickman and colleagues (2008) suggest police use some type of 
force during 20% of all arrests.  Moreover, studies have found that use of force is more 
likely to occur when there is a conflict between citizens before police arrive on the scene 
(McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002) as well as when more evidence of a suspect’s criminal involvement is 
present (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey, Terrill, & 
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Paoline, 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010).  Studies have also 
found that pursuits increase the likelihood that force is used (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).  
The extant research has concluded that officers’ use of coercive force is heavily 
influenced by legally relevant factors (National Research Council, 2004). 
 Other features of the interaction have shown to be more inconsistent.  The 
presence of fellow officers on the scene is an encounter-level variable that has received 
an ample amount of attention.  Some studies have found that an officer is less likely to 
use force when there are fellow officers present (Lawton, 2007; Paoline & Terrill, 2004), 
while others show that an officer is more likely to use force in the presence of his/her 
colleagues (Garner et al., 2002; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002); still, 
some research has found no such relationship (Engel, Sobol, & Worden, 2000; Johnson, 
2011; McCluskey et al., 2005; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010).  The manner in which a police 
encounter is initiated (e.g., proactive stops versus being dispatched to a location) has also 
evidenced mixed results.  Some tests have uncovered that the use of force is more likely 
to arise during proactive police encounters (Johnson, 2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; 
Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010); however, other research that has 
further specified this relationship found that proactive encounters only increased the 
likelihood of use of force when a suspect exhibited resistance to officers (Garner et al., 
2002; Paoline & Terrill, 2004; Terrill, 2005; Terrill et al., 2003). 
 A few situational features have been shown to exert little to no influence on police 
use of force decisions.  While Muir (1977), among other scholars, discussed the unique 
dynamics of policing scenarios with onlookers bearing witness, research has not found 
the presence of bystanders to be predictive of use of force (Leinfelt, 2005; Rydberg & 
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Terrill, 2010; Terrill, 2005; Terrill et al., 2008).  Similarly, the location of the encounter 
(i.e., private versus public places) has not been found to influence police use of force 
(Engel et al., 2000; Johnson, 2011).   
Organizational Correlates 
 James Q. Wilson’s (1968) seminal work “Varieties of Police Behavior” largely 
influenced research on organizational correlates.  Speaking to the salience of the role that 
organizational features play in influencing the behavior of officers, Smith (1984: 33) 
stated, “Any theory of legal control that ignores the organizational context in which 
police operate cannot adequately account for police behavior across different 
organizational contexts.”   
 A substantial amount of research has explored the impact of administrative policy 
on police use of deadly force.  James J. Fyfe largely pioneered this body of work through 
his examination of differential departmental lethal force policies, both within the same 
agencies over time and between different agencies, and their subsequent effects on the 
manner in which officers used their firearms.  Fyfe (1979) analyzed officer-involved 
shootings within the New York Police Department prior to and following the 
implementation of more restrictive administrative shooting guidelines and novel shooting 
incident review procedures.  He found that the department’s direct intervention on the 
firearm discretion of its officers resulted in a significant reduction in the number of police 
shootings of citizens, and, more specifically, that the largest reduction took place among 
the most controversial shooting incidents where officers discharged their weapons in 
order to prevent the escape of “fleeing felons.”  Similar longitudinal observations of 
decreases in the number of officer-involved shootings due to changes in more restrictive 
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administrative policies have been found in the Los Angeles Police Department (Meyer, 
1980) and the Philadelphia Police Department (White, 2000).  Alternatively, White 
(2001) found that the Philadelphia Police Department’s use of deadly force subsequently 
increased during a period of administrative permissiveness in which the more restrictive 
shooting guidelines were removed. 
 In addition, Fyfe (1982) took a cross-departmental approach to investigate how 
variations in deadly force policies among the New York Police Department and the 
Memphis Police Department influenced officer-involved shootings.  He discovered 
sizeable disparities between the two agencies: the Memphis Police Department, which 
had a less restrictive policy, engaged in more “elective” shootings (i.e., those in which the 
officer involved may elect to shoot or not to shoot at little or no risk to himself or others), 
while the New York Police Department, which as previously discussed had a more 
restrictive policy, participated in more “nonelective” defense of life shootings (i.e., those 
in which the officer has little real choice but to shoot or to risk death or serious injury to 
himself or others).  Differences in these administrative policies also manifested into the 
disproportionate use of deadly force against African-Americans.  Racial disparities were 
greatest for elective shootings in Memphis: blacks who were unarmed and non-assaultive 
were killed at a rate 18 times greater than that of their white counterparts.  These findings 
display that stricter administrative policies regarding lethal force –when enforced– have 
1) reduced the likelihood that officers will use their firearms and, when they do, will tend 
to do so in “defense of life” situations (Geller & Scott, 1992; Walker, 1993) and 2) 
reduced racial disparities, especially in regard to elective shootings where officers have 
the most discretion.  Walker (1993) concluded: 
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 “…administrative rules have successfully limited police shooting discretion, with 
 positive results in terms of social policy. Fewer people are being shot and killed, 
 racial disparities in shootings have been reduced, and police officers are in no 
 greater danger because of these restrictions.” (32) 
 A smaller number of studies have examined the impact of administrative policy 
on less than lethal force.  Most of these examinations, however, focus on specific types of 
less lethal force, such as Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray and the use of TASERS (i.e., 
conducted energy devices or CEDs).  When both forms of force are regulated by more 
restrictive administrative policies, officers are found to rely on these weapons much less 
frequently (Ferdik, Kaminski, Cooney, & Sevigny, 2014; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; 
Thomas, Collins, & Lovrich, 2010).  Additionally, results show that there are fewer CED 
deployments when these weapons are placed higher on a department’s use of force 
continuum (i.e., more restrictive; Ferdik et al., 2014; Terrill & Paoline, in press; Thomas 
et al., 2010).  Terrill and Paoline (in press) performed the only inquiry into the impact of 
administrative policy on the full spectrum of less than lethal force tactics to date.  They 
found that officers working in departments with more restrictive policies employ force 
less readily compared to officers working in agencies with more permissive or lenient 
policies.  Despite being limited in number, the findings for less than lethal force mirror 
the aforementioned studies that have tested the influence of administrative policy on 
police use of deadly force.   
 Researchers have devoted considerably less attention to other organizational-level  
characteristics, such as those associated with departmental professionalism.  Although the 
concept of professionalism has been characterized in a number of different ways, there is 
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a general consensus that the “professional” police department is one that emphasizes 
education, rigorous recruitment and selection of officers, and training (Smith, 2004; 
White & Escobar, 2008; Willits & Nowacki, 2014; Wilson, 1968).  Using agencies as the 
unit of analysis, the limited number of studies that have been conducted have produced 
mixed and counterintuitive results.  Minimum college education requirements have not 
been shown to reduce departmental rates of use of deadly force (Smith, 2004; Willits & 
Nowacki, 2014), although Shjarback and White (2016) found that agencies that required 
officers to possess at least an Associate’s degree had lower rates of formal citizen 
complaints of use of force.  Surprisingly, Smith (2004) and Lee et al. (2010) found that 
the number of departmental training hours had a positive association with the prevalence 
of lethal and non-lethal use of force incidents, respectively.   
Limitations of Prior Research on Police Use of Force 
 As previously discussed, there are number of limitations with research on police 
use of force.  These limitations stem, partly, from the lack of adequate data (Klinger, 
2008) and minimal theoretical development (Terrill, 2014).  However, another substantial 
shortcoming involves a limited understanding of the interplay between different types of 
use of force research (e.g., individual, situational, organizational, and ecological).  While 
each of these contexts has been shown to be important in their own right, it seems 
nonsensical to study them in isolation from the others.  Future research on police use of 
force must include multiple contexts and levels of analysis, and James F. Short Jr.’s 
theoretical framework could be used to address this concern. 
 In his 1997 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, Short 
revisited the field’s “level of explanation problem.”  Referring to what he perceived at the 
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time as a general lack of consideration given to multiple levels of analysis/observation, 
Short (1998:28) outlined a framework to better address “theoretically informed questions 
that are contextualized in terms of time and social location.”  In line with the traditional 
Chicago school of thought, Short highlighted that researchers must be sensitive to 
context, and that multiple levels of explanation are necessary in order to truly understand 
any type of human behavior (Abbott, 1997).  Short elaborated on the microsocial context 
(i.e., situational or interactional) and how this third dimension could aide scholars in their 
attempt to bridge the gap between 1) the macrosocial and 2) the individual levels of 
analysis; policing scholars have already written and studied this microsocial context 
regarding the transactional approach of use of force at length (Binder and Scharf, 1980; 
Fridell & Binder, 1992; Terrill, 2005; Toch, 1969).  Each of these three contexts 
influence and, in turn, are influenced by the other two; the interactions unfold and give 
way to social process.  For example, situational or interactional elements (i.e., the 
microsocial level of observation) are nested within social and cultural contexts, and they 
are comprised of individuals who make decisions and shape those encounters.  In relation 
to policing research, scholars must consider how neighborhood contexts might influence 
officer perceptions and outlooks (i.e., culture) at both the individual and collective group 
level.  Officers do not enter into interactions as blank slates but instead bring with them 
preexisting beliefs, values, and expectations. 
Conclusion 
 Though police use of force is necessary to ensure officer and citizen safety and to 
foster compliance with the law, use of force incidents –whether justified or not– are sure 
to elicit strong public sentiment.  Use of force situations, particularly when excessive or 
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unnecessary levels of violence are employed (real or perceived), can have far-reaching 
consequences on citizens’ views of police legitimacy.  Due to the controversial nature of 
the topic, police use of force has been studied extensively over the last four decades.  
While the field has learned a great deal about police use of force through the lenses of 
individual-level characteristics of both officers as well as suspects, situations/encounters, 
organizations, and, to a lesser extent, neighborhoods, policing scholars have largely taken 
a siloed approach –studying each research context in isolation from the others.  The 
following two sections of this chapter make a case to integrate two bodies of literature, 
police culture and neighborhood/ecological influence, to assist in arriving at a more 
complete, “big picture” view of use of force.  
Police Culture 
Culture can be understood as a set of solutions devised by a group of people to  
meet specific problems posed by situations they face in common.  –Van Maanen & Barley 
(1985) 
The idea of a “police culture” or an “occupational subculture” has attracted the 
attention of a number of academics over the years.  As previously discussed, scholars 
began dedicating much more attention to the police in the 1960s.  One of the first 
substantive areas of inquiry during the early years of policing research centered around 
culture.  Scholars debated whether the profession attracted individuals with a certain set 
of personality characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism, cynicism, conservatism; Rokeach, 
Miller, & Synder, 1971) or if officers were socialized into adhering to common outlooks 
and belief systems through the demands and shared experiences of the occupation 
(Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1969; Niederhoffer, 1967) (see Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998 
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for a review of the psychological-sociological debate).  Some of the most influential 
works that emerged during this time period (Wright & Miller, 1998), such as Jerome 
Skolnick’s (1966) “Justice Without Trial” and James Q. Wilson’s (1968) “Varieties of 
Police Behavior”, focused on police culture.  Despite the high degree of scholarly 
attention that the topic has received, police culture remains a concept that is abstract and 
varied.   
Police culture has been described in a number of different ways throughout the 
years.  Scholars have identified a large degree of vagueness and confusion with the idea 
of police culture.  In his synthesis of the literature, Paoline (2003) discusses four distinct 
conceptualizations of police culture: occupational, organizational, rank, and style –each 
of which uses different units of analysis.  The occupational perspective draws attention to 
the police profession as a whole, whereas the styles perspective is much narrower with an 
emphasis on individual officers.  Often, these disparate conceptualizations contradict the 
key assumptions of the others.  Aside from quantitative examination of police styles, 
most of the work on the other three conceptualizations has been theoretical or qualitative 
in nature. 
Occupational Culture 
The majority of writing, historically, has focused on the broadest application of 
the concept: police occupational culture.  Proponents of this perspective assume officer 
homogeneity and a monolithic police culture based on a professional worldview that 
officers develop in response to common strains experienced on the job as well as from 
the shared methods of coping with those strains.  In addition, it is assumed that the police 
occupation shapes officer culture through the transmission of attitudes, values, and norms 
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to new recruits during their time on patrol (Kappeler et al., 1998; Van Maanen, 1974).  
Skolnick’s (1966) and Westley’s (1970) seminal ethnographic studies serve as the 
foundation for the police occupational culture perspective.  Skolnick (1966), for example, 
proposed a police working personality characterized by three distinct features of the job: 
danger, authority over citizens, and efficiency in the eyes of supervisors; the first two of 
which occur in the external environment (i.e., interactions on the streets with citizens) 
with the last feature taking place in the internal environment (i.e., exchanges with 
supervisory personnel) (Paoline, 2003; Paoline & Terrill, 2014).  Westley (1970), on the 
other hand, observed a high degree of police-citizen violence and hostility –attributing 
the animosity between the two groups to the routine use of aggressive police tactics such 
as the “third degree.”  Furthermore, Westley proposed an informal socialization process 
whereby young officers learned such techniques from senior officers.  This tension and 
animosity negatively impacts police-community relationships, serving to strengthen the 
bond between officers while concurrently alienating them from outsiders.  Kappeler and 
colleagues (1998), for example, discuss the “police worldview” at length.  Other scholars 
have written on topics similar to that of Skolnick and Westley, such as “danger” (Herbert, 
1998; Toch, 1973; Van Maanen, 1978), “coercive power” (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; 
1970; Muir, 1977), “social isolation” (Niederhoffer, 1967; Rubinstein, 1973), “loyalty” 
(Brown, 1981; Reuss-Ianni, 1983), “covering your ass” (McNamara, 1967; Van Maanen, 
1974), and the crime fighter role orientation (Bittner, 1974; Klockars, 1985; Rumbaut & 
Bittner, 1979).  Although all of these elements fall under the umbrella of police culture, 
they appear in the literature in a piecemeal fashion (Crank, 2004).  The problem, up until 
the early 2000s, was that there was no coherent theoretical model for describing how  
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each of the aforementioned elements of culture were related. 
Paoline’s (2003) monolithic police culture model put it all together in a causal, 
path-like manner.  Patrol officers’ interactions with both citizens (i.e., the 
external/occupational environment) and supervisors (i.e., the internal/organizational 
environment) serve as the starting point.  In regard to the former, an officer’s time out on 
the street is described as dangerous (Skolnick, 1966) with the always-present potential for 
injury and/or death; moreover, the ability to use coercive authority over citizens is one of 
the defining characteristics of police work (Bittner, 1970).  Supervisors also place strain 
on officers by scrutinizing their every decision/action, and officers are forced to deal with 
role ambiguity where they are expected to perform a number of police duties (e.g., 
fighting crime, maintaining order, and providing services) but are only recognized, 
acknowledged, and rewarded for their crime control duties.  As a result of these 
stressors/strains, officers employ specific coping mechanisms, such as “suspiciousness” 
and “maintaining the edge” during interactions with citizens and “laying low/covering 
your ass” as well as embracing a crime fighter orientation while dealing with interactions 
with supervisors (Paoline, 2003).  The final consequences of both the stressors/strains and 
the coping strategies to alleviate them result in an occupational culture where officers 
become more socially isolated and distrustful of citizens while attempting to establish and 
maintain authority during interactions with them.  In addition, officers adopt a crime 
control mentality and attempt to avoid controversy/confrontation with supervisors, which 
further increase their loyalty to fellow front-line officers (Paoline, 2003). 
Organizational Culture 
The second conceptualization of police culture is organizational.  Scholars of this  
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perspective assume that it is the specific agency (and the community it is situated in), not 
the occupation itself, which is responsible for producing distinct organizational cultures.  
It is assumed that an organization will have a single overarching culture where all 
department personnel share similar outlooks.  James Q. Wilson’s (1968) study of 
organizational culture serves as the foundation for this particular cultural perspective.  
Viewing top leadership (e.g., chiefs of police) as influencing and establishing the culture 
for the entire organization, Wilson identified three different styles of policing: legalistic, 
watchman, and service.  Wilson also outlined the impact that communities (i.e., urban 
versus rural, high versus low crime) have in shaping policing styles.  Relational distance 
between the officers and the public is said to vary depending on policing styles and the 
type of community.  
Most research examining police organizational culture uses individual agencies as 
the unit of analysis.  According to Wilson, departments situated within urban 
environments with higher crime are more likely to be characterized as “legalistic” –
adhering to a more formal crime control approach through the frequent use of arrests and 
tickets.  There is a high degree of relational distance between officers and citizens in 
agencies characterized as legalistic.  “Watchman” style departments, by contrast, are 
more likely to serve low crime, rural areas where a larger focus is placed on maintaining 
public order rather than fighting crime.  With a lower degree of relational distance 
compared to legalistic departments, officers in watchman style agencies are less likely to 
respond to citizens in a formal manner.  Being situated in suburban areas with low levels 
of crime and disorder, “service” style departments dedicate most of their duties to 
providing assistance to communities and their residents.  Although officers in service 
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style agencies frequently intervene in citizen affairs, they do so in an informal manner 
(i.e., less use of arrests and tickets).  More recent work, however, has extended the 
organizational perspective to the role that precincts play in operating as sub-organizations 
within a single department (Hassell, 2007). 
Rank Culture 
The third conceptualization of police culture focuses on the role of rank, 
specifying cultural variation based on an officer’s position in the organization’s 
hierarchical structure.  While all of the other conceptualizations limit their discussion to 
patrol officers, the police rank conceptualization also addresses personnel serving in 
supervisory and management positions (Paoline & Terrill, 2014).  This perspective 
assumes that rank related variation persists even among departments with differing 
organizational characteristics.  Two studies, one from Manning (1994) and the other by 
Reuss-Ianni (1983), serve as the foundational base for the police rank cultural 
perspective.  Reuss-Ianni (1983) proposed a two-level perspective where front-line 
officers form a “street cop culture” while upper level supervisors form a “management 
cop culture.”  Manning (1994) expanded on Reuss-Ianni’s model by proposing a three-
tier system: “lower participants” (e.g., patrol officers), “middle management” (e.g., 
sergeants), and “top command” (e.g., chiefs of police).  Different stressors and 
interactions with specific audiences are dependent on an officer’s particular rank 
designation; themes of  “real” police work, “peer loyalty”, and “laying low from 
supervisors”/“covering your ass” have been shown to be more characteristic of the 
experiences of front-line officers, whereas sergeants experience a completely different set 
of circumstances based on their social relationships: often straddling the line and acting 
	 51 
as a buffer between front-line officers and department elites (Manning, 1994; Reuss-
Ianni, 1983; see also Paoline & Terrill, 2014).  Both works emphasize the role that rank 
plays in differentiating the issues and concerns that particular types of officers must deal 
with on a day to day basis. 
Police Styles 
The fourth and final conceptualization of police culture is based on officers’ 
working styles.  Using the individual as the unit of analysis and challenging the idea of a 
monolithic police culture, the police styles perspective proposes variation in how officers 
perceive their occupational role (i.e., crime control versus public service), citizens, and 
supervisors/upper management.  It is assumed that one’s style of policing develops from 
his/her experience working the job –through both the external and internal environments 
(see above).  A series of studies (Broderick, 1977; Brown, 1981; Muir, 1977; White, 
1972) that constructed officer typologies based on different attitudinal dimensions 
contributed to this conceptualization.  Brown’s (1981) typology, for example, 
differentiated officers according to their attitudes towards “aggressiveness” (i.e., the 
degree to which an officer shows initiative to control crime and preserve order) and 
“selectivity” (i.e., the degree to which an officer believes that all laws should be 
enforced).  Brown identified four types of officers: 1) old-style crime-fighters (highly 
aggressive and selective), 2) clean-beat crime fighters (highly aggressive and non-
selective), 3) service officers (low levels of aggressiveness and selective), and 4) 
professional officers (low levels of aggressiveness and non-selective).  In addition, 
Muir’s (1977) typology distinguished the degree to which officers exhibit “passion” (i.e., 
the willingness to use force and knowing when it is necessary) and “perspective” (i.e., 
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having empathy and understanding the dignity/tragedy of the human condition) while 
using coercive force.  Muir categorized four types of officers: 1) professionals (those 
possessing passion and perspective), 2) enforcers (those possessing passion but lacking 
perspective), 3) reciprocators (those lacking passion but possessing perspective), and 4) 
avoiders (those lacking passion and perspective). 
 Similar to how Paoline (2003) synthesized and integrated the extant literature on 
the police occupational culture, Worden (1995a) combined many of the attitudinal 
constructs from the aforementioned typologies to develop a more parsimonious 
perspective of officer styles.  Five primary officer styles were proposed, including the 
“tough-cop”, “clean-beat crime fighters”, “avoiders”, “problem-solvers”, and 
“professionals.”  Worden’s tough-cop is characterized as cynical and aggressive in 
his/her pursuit of fighting only serious crime; service functions and maintaining order are 
viewed as trivial matters unworthy of the officer’s time.  Clean-beat crime fighters are 
similar to the tough-cop in that they are cynical and patrol aggressively; however, they 
believe in the enforcement of all laws.  In contrast to the two previous styles, problem-
solving officers place an emphasis on providing services to citizens, as opposed to 
aggressive crime control, and generally hold favorable opinions of the public; these 
officers focus on outcomes or the “ends” of policing (Goldstein, 1979) compared to the 
traditional “clear each call quickly in order to respond to the next” approach made 
popular during the Reform era.  Like problem-solvers, professionals hold a broader view 
of their occupational role (i.e., fighting crime as well as maintaining order and providing 
services).  Lastly, avoiders attempt to “lay low” while trying to evade as much work and 
citizen interaction as possible.  
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 A growing body of empirical research has found support for the officer styles 
perspective while casting doubt on the idea of a monolithic police culture.  Data from 
qualitative (Haarr, 1997) and ethnographic observations of police departments (Herbert, 
1998), quantitative (Paoline et al., 2000), and mixed methods studies (Jermier et al., 
1991) reveal much attitudinal heterogeneity among officers.  Paoline (2001; 2004) 
performed perhaps the most complete and quantitatively rigorous examination of the 
perspective with many of the attitudinal dimensions previously identified in the literature 
(e.g., police role, views toward citizens, supervisors, and upper management).  Using a 
cluster analysis based on self-reported surveys of 585 patrol officers from two 
departments in the U.S., Paoline discovered seven different groups of officers.  Five of 
these sets -which Paoline called “traditionalists”, “law enforcers”, “lay-lows”, 
“peacekeepers”, and “old pros”- were similar to the different styles of officers proposed 
in the typology research throughout the previous four decades.  In addition, two new 
officer styles were uncovered.  The first type, titled “anti-organizational street cops”, was 
characterized by strong negative perceptions of supervisors and favorable attitudes 
toward citizens.  The second type, titled “dirty Harry enforcers”, displayed positive 
beliefs of aggressive policing while also justifying rule breaking and violating citizens’ 
rights for the greater good of fighting crime (Klockars, 1980).  This body of literature 
provides support for the idea that officers do differ in how they perceive their 
occupational and organizational worlds and respond to their work environments. 
Culture’s Influence on Police Use of Force  
Terrill and colleagues (2003) tested the relationship between police culture and 
use of force at the individual officer level.  They sought to determine whether officers 
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who closely embodied the attitudes of the traditional view of police culture (e.g., an 
exclusive focus on the role of crime fighting, unfavorable attitudes toward citizens) were 
more likely to use coercion in day-to-day encounters, compared with officers whose 
attitudes diverged from this view.  This was the first study to empirically assess the link 
between cultural attitudes and some type of behavior.  Employing similar methods as 
prior research (Jermier et al. 1991; Paoline, 2004), Terrill et al. (2003) used the 
aforementioned cluster analysis (Paoline, 2001; 2004) to classify officers into seven 
distinguishable groups based on their attitudes regarding citizens, supervisors, procedural 
guidelines, role orientation, and policing tactics.  These seven different officer types were 
then condensed into three broader groups: 1) those adhering to the traditional view of 
police culture, 2) those who did not adhere to this traditional view, and 3) those falling 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.  Terrill and colleagues (2003) found that 
officers who were oriented towards the values of the traditional police culture were more 
likely to use coercion (both verbal and physical force) than their counterpart officers who 
did not embody those same values.  Results were consistent across the two departments 
under study and emerged regardless of the policing styles promoted by each agency’s 
upper management. 
Limitations of Prior Work on Police Culture 
Although scholars have learned a great deal about police culture over last few 
decades, there are still a number of shortcomings and gaps in literature.  Terrill et al. 
(2003) note that current research on the topic is incomplete, and they urge future scholars 
to focus on a few specific issues.  For one, studies have only recently begun to test 
culture’s impact on police behavior (Engel & Worden, 2003; Paoline & Terrill, 2005; 
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Terrill et al., 2003).  Additionally, and most relevant to this dissertation, discussion and 
examination of the antecedents or potential socializing influences on police culture(s) has 
only concentrated on officer characteristics, peers, and supervisors.  One of the largest 
omissions in the literature, thus far, is the failure to consider the role that ecological and 
structural factors (e.g., neighborhoods) play in contributing to variation in police culture 
(see Chan, 1997).   
Looking to Criminology for Guidance on Police Culture 
Research on police culture might benefit by incorporating theoretical models from 
other bodies of literature in criminology and sociology, such as how social structure and 
neighborhood context influences culture and cultural attenuation among the general 
population.  The following ideas were originally aimed towards residents, and I argue 
that these same concepts can be applied to police officers.  Culture was once an important 
component in Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory; however, 
scholars have focused almost exclusively on structural characteristics like concentrated 
disadvantage after Kornhauser’s (1978) critique downplayed the salience of cultural 
influences.  In addressing the long-contested structure versus subculture debate, Sampson 
and Wilson (1995) advanced a theory of crime that incorporated components from both 
perspectives.  Sampson and Wilson, in stressing the importance of communities, argue 
that macrosocial patterns (e.g., deindustrialization and the exodus of upper- and middle-
income residents) of residential inequality have induced social isolation and the 
ecological concentration of the “truly disadvantaged” (Wilson, 1987).  Such conditions 
lead to structural barriers to employment and access to adequate social institutions and, in 
turn, cultural adaptations that are a result of constraints and the lack of legitimate 
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opportunities (compared to the internalization of norms commonly associated with 
traditional cultural explanations).  Sampson and Wilson (1995) posit that neighborhood 
context shapes what the authors call “cognitive landscapes”, or ecologically structured 
norms (e.g., normative ecologies), regarding appropriate standards and expectations of 
conduct.  As a result, in socially disorganized communities, a system of values emerges 
whereby crime, disorder, and drug use are less than fervently condemned and, thus, more 
of an expected feature of everyday life.    
 Related, Elijah Anderson’s (1999) “code of the street” thesis and the recent work 
on legal cynicism (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998) also outline how neighborhood structural 
characteristics influence cultural adaptations conducive to offending and violence (see 
also Bellaire, Roscigno, & McNulty, 2003; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).  Those who follow 
or live by the “code of the street” support the use of physical violence, often in response 
to what many may view to be trivial matters (e.g., perceived verbal slights from others).  
This street culture is argued to emerge as an adaptation to adverse economic conditions 
(e.g., chronic poverty and unemployment) in addition to being a mechanism to acquire 
self-worth and personal status in disadvantaged areas.  Legal cynicism refers to a cultural 
frame whereby the law as well as those tasked with enforcing it, such as the police and 
the court system, are perceived as “illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure 
public safety” (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011, pg. 3).  As a result, those who adhere to the 
legal cynicism orientation, it is hypothesized, will be more likely to take the law into their 
own hands (i.e., by engaging in “self-help” behavior; Black, 1983) due to mistrust of the 
criminal justice system and the belief that police cannot be relied on to handle 
interpersonal grievances. 
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The work of Stewart and colleagues has recently begun to empirically test 
whether neighborhood context influences residents’ values and beliefs (i.e., “codes of the 
street”), which, subsequently, influence their behavior.  Stewart and Simons (2006) found 
that communities with high degrees of structural disadvantage led residents to adopt 
street code values, such as justifying the use of physical violence to gain respect from 
others; additionally, they found that the adoption of individual-level street code 
values/beliefs was predictive of interpersonal violence while controlling for 
neighborhood disadvantage, family characteristics, and perceived discrimination (see also 
Brezina, Agnew, Cullen, & Wright, 2004; Stewart, Simons, & Conger, 2002).  
Furthermore, Stewart and Simons (2010) examined whether neighborhood street culture 
influenced violent offending above and beyond individual level street code values as well 
as whether neighborhood street culture moderated individual-level street code values on 
violent offending.  Stewart and Simons found that neighborhood street culture did, 
indeed, exert a direct influence on violence above the effect of individual-level street 
code values, and they also found that neighborhood street culture and individual-level 
street code values interacted to impact violent offending.  Overall, these studies have 
uncovered support for the “code of the street” hypothesis, indicating that context matters 
in shaping and moderating beliefs, values, and the behavior of citizens residing in those 
areas.   
Initial empirical examinations also show support for notion that neighborhood 
context influences legal cynicism.  Kirk and Papachristos (2011) and Sampson and 
Bartusch (1998) both found that legal cynicism was a product of neighborhood 
characteristics.  Put differently, citizens’ individual-level perceptions of legal cynicism 
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varied as a function of neighborhood conditions such as concentrated disadvantage.  
Residents in communities characterized by high levels of concentrated disadvantage were 
more likely to practice “self-help” –taking the law into their own hands.  Kirk and 
Papachristos (2011) extended their analysis even further.  Similar to the results found by 
Stewart and colleagues regarding the “code of the street” exerting independent direct 
effects, Kirk and Papachristos discovered that the impact of legal cynicism on violence 
persisted even after controlling for neighborhood levels of concentrated disadvantage.  
Both emerging bodies of literature, taken together, show that in addition to neighborhood 
context giving way to the cultural orientations of their residents, “codes of the street” and 
legal cynicism take on a life of their own and influence citizen behavior.  It is plausible 
that a similar relationship between structure and culture occurs among police officers and 
the specific areas where they work. 
Conclusion 
 While writing and theoretical development on the police culture dates back to the 
1960s, it is only relatively recently that scholars have synthesized and integrated the 
relevant literature that has been produced (Paoline, 2003; Worden, 1995a).  Four distinct 
conceptualizations of police culture have been identified; however, it is the quantitative 
work on individual police officer styles that has garnered the majority of the empirical 
attention.  So far, many of these studies have found attitudinal variation in how patrol 
officers view the purpose of their occupational roles, the specific tactics that they should 
be using, and how they perceive citizens and supervisors/upper management.  Although 
these developments are certainly a start, there is still much to be learned about how police 
culture and these attitudinal outlooks are formed.  One potentially fruitful avenue to 
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further extend this body of work is through the integration of neighborhood context –
similar to the approach that has been taken with recent research on the “code of the 
street” and legal cynicism.  Also of particular relevance to this dissertation is the initial 
finding the individual officer culture influenced police use of force (Terrill et al., 2003).  
Use of force research may benefit from the inclusion of both culture and 
neighborhood/ecological influence on police in tandem. 
Neighborhood and Ecological Influences on Police 
One cannot understand social life without understanding the arrangements of particular 
social actors in particular social times and places… no social fact makes any sense 
abstracted from its context in social (and often geographic) space and social time.  –
Abbott (1997) 
 The field has witnessed a surge throughout the last three decades in scholarship 
dedicated to examining the influence of neighborhood characteristics on offending 
(Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997), reentry and 
recidivism (Kubrin & Stewart, 2006; Mears, Wang, Hay, & Bales, 2008), and even 
sentencing outcomes (Johnson, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010).  Following this broader 
trend, policing research has also experienced an increase in the number of empirical 
studies testing whether officer behavior is impacted by the neighborhoods in which those 
officers conduct their work.  Despite this increase in recent years, scholarship concerning 
neighborhood influence on police greatly lags behind individual, situational, and 
organizational-level tests.  While research in this area is relatively limited, the majority of 
these studies have shown that neighborhood characteristics do, in fact, affect a number of 
policing outcome measures, including use of force.  Continued scholarly attention to  
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neighborhood context is needed to further develop this body of literature.     
Following Broader Disciplinary Trends  
The importance of social structure in explanations of crime and delinquency has 
been cyclical.  During the early twentieth century, sociologists from the Chicago school 
emphasized the role of neighborhoods in the development of social control and social 
organization (Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1942).  Scholarly focus was placed on 
neighborhood characteristics to explain why crime rates varied across different places.  
But the field moved away from the neighborhood tradition in the 1950s/1960s, and 
attention shifted towards individual-level correlates of offending (Reiss, 1986; Stark, 
1987).  Social-psychological perspectives of crime would come to dominate the field for 
the next few decades –largely influenced by Travis Hirschi’s (1969) seminal piece, 
“Causes of Delinquency”, and the self-report survey methodology he used to test theory.  
The focus on neighborhood context would eventually reemerge due to a number of 
influential works in the 1980s and 1990s (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Sampson & Groves, 
1989; Sampson et al., 1997).  Since this time, renewed interest in neighborhoods and 
place has become a fundamental context for criminology (Sampson, 2013; Weisburd, 
Groff, & Yang, 2012).  
Policing research has loosely mirrored the larger scholarly trends in the discipline.  
Scholarship in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s -such as work using data from the American 
Bar Foundation Survey (Rumbaut & Bittner, 1979) and the President’s Commission 
Survey (Black & Reiss, 1967)- tended to focus on officer discretion (i.e., decisions to 
arrest) and police-citizen interactions at the micro-level.  The aforementioned renaissance 
of empirical studies investigating neighborhood and ecological influence on crime had an 
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impact on how policing scholars began to study law enforcement.  Similar to the 
disciplinary shift in criminology more broadly, the 1980s witnessed a renewed interest in 
how police actions might differ across neighborhoods (Slovak, 1987; Smith, 1986). 
Early Theoretical Formulation and Ethnographic Work  
Speculations that police respond differently to similar situations based on 
area/place date back nearly seven decades.  While pondering whether police records 
offered reliable and valid measures of juvenile delinquency, Robison (1936) posited that 
the disproportionate representation of poor youth offenders might be due to police bias.  
Robison (1936: 60) suggested that, in addition to actual offending and rule-violating 
behavior, police respond more formally (i.e., more likely to arrest) to juveniles from the 
“wrong side of the tracks” –primarily because of officers’ assessments of the youth’s 
moral character.  Robinson did not use any data to test hypotheses; she simply proposed 
that such a relationship might exist.    
A number of classic ethnographic studies found support for the idea that 
departments provided different services in different neighborhoods, while further refining 
the theoretical reasons why such findings existed.  Much of the theoretical formulation 
can be attributed to inductive approaches from the social observation of police-citizen 
interaction across place.  In perhaps the most influential early study, Werthman and 
Piliavan (1967) observed that police divided the population and the physical territory that 
they patrol into distinct categories.  They proposed that this resulted in a process of 
“ecological contamination” where all persons encountered in neighborhoods perceived as 
“bad” were viewed by police as having little commitment to the moral order.  Put 
differently, police were said to stereotype places based on internalized expectations 
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derived from past experiences.  As such, “Residence in a neighborhood is the most 
general indicator used by police to select a sample of potential law violators” (Werthman 
& Piliavan, 1967, pg. 76).    
Other scholars from this era also observed that police practices varied 
considerably from one context to the next –albeit through different theoretical processes.  
Banton (1964) suggested that less social distance between officers and the public would 
result in a higher likelihood that police would adopt a helping orientation in encounters 
with citizens.  Similar results and theoretical propositions are found in the works of 
Bayley and Mendelsohn (1969), Black (1976), and Reiss and Bordua (1967).  Bayley and 
Mendelsohn (1969) argued that increased social distance between officers and citizens in 
poor neighborhoods led to more aggressive/punitive police response (i.e., more use of 
force or coercion) in these areas.  Reiss and Bordua (1967) took a more nuanced 
approach, positing that officers are more reluctant to intervene in disputes and 
victimizations of minorities in disadvantaged communities (i.e., use less “law”; see 
Black, 1976) in addition to acting more aggressively with people in those areas.  Again, 
these scholars based their propositions on the ethnographic studies of others.  Goldstein 
(1960), for example, uncovered that officers in one economically disadvantaged 
neighborhood took no formal police action in thirty-eight of the forty-three total felony 
assaults over the course of a one month study.  In addition, Rubinstein (1973) witnessed 
that officers were less likely to make arrests for assaults involving black victims. 
Klinger’s Ecological Model of Policing 
To date, the most comprehensive theoretical explanation for why neighborhood 
context influences police behavior comes from the work of David Klinger.  Influenced by 
	 63 
Donald Black’s (1976; 1980; 1989) notion that use of the law can be quantifiable, 
Klinger (1997) conceptualized police action with citizens as falling on a continuum: 
varying from leniency to vigor (i.e., police being more likely to invoke the law or use 
formal social control).  It is important to point out that while Klinger (1997) sets out to 
describe “police behavior” (pg. 277) and uses phrases such as “vigor of formal social 
control response” (pg. 279), he indirectly discusses the issue of use of force –addressing 
how it could apply but not definitively committing to it.  According to Klinger (1997): 
“The amount of force officers use and the amount of time they expend handling 
 calls—as well as other dimensions of law embodied in police action, such as the 
 amount of protection it affords the vulnerable and the degree of due process it 
 extends to criminal suspects—may well vary systematically across physical space.  
 Indeed, much of the theory developed in this article may well be applicable for 
 understanding spatial variation in dimensions of police behavior besides formal 
 authority.  At this stage, however, I confine my attention to variation in police 
 vigor/leniency.” (pg. 280) 
Klinger details how the ecological structure of communities intersects with the 
organizational structure of police departments to explain why officers who patrol 
neighborhoods with higher levels of crime and economic disadvantage tend to police with 
“less vigor.”  This logic originates from the “overload hypothesis” (Geerken & Gove, 
1977) with the idea that the capacity of formal social control mechanisms decreases when 
crime rates increase due to reductions in the time and energy that can be focused on any 
single incident/case.  Klinger (1997) integrated bodies of literature from a number of 
academic disciplines and sub-disciplines to arrive at his propositions, including 
	 64 
community/ecological perspectives, interactionist perspectives, and organizational 
theory.  He termed his theoretical perspective “the social ecology of policing.” 
From both an ecological and organizational standpoint, policing occurs in the 
context of territorial-based work groups.  Klinger starts by introducing ecological 
research that views neighborhoods as systems of human settlement circumscribed by 
territorial and temporal boundaries (Hawley, 1950; 1986).  Policing, even within single 
agencies, is territorially based.  Except for those departments serving extremely small 
jurisdictions, police organizations divide areas into smaller, more manageable sections.  
Departments are similarly broken down into districts, precincts, and beats based on these 
territorial sub-divided areas.  And because different districts, precincts, and beats have 
separate administrative structures and sets of personnel, the divisions create distinct 
systems of policing at these smaller units of aggregation (Klinger, 1997).  Officers are 
located in territorial based units on a semi-permanent basis, especially since the advent of 
the community policing era when organizational changes called for officers to be 
assigned to fixed beats for a consistent amount of time (usually at least a year) (Paoline & 
Terrill, 2014); a national survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2001) 
found that assigning officers to geographic areas on a semi-permanent basis was the norm 
in cities with more 250,000 residents by 1999. Within this context, officers take part in a 
relatively stable work environment where they interact with the same colleagues as well 
as the same citizens on a regular basis. 
It is within these territorial based work groups that the remainder of Klinger’s 
(1997) theory begins to unfold.  He focuses on two primary concepts: 1) negotiated work 
rules and 2) officers’ understanding of rates of crime/deviance –both of which are  
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influenced by social structure.  In regards to the former, negotiated order is rooted in the 
classic interactionist perspective (Mead, 1934); negotiations that take place in a particular 
social setting are highly dependent and tied to the structural context that frames that 
setting.  The external environment is particularly salient for police since officers are 
totally immersed in the neighborhoods that they patrol (Reiss & Bordua, 1967).  The fact 
that officers receive a high level of autonomy from administrative control in addition to 
the many aspects of the job that are governed by informal rules/norms (Lipsky, 1980) 
contributes to the negotiation of work rules that guide officer conduct.  Turning to the 
second concept, variation in rates of crime and deviance across departmental territories 
affects officer workload; officers serving high-crime areas are busier and respond to more 
serious and violent offenses (Goldstein, 1977; Walker, 1992).  Officers also observe 
different levels of poverty and social and physical disorder in their respective patrol 
areas.  Based on similar job experiences and observations, officers working in territorial 
based work groups share a common understanding of levels of deviance in the 
neighborhoods that they serve (Brown, 1981).  
 Klinger (1997) further posits that four critical factors -1) normal and deviant 
deviance, 2) the deservedness of victims, 3) police cynicism, and 4) workload- influence 
police vigor.  Research has found that social control agents (e.g., criminal court lawyers) 
come to view certain crimes as “normal” in the communities in which they work –in turn 
developing different informal methods for handling and processing normal crime 
compared to “deviant” crimes (Sudnow, 1965; Swigert & Farrell, 1977; Waegel, 1981).  
When more serious deviant acts are subsequently defined as “normal” due to increasing 
levels of crime, it is suggested that officers in these higher crime areas will perceive 
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fewer deviant acts as warranting vigorous police interaction compared to officers in lower 
crime areas.  Moreover, officers may stereotype victims as undeserving of police services 
if they perceive victims to have contributed to their own victimization or are themselves 
criminals (Fattah, 1993; Lauritsen, Sampson, & Laub, 1991; see also Spohn & Tellis, 
2014 for a discussion of “righteous” victims in the sexual assault literature).  The line 
between victim and offender may be more blurred in high crime areas; thus, it is 
proposed that officers will see fewer victims as deserving vigorous police action in areas 
with increasing levels of deviance.  Police who work in high crime areas come into 
contact with more offenders, witness more victimizations, and experience more justice 
system “failures” (i.e., charges being dropped, parolees returning to crime after release 
from prison) –leading them to become more cynical; increases in officer cynicism, it is 
hypothesized, will result in less vigorous police action.  Lastly, areas with more crime 
tend to have higher calls for service to officer ratios, and officers must prioritize which 
calls receive more of their attention.  Given the organizational demand placed on front-
line staff for efficiency (Skolnick, 1966), it is argued that officers will respond less 
vigorously to a higher percentage of calls in areas with more crime.   
Empirical Research  
Research has begun to empirically test neighborhood influence on police and 
police decision-making, although the number of these studies is quite limited compared 
to individual, organizational, and encounter-level tests.  Perhaps the most significant 
examination of neighborhood context on discretionary police behavior, in terms of 
novelty and scope, was conducted by Douglas Smith in 1986.  Using the Police Services 
Study, Smith (1986) explored whether neighborhood characteristics affected five 
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different officer outcome measures -proactive investigation, proactive assistance, arrest, 
coercion, and official reporting- while controlling for encounter-specific and situational 
factors.  The first two of these measures represent pre-contact indicators based on an 
officer’s use of unassigned time.  Smith (1986) found that officers tend to be more active 
in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods by initiating more investigative contacts with 
suspicious persons and suspected violators as well as by offering more assistance to 
residents; officers were also less likely to stop suspicious persons in high crime areas.  
The last three measures focus on official actions (or their lack thereof) that happen post-
contact with citizens.  Suspects confronted by police in lower status neighborhoods were 
more likely to be arrested than those in higher status neighborhoods, while holding 
factors such as type of crime, offender race, demeanor, and victim preferences for arrest 
constant.  Smith also found that officers were less likely to file official reports of 
victimization in higher crime areas. 
The results and conclusions from Smith’s (1986) research can be viewed as a 
critical first step towards understanding the ways in which neighborhood characteristics 
influence police behavior.  This work essentially paved the way and provided the impetus 
for other scholars to take up the task of quantitatively examining police in the context of 
the neighborhoods that they serve.  Research has slowly begun to test the influence of 
neighborhoods characteristics on a variety of police outcomes.  For example, Mastrofski 
and colleagues (2002) examined whether police disrespect towards citizens (i.e., speech 
and gestures) was a function of the environment in which the encounter took place.  They 
found that suspects in patrol beats characterized by higher levels of concentrated 
disadvantage had a greater risk of being treated disrespectfully by officers, while 
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controlling for a host of individual and encounter-level variables.  In addition, Kane 
(2002) tested whether neighborhood structure predicted variation in police misconduct 
among officers in the New York Police Department.  Kane found that structural 
disadvantage, population mobility, and increases in the Latino population (but not 
changes in the percentage of the black population) increased the likelihood of police 
misconduct at both the precinct and division levels.   
The empirical tests of the influence of neighborhood characteristics on policing 
behavior continue.  Fagan and Davies (2000) analyzed the New York Police 
Department’s “stop, question, and frisk” policy to assess whether officers employed this 
place-based strategy as it was intended –for the purposes of targeting physical disorder– 
or whether neighborhood indicators of race/ethnicity and disadvantage were being used 
in the deployment of order-maintenance/ broken-window policing.  After controlling for 
disorder through more objective measures (i.e., individual citizen surveys aggregated to 
the neighborhood level), the authors found little evidence to support claims that the 
department’s policy targeted places and signs of physical disorder.  Instead, findings 
showed that pedestrian stops of citizens were more often concentrated in minority 
neighborhoods that were characterized by poverty and social disadvantage.  Kane, 
Gustafson, and Bruell (2013) examined the influence of neighborhood context on 
misdemeanor arrests –arguably police actions with a high degree of discretion.  They 
found, net of controls, that increases in the percent black population were associated with 
higher levels of black misdemeanor arrests in historically majority white census tracts.  
Similarly, increases in the percentage of Hispanic residents were associated with higher 
levels of Hispanic misdemeanor arrests across tracts in general, but this relationship was  
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pronounced in historically majority white census tracts. 
It is important to note that a small number of studies have uncovered less support 
for the notion that neighborhood context influences police behavior.  Examining a single 
department in the Midwest, Slovak (1987) found that the style of policing (e.g., legalistic, 
service, or watchman; see Wilson, 1968) did not vary across neighborhoods that differed 
by socioeconomic status and the racial and age composition of residents.    
Contemporary ethnographic research has also supported the idea that police work 
is influenced by neighborhood context.  Using police precincts as the unit of analysis, 
Hassell’s (2007) case study of a Midwestern department demonstrates how the external 
environment impacts patrol patterns depending on the geographic area of the city.  The 
strength of this observational study lies with its multi-method approach, including 
structured surveys and unstructured interviews of officers within each of the four 
precincts in the department.  All participating officers were asked whether they believed 
that patrol patterns varied by precinct based on precinct-level factors (e.g., neighborhood 
characteristics, calls for service) and whether officers handle similar situations differently 
based on precinct assignment.  The qualitative nature of the research project allowed for 
officers to provide in-depth explanations for why they thought precinct-level 
characteristics affected the nature of policing in their respective precincts compared to the 
other three. 
 Officer responses suggest that they felt there were, indeed, precinct-level 
differences in policing behavior.  Ninety-three percent of officers across all four precincts 
articulated explicit reasons why they believed similar situations were handled differently 
across precincts.  Respondents cited dissimilarities in citizen attitudes toward the police, 
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which, in turn, translated into variation in citizen demeanor and levels of compliance and 
resistance.  Providing support for Klinger’s (1997) hypothesis, Hassell (2007) found that 
officers pointed to distinctions in the nature and volume of calls for service.  Other 
reasons that officers attributed to account for differences in police practices include 
perceptions of officer safety, officers’ levels of experience on the job, and a general 
permissiveness of aggressive police practices by command staff.  Overall, the study 
highlights the utility of studying departments at the sub-organizational level of the 
precinct, while detailing how officers, in their own words, credited differential police 
practices to differences in neighborhood characteristics.   
Racial Profiling and the Importance of “Place”  
Perhaps the most salient indicator demonstrating that policing outcomes are 
dependent on the neighborhood in which they occur is research on racially biased 
policing.  A growing number of recent studies examining the contextual influence on 
racial profiling of motorists have provided further support for the notion that officers take 
“place” into account when making discretionary decisions.  Carroll and Gonzalez (2014), 
Ingram (2007), Meehan and Ponder (2002), Novak and Chamlin (2012), Petrocelli, 
Piquero, and Smith (2003), Renauer (2012), and Rojek and colleagues (2012) have all 
used a multi-level approach to test the impact of the racial population composition of 
neighborhoods in addition to the race/ethnicity of the driver.  The results consistently find 
that neighborhood context impacts profiling outcome variables (e.g., stops, searches, 
citations).  For example, profiling among African American drivers tends to increase as 
members of this racial group travel further from “black” neighborhoods into whiter 
neighborhoods at the same time that the profiling of white drivers tends to increase with 
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an area’s percentage of Black residents.  The results, contributing to their 
generalizability, are found to exist across a number of research settings and units of 
analysis, such as census tracts in Richmond, Virginia (Petrocelli et al., 2003), cities/towns 
in Rhode Island (Carroll & Gonzalez, 2014), and police districts in St. Louis, Missouri 
(Rojek et al., 2012).  These findings are also consistent with an ecological perspective: 
suspiciousness of both Black and white drivers can be attributed to individuals who are 
perceived as being “out-of-place.”  Such studies support the notion that police take place 
into consideration as well. 
Neighborhood/Ecological Influence on Police Use of Force 
 As previously discussed, the literature on neighborhood characteristics’ influence 
on police use of force decisions is quite limited compared to the three other 
aforementioned contexts (individual, situational, and organizational).  In fact, 
neighborhood-level indicators were not even identified as a type of use of force research 
in Friedrich’s (1980) initial categorization of existing studies on the topic.  Friedrich, at 
the time, only discussed individual, situational, and organizational-level correlates of 
police force.  Bolger (2015: 468) echoes this sentiment in a recent meta-analytic review 
of the correlates of police officer use of force decisions when he states, “While the former 
three categories have received a substantial amount of empirical attention, community 
characteristics are just beginning to be included in analyses.”  Very few studies have 
investigated this relationship and the preliminary findings point to mixed to adequate 
support for neighborhoods’ impact on police use of force.  However, the lack of research 
prohibits scholars from drawing any firm conclusions as of yet.   
 In an initial test, Smith (1986) found that police use of force and threat of force  
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was more likely in primarily black and racially heterogeneous neighborhoods, while 
holding individual and encounter-level variables constant.  It is worth noting that the 
operationalization of “neighborhood” was a bit vague.  According to Smith (1986: 317), 
“Neighborhoods were defined on the basis of police beat boundaries, census block 
groups, and enumeration districts.” Nonetheless, the neighborhood effects, more 
specifically, were independent of the race, sex, and demeanor of the suspect as well as a 
number of situational characteristics.  Smith also found a conditional effect of suspect 
race depending on the racial composition of the neighborhood.  Police were less likely to 
use or threaten force against black suspects in white neighborhoods, and most likely to 
use or threaten force against black suspects in black neighborhoods.  These findings led 
Smith (1986: 331-332) to conclude, “Thus, the propensity of police to exercise coercive 
authority is not influenced by the race of the individual suspect per se but rather by the 
racial composition of the area in which the encounter occurs.”    
 Terrill and Reisig (2003) provided a direct test of the influence of the broader 
social context on police use of force.  Examining use of force across departmental-
designated patrol beats, they uncovered support for Werthman and Piliavan’s (1967) 
“ecological contamination” hypothesis.  Officers used higher levels of force on suspects 
in high-crime patrol beats with a greater degree of concentrated disadvantage –again, 
independent of suspect behavior and characteristics and a number of other relevant 
controls.  Additionally, the effect of suspect race no longer exerted a significant influence 
on use of force once the patrol beat characteristics were taken into consideration.  
Minority suspects were no longer more likely to have force used against them once levels 
of concentrated disadvantage and homicide rates of the patrol beat were included in the  
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statistical models. 
 Lee et al. (2014) examined the influence of neighborhood violent crime on police 
use of force across two units of analysis (street level as well as the police district level) in 
Austin, Texas.  It was the first study, to my knowledge, to simultaneously investigate the 
relationship between neighborhood violence and use of force at multiple levels of 
aggregation.  Using GIS mapping techniques, Lee and colleagues (2014) generated four 
radial buffer zones (500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 feet) around every use of force incident.  
The impact of neighborhood violent crime on police use of force was statistically 
significant at all four levels of aggregation at the street level; however, the effect of 
violent crime decreased as the size of the radial buffer increased.  Stated differently, 
violent crime in the 500-foot street buffer zone exhibited the strongest influence on use of 
force.  Violent crime across the nine police districts was much less predictive than the 
results found for the four street-level analyses.  Aside from increasing the odds of police 
using “hard empty hand control” relative to “soft empty hand control”, the neighborhood 
violent crime rates at the district level did not significantly influence levels of use of 
force severity. 
 Morrow (2015) examined weapon and non-weapon use of force during stop, 
question, and frisk (SQF) incidents across the NYPD’s police precincts.  The racial/ethnic 
composition of residents living in those precincts was the primary neighborhood 
characteristic of interest.  Percent black and percent Hispanic did not emerge as 
significant predictors of either weapon or non-weapon police use of force.  However, 
findings from the cross-level interactions do offer support for an ecological influence.  
Black citizens were less likely to experience non-weapon use of force in predominately 
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black precincts compared to whites (i.e., whites had more force used against them in 
Black communities).  Moreover, Hispanics were significantly more likely to experience 
non-weapon as well as weapon force in primarily Hispanic precincts relative to whites.  
The results indicate that the racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct impacts use of 
force, but the influence is contingent on the race/ethnicity of the individual stopped in a 
given area.  
 In the most recent test, Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom, and Deckard (2016) studied the 
impact of neighborhood characteristics on police use of deadly force.  Using data on 230 
police shootings in St. Louis, Missouri from 2003 to 2012, Klinger and colleagues 
examined an area’s racial composition, economic disadvantage, and violent crime with 
the census block group as the unit of analysis.  The results indicated that neither the 
census block group’s racial composition nor its level of economic disadvantage directly 
increased the frequency of police shootings.  However, a census block group’s level of 
violent crime was associated with police shootings, but the relationship is curvilinear.  
Police shootings, stated differently, are more prevalent in neighborhoods with somewhat 
higher levels of firearm violence than others, yet they occur less frequently in 
neighborhoods with the highest levels of firearm violence.  Both racial composition and 
economic disadvantage at the census block group level were shown to have indirect 
effects on police shootings through their impact on levels of firearm violence.  Klinger et 
al. (2016) conclude that crime, specifically violent crime involving firearms, is the 
primary driver of police shootings. 
 Two studies, however, produced dissimilar results.  Although Lawton (2007)  
found that use of force significantly varied by police districts in Philadelphia, district- 
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level measures of violent crime and racial heterogeneity did not predict police use of 
force.  Although nonsigificant, Lawton does bring attention to the direction of the 
relationships between the contextual variables and use of force.  Both were in the 
expected direction: districts with higher crime rates were more likely to have incidents of 
lower levels of force, and more racially homogenous districts were more likely to have 
higher levels of force.  Lawton (2007) also discusses the disparate findings between his 
analysis and that of Terrill and Reisig (2003).  Both utilized police use of force dependent 
variables with very different structures.  Whereas Terrill and Reisig’s measure exhibited 
wide variation in different levels of use of force severity, Lawton’s measure included 
only the most extreme levels of nonlethal force.  Slovak’s (1986) examination of 
environmental characteristics revealed similar levels of police aggressiveness across 
neighborhoods. 
 A few other empirical tests are worth pointing out, although the level of 
aggregation that they employ is the city/municipality –using police departments as the 
unit of analysis.  This is an important distinct to make, since cities exhibit such a large 
degree of variation across their geographic landscapes.  Scholars should tread carefully 
when using the term “neighborhood” to refer to the examination of police outcomes at the 
city or department-level.  Lee and colleagues (2010), however, use the phrase 
“neighborhood contextual factors” in their article title when the unit of analysis that they 
employ is the city/department.  With that said, these studies still highlight the ecological 
dimension and how the broader social context might influence police use of force.  Lee et 
al. (2010) discovered that cities with higher violent crime and unemployment rates 
experienced increased levels of nonlethal force used by police.  Shjarback and White 
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(2016) found that a jurisdiction’s violent crime rate was associated with rates of citizen 
complaints of use of force among municipal police departments with over 100 sworn 
officers.  In terms of deadly force, Smith (2004) found that cities with higher violent 
crime were more likely to experience an incident of a police killing of a citizen. 
 The above findings, taken together, highlight two critical issues to consider while 
conducting research on neighborhood influence on police use of force.  They include the 
level of aggregation of “neighborhoods” and, as previously discussed, the measurement 
and categorization of different levels of force.  Results appear to vary based on each of 
these two characteristics.  For example, neighborhood characteristics, such as rates of 
crime, have been found to be more salient at the patrol beat level compared to the police 
precinct level (Lawton, 2007; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  The latter issue, however, has 
received much more scholarly attention than the former, and policing scholars have at 
least debated the appropriate scaling and measurement of use of force (Garner et al., 
1995; Hickman, Atherley, Lowery, & Alpert, 2015; Hickman et al., 2008).  While 
criminology more broadly has addressed the level of aggregation problem (i.e., census 
blocks versus tracts; Hipp, 2007), little discussion exists regarding how to best measure 
“neighborhoods” for policing research.  Scholars have used a number of units of analysis, 
some of which are derived from different data sources.  The U.S. Census bureau provides 
measures of “blocks/streets” and “tracts”; yet, departments also divide geographic spaces 
into “beats” and “precincts.”  Aside from the distinction and potential controversy 
surrounding census-designated versus department-designated places (which will be 
examined in more depth in the Methodology and Discussion sections), policing 
researchers have approached “neighborhood” influence through the use of different 
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agency-designated levels of aggregation, such as patrol beats (Terrill & Reisig, 2003) and 
police precincts (Lawton, 2007).  More attention needs to be directed towards both of 
these issues.  
Neighborhood Stereotyping and the Role of Officer Perceptions 
 A more complete picture of why neighborhood context might influence police 
behavior requires moving beyond the focus on the objective structural characteristics of 
an area (e.g., economic disadvantage, population demographics).  These structural 
neighborhood factors are the primary explanatory variables that are used to examine 
neighborhood impact on policing outcomes in the limited number of studies that do exist; 
this is the same pattern that has been found in criminological research as a whole 
(Sampson, 2013).  While this is certainly a good start, theory and research also points to 
the salience of how outsiders/visitors view different areas.  Thinking about neighborhood 
context more broadly, it is important to understand how prospective residents, investors, 
and government representatives (e.g., the police) perceive neighborhoods and its 
residents (i.e., the “social meaning” of a particular context) and how stigma might, in 
turn, further contribute to the continued disadvantage of areas.  Sampson (2013: 8) makes 
this a point of emphasis in his 2012 Presidential Address to the American Society of 
Criminology when he states, “…citizens make decisions and render opinions every day 
based on broad perceptions and imagined neighborhoods, which in turn have real 
consequences.”  As previously discussed, Werthman and Piliavan’s (1967) concept of 
“ecological contamination” addressed this idea of neighborhood stereotyping, which they 
propose is subsequently extended to the citizens who live in those areas through a process 
of association.  Policing scholars, however, have not given “ecological contamination”, 
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or even officer perceptions of neighborhoods and its residents for that matter, the 
attention that it deserves.  
 In fact, very few studies in general have tested the neighborhood stigma 
hypothesis as it relates to suspicion and mistrust experienced by residents of 
disadvantaged areas by members of the general population, let alone among police 
officers’ perceptions of citizens.  Besbris and colleagues (2015) attempted to estimate the 
effect of neighborhood stigma on individual-level discrimination in terms of economic 
transactions with strangers.  Using an experimental audit methodology to manipulate the 
neighborhood of origin of the “seller” on a local online marketplace, Besbris et al. (2015) 
tested the number of responses to advertisements for used iPhones for sale.  Results 
showed that advertisements from economically disadvantaged neighborhoods received 
significantly fewer inquiries than those advertisements claiming to be from advantaged 
neighborhoods; the disparities in responses were pronounced for disadvantaged black 
neighborhoods.  The experimental methods provide evidence that residence in a 
disadvantaged neighborhood not only affects individuals through more objective 
mechanisms (i.e., limited economic resources) but also impacts residents through the 
perceived stigma by others.  Neighborhood stereotyping and the processes through which 
negative perceptions are consequently attributed to residents represent an important and 
promising area for future research, particularly as it applies to agents of social control. 
 Fortunately for policing scholars, there is a small foundation from which to 
expand theory and research regarding neighborhood stigma and officers’ perceptions of 
places and its people.  In an early study that inquired about officer perceptions, Kephart 
(1954) found that approximately 90% of officers in the Philadelphia Police Department 
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overestimated the African-American arrest rates in their respective districts.  While 
Kephart did not necessarily investigate neighborhood stereotyping, the findings suggest 
that police officers are prone to exaggerate the lawlessness of black residents in the areas 
they serve.  Groves and Rossi (1970) proposed that officer perceptions of neighborhoods 
might play a causal role in police-citizen violence that is more likely to emerge in certain 
areas compared to others.  They hypothesized that the police overestimate the level of 
anti-law enforcement hostility among residents in disadvantaged areas (i.e., “ghetto 
hostility”).  These perceptions, in turn, influence how officers enter into day-to-day 
interactions/encounters with citizens.  Crawford (1974) tested Groves and Rossi’s 
hypothesis by examining both citizen attitudes toward the police in the most 
economically disadvantaged section of a California city (i.e., the “ghetto”) as well as 
officers’ perceptions of the citizens’ level of hostility in that area.  The results provided 
evidence that officers did, indeed, exaggerate the amount of antipolice hostility among 
residents in the ghetto area of the city when, in fact, those citizens held more positive 
attitudes towards the police. 
 Neighborhood stigma and the potential consequences stemming from 
unrealistic/skewed officer perceptions are even more concerning when considering that 
certain innovative policing strategies rely heavily on how officers view places.  This 
concern is particularly relevant for broken windows/order maintenance policing, but it 
could also apply to problem-oriented and hot spots policing strategies.  Wilson and 
Kelling’s (1982) theory of broken windows proposes a causal relationship between 
unchecked social disorder/public incivility and crime.  The hypothesized relationship 
provided for the police an opportunity to become active participants in crime control: by 
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targeting and enforcing low level disorder and “quality of life” offenses (e.g., crackdowns 
on panhandlers, loitering, etc.), officers could impact more serious crime.  Aside from the 
lack of empirical support as a crime-reduction strategy (Robinson, Lawton, Taylor, & 
Perkins, 2003; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Taylor, 2001), a substantial problem lies 
in whether it is possible to objectively and accurately discern disorder from order and the 
disorderly person from the law-abider (see Harcourt, 2001; Taylor, 2001).  A growing 
body of research has found disparities in people’s perceptions of disorder among citizens 
living in the same neighborhoods (Sampson, 2013); disorder perceptions vary by race, 
class, age, and level of education (Hipp, 2010), and neighborhood concentration of both 
immigrants and black residents lead all racial/ethnic groups to view disorder as more 
problematic (Sampson, 2012).  It is important to investigate the extent to which 
neighborhood stereotyping or even simple characteristics of an area, like population 
demographics, influence disorder perceptions of officers.  As previously discussed, Fagan 
and Davies (2000) uncovered evidence that the NYPD based their “stop, question, and 
frisk” (SQF) policy more on neighborhood characteristics (e.g., poverty/disadvantage) 
than on objective signs of physical disorder. 
The Relevance of “Place” in Modern-Day Policing and Beyond 
There is adequate reason to suggest that the policing of “space” is more of an 
issue today than it was in years past.  Controlling geographic territory through the use of 
department-made boundaries (e.g., divisions, precincts, sectors) and the management of 
people within those locations has always been central to the police function.  But since 
the mid-1990s, departments have increasingly relied on technologies such as 
sophisticated mapping and geographic information system (GIS) computer programs 
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(Pelfrey, 2010).  These programs are the building blocks of CompStat (Walsh, 2001; 
Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003): an innovative management 
strategy that witnessed widespread diffusion throughout agencies across the country.  
Additionally, these technologies/innovations have been integral in the identification of 
“hot spots” (Braga, 2005) and the broader “intelligence-led policing” movement 
(Ratcliffe, 2008).   
Herbert (2014), however, raises concern about how these new features of policing 
could inherently affect how departments and their officers view certain places.  
According to Herbert, reliance on GIS-mapping could be used to legitimate or justify 
geographically-differentiated policing practices.  Weisburd, Telep, and Lawton (2014) 
found evidence for this while examining the deployment of stop, question, and frisk 
(SQF) in New York City.  With 5% of street segments accounting for 82% and 78% of all 
SQF incidents in 2009 and 2010, respectively, they conclude that SQF was applied and 
implemented as a focused hot spots policing strategy.  Novel technologies, essentially, 
have the potential to exacerbate geographic stereotypes and perceptions of “ecological 
contamination” (Werthman & Piliavan, 1967).  Deploying more resources and manpower 
to specific areas could also intensify the already-established racial/ethnic disparities in 
the justice system (Beckett, Nyrop, & Pfingst, 2006).  Weisburd and colleagues (2014) 
caution the use of policing tactics, like SQF, for targeting “places” since any hot spots 
approach can potentially lead to unintended negative consequences, such as lowered 
citizen perceptions of police legitimacy (Kochel, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2006; Tyler, 2004). 
Conclusion 
 Early policing scholars, dating back to the 1960s, theorized about and  
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ethnographically observed how neighborhood context shaped the behavior of police.  
Yet, quantitative examination of neighborhood influence on police actions did not begin 
until Smith’s seminal work in 1986.  Researchers have since tested the impact of 
neighborhood characteristics, specifically concentrated disadvantage, on a number of 
officer outcomes: from disrespect directed towards citizens and misconduct to vehicle 
stops/searches and, most pertinent to this dissertation, police use of force.  Findings from 
the majority of these studies suggest that neighborhood context plays a significant role 
(but see Lawton, 2007).  What remains unclear, however, are the intervening mechanisms 
through which the larger social context influences police behavior like use of force.  As 
previously discussed, police culture and the attitudinal/perceptual features of officers 
might provide some guidance into the observed link between structure (i.e., 
neighborhoods) and behavior. 
Current Focus 
 Use of force remains, arguably, the most controversial aspect of police work.  
Excessive or unnecessary levels of force, whether real or simply perceived by citizens, 
can create a number of problems for departments and their officers.  Negative 
consequences stemming from use of force incidents include the erosion of police 
legitimacy and civil disorder.  The controversial nature of police use of force has 
manifested over the last year and a half in the wake of several high-profile deadly force 
encounters.  Protests and demonstrations have taken place across the country, some of 
which have turned violent.  These events spurred President Obama to take action, and in 
December of 2014, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing convened to 
investigate the rifts between local police and the citizens and communities they serve.  
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Many of the Task Force’s pillars of recommendation, such as “building trust and 
legitimacy”, “policy and oversight”, “community policing and crime reduction”, and 
“training and education”, are relevant to issues of use of force, police culture, and police-
community relations. 
 Despite the fact that a substantial amount of empirical attention has been directed 
toward the topic since the 1970s, our understanding of police use of force remains 
underdeveloped.  Robust bodies of knowledge have been established in a number of key 
domains: situational characteristics of the encounter (e.g., suspect disrespect and 
resistance), individual characteristics of both officers and suspects, and organizational 
factors (e.g., administrative/departmental policy).  However, empirical studies testing the 
impact of neighborhood characteristics on police use of force have lagged behind 
research in the other aforementioned domains.  From the limited number of examinations 
that do exist, most studies suggest that neighborhood characteristics (e.g., concentrated 
disadvantage, crimes rates) are, indeed, associated with police behavior, such as officer 
disrespect to citizens (Mastrofski et al., 2002), misconduct (Kane, 2002), and use of force 
(Lee et al., 2014; Smith, 1986; Terrill & Reisig, 2003) in particular.  Yet, it is less clear 
why neighborhood context appears to influence police use of force.      
  Policing scholars have begun to apply Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social 
disorganization theory and the larger Chicago school tradition of community ecology to 
understand why neighborhood context might influence officers.  However, much of this 
theorizing and subsequent empirical research has focused exclusively on objective 
structural characteristics of an area (e.g., population demographics, concentrated 
disadvantage).  This exclusive focus has occurred despite the fact that Shaw and McKay 
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originally proposed and argued that culture was an important component in their 
theoretical model in addition to structural factors.  The concepts of legal cynicism and 
“codes of the street” represent the integration of structural and cultural components, 
specifically how cultural orientations arise out of adaptations to neighborhood 
characteristics.  This dissertation builds on these concepts from the broader 
criminological literature and applies the integration of structure and culture to the police.  
It is possible that scholars might have missed the complete picture while employing 
social disorganization and other ecological perspectives to police behavior, but failing to 
also consider officer culture. 
 Policing scholars have written at length about the salience of culture.  Recent 
empirical research on policing styles, using individuals as the unit of analyses, has found 
considerable variation in how officers perceive their occupational roles, the citizens they 
serve, and their supervisors and upper management in the department – challenging the 
idea of a monolithic police culture.  One study, in particular, tested the impact of 
individual officer outlooks on use of force.  Terrill and colleagues (2003) uncovered that 
officers who adhered to elements of the “traditional” police culture (e.g., unfavorable 
views of citizens, attaching importance to aggressive law enforcement functions) used 
higher levels of verbal and physical force during interactions with citizens.  Still, this 
study as well as the majority of the theorizing and subsequent research on police culture 
has neglected the potential influence that neighborhood context might have on officers’ 
occupational outlooks. 
 Merging the focus on structural characteristics from social disorganization theory  
and the broader Chicago school with the current work on individual policing styles can  
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potentially advance both bodies of literature that appear to be progressing separately.  For 
example, neighborhood context has the opportunity to shed light on the development and 
maintenance of police culture.  Policing scholars acknowledge that policing is 
territorially-based (Bittner, 1967; 1970; Rubinstein, 1973), and it is a common practice 
for departments to divide service delivery functions according to geographic boundaries 
based on existing neighborhood boundaries (Mastrofski et al., 2002; Skogan & Hartnett 
1997; Smith 1986; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  Police culture, concurrently, might provide 
insight into why neighborhood characteristics appear to influence police behavior, 
specifically use of force.  This may assist in the effort towards uncovering the underlying 
processes at work.  As such, I sought to answer three research questions: 
 1) Does variation of structural characteristics at the patrol beat level, such as 
 concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the percentage of minority 
 citizens, predict how an officer views his/her occupational outlook (i.e., culture)? 
 2) Do officers who work in the same patrol beats share a similar occupational 
 outlook (i.e., culture) or is there variation? 
 3) Does the inclusion of police culture at the officer level moderate the 
 relationship between patrol beat context and police use of force? 
The next chapter outlines the data, measures, and analytical strategy used to examine 
these research questions. 
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter details the data and proposed research methodology.  It starts with a 
section describing the research setting, offering a contextualized view into the two 
participating cities and their respective police departments.  The next section discusses 
the varied nature of the data and the manner in which the different sources were 
collected.  This is followed by an outline of the variables of interest, including how each 
is conceptualized and operationalized.  The chapter concludes with the plan of analysis 
used to assess the three research questions.   
Overview 
 The data used for this dissertation come from the Project on Policing 
Neighborhoods (POPN), a large-scale multi-method study funded by the National 
Institute of Justice in 1996 and 1997.  The purpose of the study, broadly, was to provide 
an in-depth description of police-community interaction in a community policing 
environment.  More specifically, POPN sought to examine eight particular issues –one of 
which included: “how patterns of policing vary among neighborhoods and what impact 
they have on neighborhood quality of life” (Mastrofski, Parks, & Worden, 2000, pg. 1).  
Data was collected in two cities: Indianapolis, Indiana in 1996 and St. Petersburg, Florida 
in 1997.  A wide range of research methods were used to collect the data, including the 
systematic social observation (SSO) of police officers while performing their job duties 
(i.e., “ride-alongs”), in-person interviews with patrol officers, telephone surveys of 
citizens across selected patrol beats, and contextual measures from the U.S. Census 
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Bureau.  With a wealth of information across multiple units of analysis –patrol beat 
characteristics, individual officer demographics and perceptions, citizen characteristics, 
and coded measures of police behavior and officer-citizen interactions– POPN has 
emerged as one of the richest sources of data for policing scholars.  Such variety makes 
POPN the ideal data set for testing neighborhood influence on police officer culture and, 
in turn, police officer behavior (e.g., use of force).   
Research Settings 
Site Selection 
 Cities and their police departments were selected using a number of specific 
criteria.  For one, the prospective cities had to be sufficiently large and diverse enough to 
observe neighborhood variation in terms of racial/ethnic makeup and socioeconomic 
status.  Agencies, similarly, needed to be large enough to observe potential differences 
across organizational sub-units (e.g., precincts, beats).  Additionally, departments had to 
possess professional reputations and to be previously engaged in community policing 
strategies.  Practical constraints, such as the amount of available grant money and the 
proximity to the principal investigators’ academic institutions, were also taken into 
consideration.    
Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida 
 Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida as well as their respective 
municipal police departments were selected based on the aforementioned search criteria.  
Each city government was run by a “strong mayor” system.  According to Census 
estimates for 1995, Indianapolis’ citizen population was 377,723 whereas St. 
Petersburg’s was 240,318.  Indianapolis and St. Petersburg were the thirteenth and sixty-
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fifth most populated cities, respectively, in the United States at the time of the study.  In 
1990, Indianapolis had a significantly larger percentage of minority residents (39%) than 
St. Petersburg (24%).  Residents of Indianapolis possessed slightly more pronounced 
indicators of socioeconomic distress.  Eight percent of Indianapolis’ population was 
unemployed compared to 5% of St. Petersburg’s population, and 9% of Indianapolis’ 
population lived fifty percent below the poverty live (i.e., extreme poverty) compared to 
6% of St. Petersburg’s population.  Seventeen percent of children in Indianapolis lived in 
female-headed households relative to 10% of children in St. Petersburg.  Both cities had 
nearly identical UCR Index crime rates per 1,000 residents in 1996 (Indianapolis = 100; 
St. Petersburg = 99). 
 When the data were collected in 1996, the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) 
employed 1,013 full-time sworn officers with 416 (41%) of them assigned to patrol.  In 
1997, the St. Petersburg Police Department (SPD) was comprised of 505 officers with 
246 (49%) assigned to patrol.  IPD was geographically broken down into four police 
precincts with fifty different patrol beats, and SPD had three police precincts with forty-
eight patrol beats.  Both agencies were similar in terms of their percentage of patrol 
officers who were racial/ethnic minorities (IPD = 21%; SPD = 22%) and female (IPD = 
17%; SPD = 13%).  The departments differed slightly by officer education and training.  
IPD’s patrol officers were more likely to hold four-year college degrees (IPD = 36%; 
SPD = 26%), and their recruits received a greater number of training hours (IPD = 1,392; 
SPD = 1,280). 
 Both departments had implemented community policing a few years prior to the 
start of the POPN project, although they varied according to scope and strategies/tactics 
	 89 
used.  In terms of scope, SPD introduced community policing in 1990, two years prior to 
IDP in 1992.  SPD also allocated a greater percentage of their officers to become 
community policing specialists (n = 60; 24% of their patrol officers) compared to IPD (n 
= 25; 6% of their patrol officers).  IPD emphasized more of a “get tough” approach 
toward community policing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), characterized by aggressive 
enforcement and increased uniform presence (Terrill, 2001).  By contrast, SPD practiced 
more of a problem-oriented policing approach by working to solve specific issues on a 
community-by-community basis.  Descriptive statistics for both research sites are 
presented in Table 1.     
 
Table 1 
 
Research Settings at the Time of Study (1996-1997) 
  
Indianapolis, IN 
St. Petersburg, 
FL 
City Characteristics   
     Population 377,723 240,318 
     % Minority Residents 39% 24% 
     % Unemployment 8% 5% 
     % Population Living 50% Below Poverty Line 9% 6% 
     % Female-Headed Households 17% 10% 
     UCR Index Crime Rate Per 1,000 Residents 
 
100 99 
Overall Department Characteristics   
     Number of Sworn, Full-Time Officers 1,013 505 
     Number (%) of Officers Assigned to Patrol  416 (41%) 246 (49%) 
     Number of Precincts 4 3 
     Number of Patrol Beats 
 
50 48 
Patrol Officer Characteristics   
     % of Racial/Ethnic Minority Patrol Officers 21% 22% 
     % of Female Patrol Officers 17% 13% 
     % of Patrol Officers with 4-year Degrees 36% 26% 
     Number of Training Hours for Recruits 1,392 1,280 
     Number (%) of Comm. Policing Specialists 25 (6%) 60 (24%) 
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Data Sources 
Systematic Social Observation 
 POPN includes several sources of data that were employed in the analyses.  
Systematic social observation (SSO) is a field research methodology used to observe 
subjects in their natural setting, which, in POPN’s case, involved the study of police 
officers out on the streets interacting with citizens.  Trained observers accompanied 
officers on the job (i.e., “ride alongs”) and recorded events as they saw them taking place.  
The strength of the method lies with the precise rules and procedures adhered to by 
trained observers as well as the specified items to code for while using a standardized 
recording instrument (Mastrofski et al., 1998; Worden & McLean, 2014).  In this sense, 
SSO is analogous to using trained interviewers to conduct structured survey research.  
This systematized process is maintained to ensure uniformity and replication across 
members of the research team.   
 SSO has been a staple of policing research, dating back to one of the first large- 
scale data collection efforts in the 1960s.  Albert J. Reiss, Jr. applied the method to study 
police behavior and officer-citizen interaction for the President’s Commission Study in 
1966.  Since then, SSO has been used in several other large-scale policing projects, 
including the Midwest City Study (Sykes & Brent, 1983), the Police Services Study 
(PSS; Ostrom, Parks, & Whitaker, 1978), and the Policing in Cincinnati Project (PCP; 
Frank, Novak, & Smith, 2001).  A number of smaller-scale SSO projects have also been 
completed in places like Denver, Colorado (Bayley, 1986), Miami, Florida (Fyfe, 1988), 
and New York, New York (Bayley & Garofalo, 1987) –often with more specific research 
agendas in mind, such as the investigation of traffic stops and potentially violent  
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situations (see Worden & McLean, 2014 for a description of each).  The method has  
made a substantial contribution to the field, especially in regard to the knowledge and 
understanding of what the police “do”, the discretionary decisions that officers make, and 
the factors that influence those decisions. 
 Trained graduate and honors undergraduate students served as field observers.  
The research team was able to select qualified observers through a rigorous application 
and interview process.  Once selected, students received classroom instruction on the 
SSO methodology and POPN’s data-entry protocols more specifically.  Training started 
with the students becoming familiar with the instrument by coding police actions and 
officer-citizen interaction that appeared on videotape, followed by four or five in-person 
practice “ride-along” sessions before official data collection began.  Training, 
preparation, and practice are essential to ensuring the reliable and valid recording of 
events. 
 The SSO captured four levels of data: 1) rides, 2) activities, 3) encounters, and 4)  
citizens.  This format, described in more detail below, allowed for greater ease during the 
data archival process.  Rides (1) represent the broadest category of the four, providing 
descriptive information for each of the ride-alongs (e.g., officer identification number, 
coder identification number, date, shift number, time of day).  Activities (2) and 
encounters (3) are significantly more detailed than rides, and they are both nested within 
rides.  The activity data provide information on all patrol officer actions not involving 
police-citizen interaction during a particular ride-along (e.g., a patrol officer meeting up 
with his/her supervisor); indicators from the activity data were not of particular 
importance to the research questions guiding this study and were not used.  Supplying  
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information on each interaction between the ride-along officer and citizens, the encounter  
data were more relevant to the purpose of the dissertation.  Last, the citizens data include 
socio-demographic indicators (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, age, socioeconomic status) for 
each person interacting with police as well as any observed actions that the officer had 
taken during the citizen encounter (e.g., formal report writing, arrest, use of force).  
Citizen data are nested within encounters, which are, in turn, nested within rides.     
Officer Interviews 
 The POPN data also includes in-person interviews with patrol officers and as well 
as patrol supervisors.  The research team set out to interview all of the patrol officers 
from the uniform divisions of each of the two departments.  Three hundred and ninety-
eight out of a total of 426 patrol officers from the Indianapolis Police Department were 
interviewed, resulting in a 93% response rate.  In addition, 240 out of a total 246 patrol 
officers from the St. Petersburg Police Department were interviewed, producing a 98% 
response rate.  The data from the officer interviews, therefore, closely resemble  
populations as opposed to mere samples.   
 Trained members of the research team interviewed officers individually (i.e., one-
on-one) in private rooms during regular work shifts.  Interviews lasted approximately 20-
25 minutes, and the interviewers used a standardized instrument with close-ended 
response sets –essentially administering a structured survey questionnaire to each officer.  
Interview questions elicited information on an officer’s demographic characteristics (e.g., 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, education level), geographic assignment or “beat”, and the 
number of years of experience on the job.  Moreover, and of particular importance, the 
interviews captured a wealth of officer attitudinal information.  Officers were asked about 
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their perceptions of their beats and the citizens that reside in them, their organizational 
environments, and their beliefs about the police role. 
U.S. Census Data 
 Objective indicators of structural characteristics were gathered from the 1990 
census.  These characteristics were then homogenized to the patrol beat level.  The census 
data include patrol beat-level measures of socioeconomic distress, such as the percentage 
of residents who live in poverty, the percentage of residents who are unemployed, and the 
percentage of children who grow up in female-headed households.  The data also provide 
measures of the patrol beat demographic characteristics.  For example, total population 
and the percentage of population who are minorities are available.  
Merging of Data Sources 
 The project was conducted in a way that facilitated the ability to link/merge 
information from multiple data sets together.  Each officer that completed an interview 
was assigned a unique officer identification number.  This unique officer identification 
number was then used and documented when a trained observer accompanied a particular 
officer during the SSO portion of project.  In other words, all of the information gained 
from an officer’s interview, such as his/her demographic characteristics or 
attitudinal/perceptual measures, could be associated with that officer’s “actions” (i.e., 
interactions with citizens and what resulted from incidents) collected from the SSO ride, 
encounter, and/or citizen data.  Unique identification numbers were also assigned to 
patrol beats.  As a result, indicators gathered from the U.S. Census (e.g., a patrol beat’s 
percentage of residents who are minorities) could be used to contextualize the specific 
locations of police-citizen interactions from the SSO data –such as the patrol beat’s level  
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of concentrated disadvantage where a particular police of force event occurs.  
Data Limitations 
 I used the publically available version of the POPN data, which is archived by the 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 3160).  Scholars 
can access this version of the data by submitting an application to the National Archive of 
Criminal Justice Data (NACJD).  Upon working with the data, however, I discovered 
disparities between the publically available version and the version that POPN’s principal 
investigators, project managers, and other affiliated researchers have used and published 
off of.  For example, slight differences emerged between basic frequencies of some of the 
individual police culture items.  Compared to a sample size of 585 patrol officers in 
previous work (Paoline, 2001; 2004; Terrill et al., 2003), my sample size for research 
questions #1 and #2 was reduced to 556 patrol officers.  Missing data was more of an 
issue for the police use of force measure and other control variables that were employed 
in research question #3 relative to the analyses conducted by Terrill and Reisig (2003).  
 Attention must also be directed to the timing of the data collection efforts in St. 
Petersburg.  Interviews with officers in the St. Petersburg Police Department and the 
systematic social observation of SPPD officers took place in 1997.  However, the city of 
St. Petersburg experienced significant civil unrest a few months prior to the start of data 
collection.  On October 24th, 1996, TyRon Lewis, an unarmed 18-year-old black motorist, 
was fatally shot by Officer Jim Knight during the course of a traffic stop for speeding.  
Lewis, reportedly, failed to exit his vehicle when ordered by Knight.  Officer Knight 
alleged that he had moved to the front of the car to peer inside when Lewis moved the 
vehicle forward –prompting Officer Knight to fire several shots through the windshield.  
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 The incident kicked off a series of riots in the predominately black section of 
south St. Petersburg, both immediately following the shooting as well as several weeks 
later when a grand jury decided not to indict Officer Knight.  On the day of day of the 
shooting, approximately 300 individuals took to the streets where they threw rocks and 
bottles; 29 fires were set, which caused more than $5 million in property damage (Los 
Angeles Times, 1996).  Several police officers were injured, twenty people were arrested, 
and the mayor declared a state of emergency.  After the grand jury decision in November 
of 1996, unrest continued and two officers were wounded by gunshots (Los Angeles 
Times, 1996).  It is unclear how these events may have affected the St. Petersburg data, 
particularly the officer interview portion that inquired about perceptions of citizen 
distrust/cooperation and supervisors/upper management as well as the systematic social 
observation of SPPD officers at work interacting with community residents, when such 
large-scale unrest occurred just a few months prior.  It is certainly possible that the events 
in October-November 1996, which propelled the St. Petersburg Police Department and its 
officers even further into the public spotlight, negatively impacted officers’ perceptions 
of city residents and/or influenced police behavior, specifically in regard to pro-active 
policing and use of force.  Research on whether “exogenous shocks”, such as riots or 
federal consent decrees, influence officers is quite limited and the results are mixed.  
Stone, Foglesong, and Cole (2009) found no objective sign of depolicing –a term that 
generally refers to officers retreating from active police work as a reaction to a negative 
event and the subsequent scrutiny that accompanies it– in terms of both pedestrian and 
motor vehicle stops, among the Los Angeles Police Department in the wake of the 
agency’s federal consent decree; however, Shi (2009), discovered a depolicing effect, in 
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terms of reductions in misdemeanor arrests, arrests for drug- and drinking-law violations, 
and arrests in African-American communities, among the Cincinnati Police Department 
following an April 2001 riot, which erupted after a controversial deadly force incident. 
 The age of the data also warrants additional discussion.  The data are now twenty 
years old.  An argument can be made that the theoretical assumptions of social 
disorganization and the Chicago school should apply across time and space.  
Additionally, the nature and structure of policing remains the same.  Officers, for 
example, are still located in territorial based units on a semi-permanent basis where they 
have ample time to interact with an area’s residents.   
 However, policing has experienced many changes since the mid 1990s that must 
be addressed.  Rigorous research and scholarly discussion of racial profiling and “bias-
based policing” was still in its infancy when the POPN data were collected (Engel, 2010).  
Since the early 2000s, a robust body of literature has been established and many police 
departments have responded by collecting traffic stop data, some of which is state 
mandated.  The federal government, through the U.S. Civil Rights Division their use of 
consent decrees, plays a much larger role in intervening in problem agencies that exhibit 
patterns or practices of constitutional violations (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  We have 
also witnessed the advent and sweeping diffusion of technology including conducted 
energy devices (CEDs; e.g., TASERS) (Terrill & Paoline, 2012) and officer body-worn 
cameras (BWCs) (White, 2014).  This increase in police technology has mirrored the 
technological advances throughout society.  We now have the Internet, smart cell phones 
with the ability to capture high-resolution pictures/videos, and numerous social media 
platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) –innovations that were absent in 1996 and 1997.  
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Dependent Variables 
Police Culture  
 Police culture serves as the first outcome variable, although it is also used in the  
context of a potential moderating variable in subsequent analyses.  Measures of police 
culture are derived from the officer interview portion of the POPN project, and they are 
attitudinal/perceptual in nature.  Close-ended interview questions captured a total of ten 
attitudinal dimensions/variables of culture, some of which are single-item indicators 
while others take the form of multiple-item additive indices.  The dimensions cover a 
wide range of topics, from attitudes about the officer’s role orientation and preferred 
policing tactics to the officer’s perceptions of citizens and supervisors.  The following is 
a description of each of the ten dimensions and the individual items that they consist of. 
 Role Orientation.  The first three dimensions of police culture are titled “Law 
Enforcement”, “Order Maintenance”, and “Community Policing.”  These variables focus 
on officers’ ideological outlooks and how they perceive different functions of the police 
role.  Law Enforcement is a single-item indicator in which officers were asked to assess 
their agreement with the statement, “Enforcing the law is by far a patrol officer’s most 
important responsibility.”  The response mode ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 
(“strongly agree”) with higher values indicating that an officer identifies more with the 
law enforcement/crime control function of the job.  The item’s mean is 3.13 with a 
standard deviation of .75.  
 Order Maintenance is an additive index that sums an officer’s responses to three 
questions: “How often should patrol officers be expected to do something about 1) 
neighbor disputes, 2) family disputes, and 3) public nuisances?”  The response mode for 
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each of the three questions ranged from 1 (“never”) to 4 (“always”).  Several steps were 
taken to construct the three item scale.  First, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (.70) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (.00) were used to justify 
moving forward with factor analytic techniques.  Principal component analysis was used 
to evaluate dimensionality, and the results showed that the three items are represented by 
a unitary latent construct (λ = 2.35, pattern loadings > .84).  Moreover, the scale exhibited 
a high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .86; mean inter-item r = .68).  The 
items were then summed, ranging from 5 to 12 with a mean of 9.07 (SD = 1.93).  Higher 
scores reflect a greater value placed on order maintenance functions.   
 Similarly, Community Policing is an additive index that sums an officer’s 
responses to three questions: “How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about 1) nuisance businesses, 2) parents who don’t control their children, and 
3) litter and trash?”  Again, the response mode for each of the three questions ranged 
from 1 (“never”) to 4 (“always”).  While evaluating dimensionality, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (.73) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (.00) 
were used to justify moving forward with factor analytic techniques.  Results from a 
principal component analysis revealed that the three items are represented by a unitary 
latent construct (λ = 2.32, pattern loadings > .87).  The scale exhibited a high degree of 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .85; mean inter-item r = .66).  When the items were 
summed, the scale ranged from 3 to 12 with a mean of 7.04 (SD = 1.86).  Higher values 
indicate that an officer attaches a greater significance to the tenets of community 
policing. 
 Policing Tactics.  “Aggressive Patrol” and “Selective Enforcement” represent the  
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fourth and fifth dimensions of police culture.  These variables capture officers’ 
perceptions of the appropriate strategies and policing styles.  Each is measured by a 
single-item indicator.  In terms of Aggressive Patrol, officers were asked to assess their 
agreement with the statement, “A good officer is one who patrols aggressively by 
stopping cars, checking out people, running license checks, and so forth.”  The response 
mode ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 (“strongly agree”) with higher values 
indicating an officer who adheres to a more aggressive policing style.  The item’s mean is 
2.90 (SD = .85).  For Selective Enforcement, officers responded to the question, “How 
frequently would you say there are good reasons for not arresting someone who has 
committed a minor criminal offense?”  The response mode ranged from 1 (“never”) to 4 
(“always”) with higher values indicative of a personal philosophy more in line with 
selective enforcement.  The item’s mean is 3.01 (SD = .59).   
 Citizens.  “Distrust” and “Cooperation” are the sixth and seventh dimensions of  
police culture.  These two variables represent officers’ perceptions of the citizens/public 
that they serve.  Distrust is a single-item indicator in which officers were asked to assess 
their agreement with the statement, “Police officers have reason to be distrustful of most 
citizens.”  The response mode ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 (“strongly agree”) 
with higher values categorizing an officer as more distrustful of citizens.  The item’s 
mean is 2.02 (SD = .80). 
 Cooperation is an additive index that sums an officer’s responses to three 
questions: “How many citizens in your beat: 1) would call the police if they saw 
something suspicious, 2) would provide information about a crime if they knew 
something and were asked about it by police, and 3) are willing to work with the police to 
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try to solve neighborhood problems?”  The response mode for each of the three questions 
ranged from 1 (“none”) to 4 (“most”).  After the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (.74) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (.00) were used to justify 
moving forward with factor analytic techniques, results from a principal component 
analysis revealed that the three items are represented by a unitary latent construct (λ = 
2.63, pattern loadings > .92).  The scale exhibited a high degree of internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .93; mean inter-item r = .82).  When the items were summed, the  
scale ranged from 4 to 12 with a mean of 9.46 (SD = 1.81).  Higher values signify that an 
officer more positively perceives citizens’ levels of cooperation. 
 Supervisors and Management.  Sergeants and Management are the eighth and 
ninth dimensions of culture.  They focus on front-line officers’ perceptions of their 
immediate supervisors (i.e., sergeants) as well as upper management.  Sergeants is an 
additive index that sums an officer’s level of agreement with the following five 
statements: “My supervisor’s approach tends to discourage me from giving extra effort 
(reverse coded)”, “My supervisor is not the type of person I enjoy working with (reverse 
coded),” “My supervisor lets officers know what is expected of them,” “My supervisor 
looks out for the personal welfare of his/her subordinates,” and “My supervisor will 
support me when I am right even if it makes things difficult for him or her.”  For each 
item, the response mode ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 (“strongly agree”).  The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (.89) and the Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (.00) justified moving forward with factor analytic techniques, and results 
from a principal component analysis revealed that the five items represent a unitary latent 
construct (λ = 3.96, pattern loadings > .79).  The scale exhibited a high degree of internal 
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consistency (Cronbach’s α = .93; mean inter-item r = .74).  When the items were 
summed, the scale ranged from 5 to 20 with a mean of 17.05 (SD = 3.65).  Higher values 
indicate that an officer fosters a more positive attitude toward his/her sergeant.   
 Management is also an additive index that sums an officer’s responses to three 
questions: “When an officer does a particularly good job, how likely is it that top 
management will publicly recognize his or her performance?,” “When an officer gets 
written up for a minor violation of the rules, how likely is it that he or she will be treated 
fairly?,” and “When an officer contributes to a team effort rather than look good 
individually, how likely is it that top management here will recognize it?”  The response 
mode for each of the three questions ranged from 1 (“very unlikely”) to 4 (“very likely”).  
After the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (.64) and the Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity (.00) were used to justify moving forward with factor analytic 
techniques, results from a principal component analysis revealed that the three items are 
represented by a unitary latent construct (λ = 1.92, pattern loadings > .77).  The scale 
exhibited an acceptable degree of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .72; mean inter-
item r = .46).  When the items were summed, the scale ranged from 3 to 12 with a mean 
of 7.58 (SD = 2.17).  Higher values signify that an officer more positively views the 
upper management in the department. 
 Procedural Guidelines.  Lastly, Procedural Guidelines represents the tenth and 
final dimension of police culture.  It is measured by a single-item that asks officers about 
their level of agreement with the following statement: “In order to do their jobs, patrol 
officers must sometimes overlook search-and-seizure laws and other legal guidelines.”  
The response mode ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 (“strongly agree”) with 
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higher values illustrating an officer’s negative attitudes towards procedural guidelines.  
The item’s mean is 1.64 with a standard deviation of .87.  Table 2 presents a summary of 
all ten dimensions’ items their respective response modes.  
 Data Reduction Techniques. Strategies to reduce these ten dimensions into a more 
manageable police culture measure were considered.  An exploratory factor analysis, 
specifically principal component analysis, was first conducted to examine whether the 
dimensions represent a unitary latent construct.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (.56) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (.00) revealed tentative 
support for moving forward with factor analytic techniques, as the former measure fell  
just shy of the traditional “.6” threshold.  Results from the principal component analysis 
found that the dimensions loaded on four factors (i.e., Eigenvalues greater than 1 as well 
as subsequent illustrations in the scree plot).  As displayed in Table 3, there were issues  
with cross-loading as well as low communality coefficients.   
 Fortunately, researchers who have previously worked with the POPN data and its 
police culture measures have attempted to develop a classification scheme of officers 
based on the aforementioned attitudinal/perceptual variables.  Paoline (2001; 2004) and 
Terrill and colleagues (2003) used cluster analysis, specifically the K-Means Cluster 
Analysis (Nourusis, 1990), to categorize officers based on similarities across the ten 
dimensions of culture.  While there are a number of different clustering techniques, the 
K-Means Cluster Analysis method is most ideal for large datasets with over 200 cases.  
This method, based on the nearest centroid sorting, makes a preliminary pass through the 
data to determine initial cluster centers.  After the centers are determined, the method 
then assigns cases to each cluster according to an estimation of the shortest distance 
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Table 2 
Police Culture Dimensions, Items, and Response Modes 
Dimension Survey Item(s) (Response Modes in Parentheses) 
Role Orientation 
        Law Enforcement  
 
      
      
        Order Maintenance  
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
        Community Policing  
 
1. Enforcing the law is by far a patrol officer’s most 
important responsibility. (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = 
disagree; 3 = agree; 4 = strongly agree) 
 
1. How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about neighbor disputes? 
2. How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about family disputes? 
3. How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about public nuisances? (for all items: 1 = 
never; 2 =sometimes; 3 = much of the time; 4 = always) 
 
1. How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about nuisance businesses? 
2. How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about parents who don’t control their children? 
3. How often should patrol officers be expected to do 
something about litter and trash? (for all items: 1 = never; 
2 = sometimes; 3 = much of the time; 4 = always) 
 
Policing Tactics 
        Aggressive Patrol  
 
      
 
      
        Selective Enforcement  
 
 
1. A good officer is one who patrols aggressively by 
stopping cars, checking out people, running license 
checks, and so forth. (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 
3 = agree; 4 = strongly agree) 
 
1. How frequently would you say there are good reasons 
for not arresting someone who has committed a minor 
criminal offense? 1 = never; 2 = sometimes; 3 = much of 
the time; 4 = always) 
 
Citizens 
        Distrust 
 
 
 
        Cooperation 
 
1. Police officers have reason to be distrustful of most 
citizens. (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; 4 
= strongly agree) 
 
1. How many citizens in your beat would call the police if 
they saw something suspicious? 
2. How many citizens in your beat would provide 
information about a crime if they knew something and  
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(continued) 
were asked about by police?                                            
                         
3. How many citizens in your beat are willing to work 
with the police to try to solve neighborhood problems? 
(for all items: 1 = none; 2 = few; 3 = some; 4 = most) 
 
Supervisors and 
Management 
        Sergeants  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
        
 
       Management  
 
 
1. My supervisor’s approach tends to discourage me from 
giving extra effort (reverse coded). 
2. My supervisor is not the type of person I enjoy working 
with (reverse coded). 
3. My supervisor lets officers know what is expected of 
them. 
4. My supervisor looks out for the personal welfare of 
his/her subordinates. 
5. My supervisor will support me when I am right even if 
it makes things difficult for him or her. (for all items: 1 = 
strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; 4 = strongly 
agree) 
 
1. When an officer does a particularly good job, how 
likely is it that top management will publicly recognize his 
or her performance? 
2. When an officer gets written up for a minor violation of 
the rules, how likely is it that he or she will be treated 
fairly? 
3. When an officer contributes to a team effort rather than 
look good individually, how likely is it that top 
management here will recognize it? (for all items: 1 = very 
unlikely; 2 = unlikely; 3 = likely; 4 = very likely) 
 
Procedural Guidelines 
        Procedural Guidelines  
 
1. In order to do their jobs, patrol officers must sometimes 
overlook search-and-seizure laws and other legal 
guidelines.(1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; 
4 = strongly agree) 
 
between a said case and the center of a given cluster –also known as the cluster’s centroid 
(Nourusis, 1990).  A group’s centroid measure is an accumulation of a combined mean 
score across all ten dimensions clustered.  Individual cases (i.e., patrol officers) are 
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Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Police Culture 
 
Dimension 
 
Communalities 
Component 
1           2           3           4 
Law Enforcement .66             -.06       .70         .02       -.41 
Order Maintenance .69              .71      -.05         .35       -.25 
Community Policing .72              .75      -.14         .30       -.22 
Aggressive Patrol .53              .06       .68         .22       -.13 
Selective Enforcement .40             -.06      -.35         .52       -.01 
Citizen Distrust .39             -.30       .42         .34       -.09 
Citizen Cooperation .31              .32      -.21        -.27       -.29 
Perceptions of Sergeants .61              .46       .38        -.32        .40 
Percept. of Management .62              .53       .28        -.07        .52 
Procedural Guidelines .64             -.13       .03         .61        .49 
 
compared to their counterparts based on cluster membership, essentially determining how 
similar they are to one another due to distance to cluster centroids.  More specifically, 
each officer’s combined responses to the ten attitudinal/perceptual dimensions are 
compared to all of the other officers, resulting in officers who are most similar being 
assigned to the same cluster.  It is important to note that officers assigned to a cluster 
together do not have to be identical; however, they will traditionally be more alike the 
officers in their cluster than officers placed in other clusters.   
 Two important methodological decisions must be made prior to moving forward 
with the K-Means Cluster Analysis.  The first is the choice of variables to be used for 
estimating clusters.  According to Crank (2004), culture can be thought of as a confluence 
of themes of ideational components; culture is best explained by the unique mix of these 
themes in a particular occupational setting and how the themes join together.   For this 
reason, all ten attitudinal/perceptual police culture dimensions were included.  Prior work 
(Paoline, 2001; 2004; Terrill et al., 2003), additionally, has argued that no single cultural 
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dimension should be weighed more heavily than the others.  Following Crank’s 
framework and previous studies, each of the ten police culture measures was standardized 
into z scores (Everitt, 1980) prior to performing the cluster analysis in an attempt to avoid 
the arbitrary and subjective process of trying to attach more/less weight to certain 
dimensions.  The K-Means Cluster Analysis function in SPSS uses a LISTWISE 
selection criterion – therefore eliminating all individual officer cases that are missing a 
response to any of the ten attitudinal/perception dimension.  As a result, 556 out of a total 
638 officers (87.1%) in the sample were eligible for assignment to a cluster. 
 The second decision lies in determining the appropriate number of clusters to be  
used.  In order to avoid an arbitrary selection of cluster solutions, an iterative process was  
used to assess the best fit to the data.  This is accomplished by examining the ratio of the  
collective distance between officers and their cluster centroid to the number of clusters 
selected (see also Paoline, 2004; Terrill et al., 2003).  It is possible to identify the most 
efficient solution by choosing a number of different clusters starting with 2, then moving 
on to 3, then 4, and so on.  Higher mean scores suggest that officers in a particular cluster 
are more dispersed, or further away from cluster centroids (i.e., officers are less 
attitudinally homogenous).  Consequently, more efficient solutions are indicated as mean 
scores flatten out or fail to exhibit differences from one cluster specification to another.  
Table 4 illustrates this iterative process by showcasing a range of specified cluster 
solutions, their respective squared distances from the cluster centers of officers for each 
number of clusters specified, and the difference in mean scores as one moves from one 
cluster solution to the next (i.e., 2 clusters to 3; 3 clusters to 4; and so on).   
 A few points warrant clarification before discussing the results from the cluster  
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analysis.  The current analyses simply followed the strategies outlined in prior work 
(Paoline, 2001; 2004; Terrill et al., 2003).  I conducted my own analyses in an effort to 
replicate previous scholarship.  My results are largely consistent with these past studies 
using the POPN data.  The specific names used to describe the different clusters of 
officers were developed and articulated by Paoline (2001; 2004), who built on the work 
of Worden (1995a).  Findings from the iterative process for selecting the most efficient 
number of cluster solutions reveal seven distinguishable groups of officers according to 
the variation in the attitudinal features that were measured –much like that of previous 
work (Paoline, 2001; 2004; Terrill et al., 2003).  The seven clusters of officer groups that 
emerged include: “traditionalists”, “law enforcers”, “old-pros”, “peacekeepers”, “lay- 
 
Table 4 
 
K-Means Centroid Cluster Formations 
Number of Clusters Squared Means Means Difference 
2 8.77 * 
3 8.13 .64 
4 7.62 .51 
5 7.16 .46 
6 6.92 .24 
7 6.61 .31 
8 6.56 .05 
9 6.26 .30 
10 6.09 .17 
11 5.96 .13 
12 5.88 .08 
13 5.72 .16 
14 5.61 .11 
15 5.53 .08 
 
lows”, “anti-organizational street cops”, and “Dirty Harry enforcers” (Paoline, 2001; 
2004).  
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 A series of t-tests were performed to examine the attitudinal/perceptual 
differences across the seven clusters of officers.  For each of the ten cultural dimensions, 
a cluster’s mean score was compared to the mean of all the other officers who did not fall 
into that particular cluster.  Results from these t-tests are presented in Table 5.  
Statistically significant mean differences at the .05 alpha level were found for the 
majority of the tests (55 out of a total of 70; 78.57%), suggesting that the cluster analysis 
was successful in grouping officers together based on similar attitudinal/perceptual 
responses to the survey questionnaire.  The mean for all of the officers in the sample (n = 
556) for each of the ten dimensions is provided on the left side column for reference.     
Cluster 1 
 The first cluster that emerges is what Paoline (2001; 2004) refers to as “Anti-
Organizational Street Cops.”  A total of 70 officers were assigned to this group.  As the 
name appropriately indicates, perhaps the most defining feature of this cluster is the 
officers’ negative perceptions of upper management (mean = 6.00) and sergeants (mean = 
9.96) in particular.  The mean scores for these two attitudinal dimensions ranked the 
lowest out of all seven clusters.  Officers in this group were less likely to view both order 
maintenance and community policing functions as important; they were less likely to 
view citizens as cooperative.  In addition, these officers were more likely to believe in 
selective enforcement of the law and state that they were more likely to overlook search 
and seizure laws. 
Cluster 2 
 The second cluster that emerges is what Paoline (2001; 2004) refers to as “Dirty 
Harry Enforcers.”  One hundred and twenty-one officers were assigned to this group.  As 
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the name of this cluster suggests, these officers hold the strongest views that search and 
seizure laws should be overlooked (mean = 3.12).  Officers in the cluster attached 
importance to aggressive patrol and order maintenance functions.  They were more 
distrustful of citizens, yet held positive opinions of both sergeants and upper 
management.   
Cluster 3 
 Out of all seven groups, the results for cluster 3 were less consistent with the  
findings from prior research (Paoline, 2001; 2004; Terrill et al., 2003).  While each of the 
other six clusters matched up well with the work of Paoline, Terrill, and colleagues, 
cluster 3 was the last group to be matched to previous clusters by process of elimination.  
However, this was a small cluster with only 21 officers assigned to it.  “Traditionalists” 
place less importance on law enforcement, order maintenance, and community policing 
functions.  They are slightly less likely to attach importance to aggressive patrol. 
Cluster 4 
 The officers assigned to cluster 4 are what Paoline (2001; 2004) and Worden 
(1995a) refer to as “Peacekeepers.”  The cluster is comprised of 65 officers.  As the name 
accurately indicates, these officers view themselves more like “peace officers” as 
opposed to “law enforcement officers.”  They place more importance on both order 
maintenance and community policing functions and less importance on law enforcement 
and aggressive patrol.  In fact, peacekeepers have the highest mean score for the 
community policing dimension (9.11) and the lowest mean score for the aggressive patrol 
dimension (2.15).  These officers were also less likely to be distrustful of citizens and 
found it less acceptable to overlook search and seizure laws.   
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Cluster 5 
 The officers assigned to cluster 5 are what Paoline (2001; 2004) and Worden 
(1995a) refer to as “Old Pros.”  This cluster is made up of 121 officers.  While they are 
more likely to view law enforcement and aggressive patrol as important, these officers 
are also more likely to place an emphasis on order maintenance and community policing 
functions.  “Old Pros” tend to have positive attitudes toward citizens as well as sergeants 
and upper management.  They are less likely to believe that it is appropriate to overlook  
search and seizure laws. 
Cluster 6 
 The officers assigned to cluster 6 are what Paoline (2001; 2004) and Worden 
(1995a) refer to as “Law Enforcers.”  The cluster is made up of 99 officers.  In line with 
its name, this group of officers places the most emphasis/importance on the law 
enforcement function out of all seven clusters (mean = 3.59); similarly, they believe that 
a good officer is one who patrols aggressively.  These officers attach less importance to 
the order maintenance and community policing functions of the job.  Additionally, “law 
enforcers” have negative attitudes towards citizens: they are more distrustful of the public 
as well as more likely to view citizens as uncooperative.   
Cluster 7 
 The officers assigned to the final group are referred to as “Lay Lows.”  Ninety-
nine officers make up this 7th cluster.  These officers’ attitudes appear to have much in 
common with Muir’s (1977) description of “avoiders.”  They are less likely to view order 
maintenance, community policing, and aggressive patrol as important.  “Lay Lows” are 
more likely believe that there are good reasons for not arresting people who have 
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committed minor criminal offenses.  Officers in this cluster hold more positive views 
towards citizens as well as sergeants and upper management.   
Trichotomized Culture Measures 
 Thus far, and following the methods used in prior work (Paoline, 2001; 2004), 
efforts were made to reduce ten attitudinal/perceptual dimensions of police culture into a 
more manageable measure.  However, it would still be difficult to analyze a police 
culture measure that consists of seven different officer clusters.  An effort was to made to 
further simplify the variable, allowing for a more parsimonious set of analyses and 
findings.  Terrill and colleagues (2003) took these seven clusters and trichotomized them 
into three groups: 1) “pro culture” or those officers who were positively oriented to the 
traditional views of police, 2) “con culture” or those officers who were negatively 
oriented to the traditional views of police, and 3) “mid-range culture” or those officers 
falling somewhere in between.  Relying on the guidance from Terrill et al. (2003), “Law 
Enforcers”, “Dirty Harry Enforcers”, and “Traditionalists” were combined to form the 
first “Pro Culture” group (n = 201); “Peacekeepers” and “Lay Lows” were combined to 
form the “Con Culture” group (n = 164); and “Old Pros” and “Anti-Organizational Street 
Cops” were combined to form the final “Mid-Range Culture” group (n = 191).   
 A series of t-tests were performed to examine the attitudinal/perceptual 
differences across the three groups of officers.  For each of the ten cultural dimensions, a 
group’s mean score was compared to the mean of all the other officers who did not fall 
into that particular group.  Results from these t-tests are presented in Table 6.  
Statistically significant mean differences at the .05 alpha level were found for the 
majority of the tests (23 out of a total of 30; 76.67%), suggesting that the cluster analysis 
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and subsequent trichotomization was successful in grouping officers together based on 
similar attitudinal/perceptual responses to the survey questionnaire.  Again, my attempt at 
replication largely mirrored that of past work.  The mean for all of the officers in the 
sample (n = 556) for each of the ten dimensions is provided on the left side column for 
reference.  
Pro Culture 
 Officers in the “pro culture” group are more likely to attach significance to the  
law enforcement function and aggressive patrol, whereas they are less likely to attach 
significance to the order maintenance and community policing functions.  Additionally,  
these officers hold more negative perceptions of the public: being more distrustful of 
citizens and more likely to view them as uncooperative.  “Pro culture” officers are less 
likely to believe that there are good reasons for not arresting people who have committed 
minor criminal offenses (i.e., they feel that it is appropriate to arrest individuals for minor 
offenses).  They are also more likely to believe that officers must sometimes overlook 
search and seizure laws and other legal guidelines in order to perform their job duties.   
Con Culture 
 Officers in the “con culture” group are less likely to attach significance to the law 
enforcement function and aggressive patrol.  These officers hold more positive 
perceptions of the public: being less distrustful of citizens and more likely to view them 
as cooperative.  “Con culture” officers are more likely to adhere to the idea that there are 
good reasons for not arresting people who have committed minor criminal offenses (i.e., 
they believe in the selective enforcement of the law).  They are also less likely to believe 
that officers must sometimes overlook search and seizure laws and other legal guidelines  
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Table 6 
Trichotomized Police Culture Groups 
 Pro Culture: 
Law Enforcers, 
Dirty Harry 
Enforcers, & 
Traditionalists 
(n = 201) 
M      SD 
Mid-Range 
Culture 
Old Pros & Anti-
Organizational 
Street Cops 
(n = 191) 
M      SD 
 
 
Con Culture: 
Peacekeepers & 
Law Lows 
(n = 164) 
M      SD 
Law Enforcement 
     (Mean = 3.13) 
      3.23*    .76       3.29*    .57       2.78*    .82  
Order Maintenance 
     (Mean = 9.07) 
      8.76*   1.71       9.75*   1.95       8.66*   1.96 
Community Policing 
     (Mean = 7.04) 
      6.54*   1.63       7.45     1.83       7.18     2.06 
Aggressive Patrol 
     (Mean = 2.90) 
      3.09*    .81         3.18*    .73       2.39*    .81 
Selective Enforcement 
     (Mean = 3.01) 
      2.87*    .62       2.99      .56       3.21*    .49 
Citizen Distrust 
     (Mean = 2.02) 
      2.37*    .81       1.85*    .72       1.75*    .68  
Citizen Cooperation 
     (Mean = 9.46) 
      8.81*   1.79       9.65     1.75      10.04*  1.62   
Percep. Sergeants 
     (Mean = 17.05) 
     18.01*  2.28      15.35*  4.77      17.64*  2.81  
Percep. Management 
     (Mean = 7.58) 
      7.52    1.95       7.86     2.35       7.44     2.06   
Procedural Guidelines 
     (Mean = 1.64) 
      2.09*   1.02       1.51*    .75       1.29*    .56   
* t test comparison between individual cluster mean and the mean of all remaining officers  
 (p < .05) 
Note: mean scores for the full sample are provided on the left side column. 
 
in order to perform their job duties. 
Mid-Range Culture 
 Officers in the “mid-range culture” group exhibited some qualities that are 
associated with “pro-culture” but other qualities that are associated with “con culture.”  In 
terms of the “pro culture” characteristics, “mid-range culture” officers are more likely to 
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attach significance to the law enforcement function and aggressive patrol.  They are, 
however, less likely to be distrustful of citizens and less likely to feel that search and 
search laws as well as other legal guidelines should sometimes be overlooked.  As 
displayed, these officers fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum in between officers 
in the “pro culture” and “con culture” groups. 
Differences Across the Three Groups  
 Table 6 highlights the mean differences for each of the three groups across all ten 
attitudinal/perceptual dimensions.  For four of these dimensions, the mean differences 
across groups make intuitive sense in terms of the level of importance/agreement officers 
attach to a given dimension.  These four dimensions include perceptions of citizens (both 
distrust and cooperation), perceptions of selective enforcement, and perceptions of 
procedural guidelines.  “Pro culture” officers are the most distrustful of citizens (mean = 
2.37), followed by “mid-range culture” officers (mean = 1.85), and then “con culture” 
officers” (mean = 1.75).  Looking at officers’ perceptions of citizen cooperation, “pro 
culture” officers have the most negative attitudes regarding citizens’ level of cooperation 
(i.e., they believe citizens tend to be uncooperative) (mean = 8.81), followed by “mid-
range culture” officers (mean = 9.65), followed by “con culture” officers who have the 
most positive attitudes regarding citizens’ level of cooperation (mean = 10.04).  “Pro 
culture” officers are the most likely to believe that there is adequate reason to arrest 
persons for minor crimes (mean = 2.87), followed by “mid-range culture” officers (mean 
= 2.99), followed by “con culture” officers who are the most likely to believe in the 
selective enforcement of the law (mean = 3.21).  Lastly, “pro culture” officers are the 
most likely to believe that they must sometimes overlook search and seizure laws and 
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other legal guidelines in order to perform their job duties (mean = 2.09), followed by 
“mid-range culture” officers (mean = 1.51), and then “con culture” officers who are the 
least likely group to believe that search and seizure laws and other legal guidelines should 
be overlooked (mean = 1.29). 
 The trichotomized culture measures are used as both an outcome variable to be 
predicted in a multivariate model (research question #1) as well as a moderating variable 
while testing the relationship between patrol beat context and police use of force 
(research question #3).  Three dummy variables were created –“pro culture”, “con 
culture”, and “mid-range culture” officers– (1 = yes/membership; 0 = no) to measure 
those officers who comprised a particular group.  In addition to creating officer culture 
measures at the individual level, these variables were used to measure officer culture at a 
larger unit of analysis.  The officer interviews provide unique identifiers for the specific 
patrol beat that each officer is currently assigned to.  These identifiers allow for the 
grouping together of those officers who work in the same geographic area.  From there, it 
was possible to assess whether officers who share a common beat assignment possess 
similar attitudinal outlooks through membership in the three trichotomized groups 
(research question #2).  
Use of Force 
 Police Use of Force is the second dependent variable.  This variable comes from 
the systematic social observation portion of the POPN project.  It is important to note that 
the original research team categorized “citizen roles” in many different ways based on the 
nature of the interaction.  For example, the coders/observers classified citizens as 
“victim”, “service recipient”, “third party”, “witness”, and “suspect”, among others.  
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Following the precedent set by previous scholarship using the data and studying police 
force (e.g., Mastrofski et al., 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003), only citizen interactions 
characterized as “suspect” are included in the analyses.  Use of force is conceptualized as 
any action or behavior by the police that falls along the traditional use of force 
continuum; this includes physical conduct as well as verbal commands and threats.  
Consistent with the approach taken by previous scholars (Alpert & Dunham, 1997, 
Garner et al., 1995; Klinger, 1995; Terrill & Reisig, 2003), the variable is operationalized 
as the highest or most severe level of force used on a suspect.  The POPN data provide 
information about whether certain levels of force were witnessed by the third-party 
observers.  The varying levels of force are all included in the data, which allows for the 
construction of use of force measures in a number of different ways.  For example, POPN 
provides information on whether officers: 1) threatened force (e.g., commands or threats); 
2) used restraint techniques (e.g., grabs or holds); 3) employed handcuffing; 4) used pain 
compliance techniques (e.g., punches/strikes with hands); and 5) used impact weapons 
(e.g., batons).   
 Past research has used these five variables to construct ordinal-level use of force 
scales, often combining more than one measure into a single category of force severity.  
Terrill and Reisig (2003) and Terrill and colleagues (2003), for example, constructed 
their scale in the following manner: 1 = no force, 2 = verbal force, 3 = restraint 
techniques (including handcuffing), and 4 = impact methods (pain compliance techniques 
and impact weapons).  A potential issue arises when handcuffing is included in the 
“restraint techniques” category.  This operationalization would mean that the majority of, 
if not all, arrests include a moderate degree of force being used.  It would contradict the 
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findings and estimates from Hickman and colleagues (2008), who found that 
approximately 20% of all arrests result in some degree of force being used by police.  
Upon investigation of the data, police employed some level of force besides handcuffing 
in 134 out of 523 arrested suspects (25.6%) –a figure much closer to Hickman and 
colleagues (2008) national level estimate; yet, it is important to note that these were 
interactions with individuals considered “suspects” and not necessarily all police-citizen 
encounters.  While there may be a justifiable reason(s) for including handcuffing into the 
restraint techniques category, such as a particular department including handcuffing on its 
use of force continuum, I take issue with this decision.  Upon examination of the data and 
the construction of my own use of force scale, I noticed that a substantial portion of cases 
being scored a “3” (restraint techniques) were suspects who were simply arrested and 
who did not have any other restraint techniques –like grabs or holds– used against them.  
Terrill and Reisig (2003) and Terrill and colleagues (2003) control for suspect arrest in 
their models; however, the inclusion of handcuffing during arrest without any other force 
(e.g., grabs, holds) taking place drastically changes the shape/distribution of the 
dependent variable –essentially inflating the degree to which police use of force occurs 
during encounters with suspects.   
 As such, I sought to construct my use of force scale in the following manner: 0 = 
no force, 1 = verbal force, 2 = restraint techniques (not including handcuffing), 3 = pain 
compliance techniques, and 4 = impact weapons.  Handcuffing was not included in the 
“restraint techniques” category if the suspect was arrested during the encounter and did 
not have any other force used against him/her.  In these particular instances, in which 
there were many (n = 354), the cases were categorized as a “0” (no force used).  Stated 
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differently, an additional 354 police-suspect encounters would have been incorporated in 
the restraint technique force category if every instance of handcuffing alone were 
included.  If, however, a suspect was arrested, handcuffed, and the officer also used 
another type of force (e.g., verbal force, grabs/holds, pain compliance, impact weapons), 
then the case was categorized accordingly.   
 Remember that the variable was operationalized as the highest or most severe 
level of force used on a suspect.  The large majority of encounters with suspects did not 
result in any force used by police (n = 2,576; 92.6%).  Verbal force was used in only 
1.1% of cases (n = 31), followed by restraint techniques (not including handcuffing) in 
3.8% of cases (n = 106), pain compliance techniques in 1.1% of cases (n = 31), and 
impact weapons in 1.4% of cases (n = 38).  Because there were so few police-suspect 
encounters where the highest level of force employed by officers was verbal, the variable 
has a type of bimodal distribution.  Figure 3 illustrates this point.  In order to avoid the 
issue of a bimodal distribution, the twenty-eight cases of verbal force were collapsed into 
the “no force” category, transforming the dependent variable into a scale of physical 
force.   
 The final categorization of the police use of force measure is as follows: 0 = no 
physical force (n = 2,607; 93.7%), 1 = restraint techniques (not including handcuffing) (n 
= 106; 3.8%), 2 = pain compliance techniques (n = 31; 1.1%), and 3 = impact weapons (n 
= 38; 1.4%).  The variable had a mean of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 0.44.   
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Figure 3  
 
Police Use of Force Histogram 
  
   
Independent Variables 
“Neighborhood” Context  
 Prior research using the POPN data has used the terms “patrol beat” and 
“neighborhood” interchangeably (Mastrofski et al., 2002; Reisig, McCluskey, Mastrofski, 
& Terrill, 2004; Reisig & Parks, 2000; 2003; 2004; Sun & Triplett, 2008; Sun, Triplett, & 
Gainey, 2004; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  Reisig and Parks (2000: 613), for example, use 
the following language: “In each city, neighborhoods were defined by the boundaries of 
primary police assignment areas (i.e., patrol beats and community policing areas).”  
Further, Mastrofski and colleagues (2002: 528) state, “Each city drew beat boundaries to 
conform as closely as possible to existing neighborhood boundaries; hereafter we refer to 
these study areas as “neighborhoods.”  The justification that the aforementioned scholars 
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employ while using the two terms synonymously stems from the precedent set in 
previous work (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Smith, 1986).  However, there are potential 
differences in the areas described as police-designated “beats” and Census-designated 
“neighborhoods” (which will be discussed at more length in the discussion section).  As 
such, the patrol beat measure (i.e., geographically created boundaries by each department 
in order to divide territory to better manage and provide services) in the POPN data is 
essentially a proxy for “neighborhoods.”  In fact, one file from the POPN data provides 
evidence that the research team homogenized the patrol beat measures.  Table 7 
illustrates a few examples of patrol beats in Indianapolis’ northern precinct and the 
respective census tracts that make up each beat.  In some cases, parts of a single census  
tract are included in two separate patrol beats.   
 A total of 98 patrol beats are represented in the data: 50 in Indianapolis across  
four police precincts and 48 in St. Petersburg across three police precincts.  Structural  
measures from each patrol beat come from the U.S. Census data and official police 
department records.  Concentrated disadvantage is a weighted factor score (mean = 0; SD 
= 1) tapping into levels of socioeconomic distress.  It includes the sum of the following 
census items: percent of the population that falls 50% below the poverty level, percent 
unemployed, and percent female-headed households with children (λ = 3.07; pattern 
loadings > .80); unlike from Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) measure, percent minority was 
not included in the concentrated disadvantage factor.  Concentrated disadvantage ranged 
from -1.46 to 3.31.   
 The weighted factor score, however, revealed a slight skew (skewness / standard  
error of skewness equaled 2.94).  Similar to Terrill and Reisig (2003), the skewed 
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Table 7 
 
Investigating Beats versus Census Tracts 
Beats Census Tracts 
 
1111 
320700 
321200* 
321300 
321400* 
 
1121 
321800* 
321900 
322200* 
 
 
1131 
321200* 
321800* 
322100 
322200* 
322300 
 
 
1141 
321400* 
321700 
322400 
322500 
322600 
 
1151 
350200 
350300 
351000 
351500 
* = census tract spans multiple patrol beats 
 
distribution was addressed by first adding a constant of 2.46 and then performing the 
natural log transformation.  This transformation was effective in normalizing the 
distribution (skewness / standard error of skewness now equaled .19).  Logged 
concentrated disadvantage ranged from 0 to 1.75 with a mean of .82 (SD = .40). 
 Homicide rate is the rate of police-recorded murders in a patrol beat per 1,000 
residents during 1996 and 1997 for Indianapolis and St. Petersburg, respectively.  This 
measure was not included in the original dataset; however, another scholar who had 
previously worked with the POPN data provided it.  The measure, unlike that of 
concentrated disadvantage, had a small missing data issue; homicide rates in 18 beats 
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were unable to be calculated, resulting in measures for 80 out of the 98 total patrol beats.  
A natural log transformation was successful in normalizing the variable’s distribution 
(skewness / standard error of skewness now equaled -.70).  The logged homicide rate 
ranged from -13.82 to 2.30 with a mean of -5.85 (SD = 7.27).   
 A patrol beat’s percent minority residents was also captured.  Percent minority  
exhibited wide variation, ranging from 0.97 to 100% minority (mean = 39.98; SD = 
36.50).  Upon closer examination, the variable revealed a slight positive skew (skewness / 
standard error of skewness equaled 2.32).  After adding a constant of 1.97 and then 
performing a natural log transformation, the slight positive skew was reduced (skewness / 
standard error of skewness equaled .19).  Logged percent minority ranged from 1.08 to 
4.62 with a mean of 3.20 (SD = 1.15).  Summary statistics for the patrol beat-level 
measures are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
 
Summary Statistics of Patrol Beats Characteristics 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Logged Concentrated Disadvantage .82 .40 .00 – 1.75 
 
Logged Homicide Rate  
 
-5.85 
 
 
7.27 
 
-13.82 – 2.30 
Logged Percent Minority  3.20 1.15 1.08 – 4.62 
    
 
Control Variables 
 Individual-level characteristics from both parties involved, officers and citizens, 
as well as situational characteristics are included as controls.  Given that the trained 
observers were able to witness police-citizen interactions as they unfolded in real time, a 
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number of relevant encounter-level and individual-level citizen factors are provided in 
the data; the individual-level officer characteristics were provided from the officer 
surveys.  Many of the encounter and citizen level variables were simply observed; 
therefore, they were based on what the trained observer saw with his/her own eyes, as is 
standard with the systematic social observation research design.  Whether a citizen 
suffered from mental illness and/or whether he/she was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, for example, were coded based on visible signs or indications from the 
individual citizen.  As previously mentioned, only citizens characterized as “suspects” are 
included in the analyses.   
Situational Variables  
 A dummy variable (1 = yes), titled suspect weapon, was included to measure 
whether a suspect possessed a weapon.  Only 2.7% (n = 90) of all suspects who 
encountered officers were observed to have been in possession of some type of weapon.  
Suspect arrest (1 = yes) was measured using another dummy variable used to indicate 
whether or not the suspect was arrested during the course of the police encounter; 18.8% 
(n = 523) of all suspect-officer interactions resulted in an arrest.  Prior research using the 
POPN data has employed a number of other situational characteristics, such as the level 
of suspect disrespect directed toward officers and the amount of evidence of a suspect’s 
wrongdoing (e.g., officer’s observations of illegal behavior).  These studies, however, 
were largely conducted by members of the research team.  While examining the 
frequency distributions of these variables, I discovered that they had a significant issue 
with missing values in the publically available data (suspect disrespect had 84.7% 
missing values; police observing illegal behavior had 31.6% missing values).  I elected to 
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exclude variables with a substantial amount of missing data rather than risk reducing the 
sample size in the analyses.   
Individual-Level Variables  
Citizen (Suspect) Characteristics.  Suspect race/ethnicity is dummy variable (1 = yes) 
used to measure whether the suspect is member of a minority group.  Because such a 
small percentage of Hispanic (3.1%), Asian (1.0%), and “other” minority (0.3%) suspects 
were observed, they were all collapsed with Black suspects (58.6%) to form a general 
minority group; 63.0% of the suspects were categorized as “minority” (n = 2,094) with 
the other 37% of suspects being categorized as “white” (n = 1,231).  Suspect sex is 
measured using another dummy variable (1 = male; 0 = female); 75.2% of the suspects 
were male (n = 2502) and 24.8% were female (n = 823).  Additionally, the information 
from the SSO was used to gain insight into whether the suspects appeared under 
influence of drugs/alcohol, exhibited symptoms of mental illness, and appeared to be in 
an emotional state of fear or anger at the beginning of the encounter.  All three were 
measured using dummy variables.  A little less than one-quarter of suspects (n = 755; 
22.8%) appeared intoxicated; the data did not allow for the parsing out of drugs and 
alcohol, as has been typical of most prior research.  Three percent of suspects (n = 98) 
exhibited symptoms of mental illness.  Just under one-quarter of suspects (n = 760; 
22.9%) appeared to be in an emotional state characterized by fear or anger when the 
police encounter began.  Summary statistics for the situational and suspect characteristics 
are presented in Table 9. 
Officer characteristics.  Officer race/ethnicity is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
officer was a member of a minority group (1 = yes; 0 = no).  Because there were so few 
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Table 9 
Summary Statistics for Situational and Suspect Characteristics 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Situational 
     Suspect Weapons 
 
.03 
 
-- 
 
0 – 1 
 
     Suspect Arrest 
 
Suspect (Individual) 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
 
     Suspect Sex 
 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
 
     Mental Illness 
 
     Emotional State 
 
.19 
 
 
.63 
 
.75 
 
.23 
 
.03 
 
.23 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0 – 1 
 
 
0 – 1 
 
0 – 1 
 
0 – 1 
 
0 – 1 
 
0 – 1 
 
Hispanic/Latino (n = 4), Asian (n = 4), and “other” minority (n = 20) officers, they were 
all collapsed with Black officers (n = 109) to form a general minority officer group; 
21.6% of the officers were categorized as “minority” (n = 137) with other 78.4% of 
officers being categorized as white (n = 498).  Officer sex is measured using another 
dummy variable (1 = male; 0 = female); 85.0% of the officers were male (n = 542) and 
15.0% were female (n = 96).  Officer education level is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the officer holds at least an Associate’s degree (1 = yes); 58.0% of the officers 
had earned such a degree (n = 368).   
 Officer age and years experience (i.e., job tenure) were extremely highly 
correlated (r = .89; p < .001).  The decision was made to include years experience over 
age since it is possible to have an older officer (e.g., 35 years old) who is a rookie.  Years 
experience is measured by the total number of years that one has been employed as a  
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sworn law enforcement officer.  It ranged from less than one year to 33 years with a mean  
of 10.44 (SD = 7.56).  A site dummy variable was also included to control for the 
department in which an officer worked (1 = Indianapolis); 62.4% of the sample were 
employed by the Indianapolis Police Department and 37.6% were  
employed by the St. Petersburg Police Department.  Summary statistics for the officer  
characteristics are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 
 
Summary Statistics for Officer Characteristics 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Race/Ethnicity .22 -- 0 – 1 
 
Sex 
 
Education Level 
 
Years Experience 
 
Site 
 
.85 
 
.58 
 
10.44 
 
.62 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
7.56 
 
-- 
 
0 – 1 
 
0 – 1 
 
< 1 – 33 
 
0 – 1 
 
Analytical Strategy 
RQ #1: Does variation of structural characteristics at the patrol beat level such as 
concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the percentage of minority citizens, 
predict how an officer views his/her occupational outlook (i.e., culture)?  
 The first research question tests whether the social structure of patrol beats shapes 
officers’ attitudes/perceptions.  Given that patrol beat characteristics (level 2 variables) 
are being used to predict an outcome at the individual level (a level 1 variable), research 
question #1 sought to use a hierarchical/multi-level modeling strategy.  The multi-level 
modeling approach has become customary for estimating contextual effects when 
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individuals are nested within a higher order unit of analysis (e.g., neighborhoods, 
schools) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  The approach permits the simultaneous 
investigation of both patrol beat- and individual-level variance components on the 
dependent variable of interest: police culture.  
 However, upon further investigation of data there was a significant issue with the 
nature of “nesting” in the dataset.  Officers are embedded and work in particular patrol 
beats; thus, they are “nested” within beats –as displayed in Figure 4.  A minimum of ten 
observations (i.e., officers) of a level 1 variable is necessary for estimating a 
hierarchical/multi-level model (Mok & Flynn, 1998).  Aside from those patrol beats 
serving “downtown” and other high call volume areas, many beats had less than 10 
officers currently working in them.  Rather than excluding those beats with less than 10 
officers or risk incorrectly employing a hierarchical modeling strategy with less than 10 
level 1 observations, a decision was made to change the methodology. 
 Traditional regression analyses offer the ability to test the influence of contextual  
 
Figure 4  
 
Officers Nested Within Patrol Beats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Patrol Beat 1 Patrol Beat 2 Patrol Beat 3 
Officer 
1 
Officer 
2 
Officer 
3 
Officer 
4 
Officer 
5 
Officer 
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variables (e.g., patrol beat’s concentrated disadvantage) on an individual-level outcome 
by using the “cluster” function in STATA.  This technique has even been termed the 
“poor man’s HLM”, an acronym for hierarchical linear modeling.  In this case, the 
dependent variables –membership in the “pro”, “con”, and “mid-range” culture groups– 
were regressed on the patrol beat characteristics –concentrated disadvantage, homicide 
rate, percent minority– using a series of binary logistic regression analyses.  All 
regression equations clustered by patrol beats.  Separate models were run to predict 
membership in each “pro”, “con”, and “mid-range” culture group (1 = yes/membership; 0 
= no).  I elected to use police culture dummy variables instead of a multinomial outcome 
variable for ease of the interpretation of results.  The use of police culture dummy 
variables also assisted in ease of testing research question #3 (i.e., using a dummy 
variable to create an interactive term with a patrol beat characteristic like concentrated 
disadvantage).  Additionally, separate models were run testing the impact of each patrol 
beat characteristic.  Controls for relevant officer characteristics –race/ethnicity, sex,  
education level, years experience, and site (see Table 10) were also included. 
RQ #2: Do officers who work in the same patrol beats share a similar occupational 
outlook (i.e., outlook) or is there variation? 
 Instead of focusing on police culture at the individual officer level, the second 
research question moves toward understanding collective police culture at the patrol beat 
level.  If patrol beat characteristics like concentrated disadvantage, homicide rate, and/or 
percent minority residents do influence an officer’s attitudes/perceptions, we might 
expect to find considerable agreement on the police culture measures (e.g., trichotomized 
officer groups) among officers working within in the same patrol beat.  Unlike research 
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question #1, a hierarchical/multi-level modeling strategy was employed to test research 
question #2 because only the initial step was used.  The first step in any multi-level 
analysis estimates an unconditional, random analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for 
the level 1 variable.  The unconditional model is useful for investigating whether or not 
significant between-group variation exists, which in this case refers to patrol beats.  If the 
variance component is statistically significant, or the 95% confidence interval does not 
include “0”, then this indicates that the level 1 variable varies across the level 2 variable.  
A statistically significant variance component and/or the 95% confidence interval that 
does not include “0” justifies moving forward with the multi-level analysis, suggesting 
that there is evidence of between-patrol beat variation in police culture.  However, only 
the initial unconditional, random analysis of variance (ANOVA) models were run to 
examine whether membership each of the “pro”, “con”, and “mid-range” culture groups 
significantly varied across patrol beats. 
RQ #3: Does the inclusion of police culture at the officer level moderate the relationship  
between patrol beat context and police use of physical force? 
 As discussed, the third research question builds on two sets of initial findings 
from previous work: 1) patrol beat context is associated with use of force (Terrill & 
Reisig, 2003) and 2) individual officer culture is associated with use of force (Terrill et 
al., 2003).  Two series of analyses were run: one using Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) 
operationalization, which included verbal force as its own category and instances of 
handcuffing in the restraint technique category, and my recoded measure of use of 
physical force, which collapsed verbal force into no physical force and did not include 
handcuffing in the restraint technique category.  A series of hierarchical multinomial 
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logistic regression models were used to assess research question #3.  Similar to the 
methods proposed for research question #2, an unconditional, random analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) model was estimated for the new dependent variable: police use of 
physical force.   
 Upon finding that police use of force did, indeed, significantly vary across patrol 
beats for both dependent variable operationalizations, I moved on to the second set of 
models used to replicate Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) finding that patrol beat characteristics 
(e.g., concentrated disadvantage, homicide rate) were associated with police use of force.  
The police culture variables were then included in the next set of multi-level models as 
interactive terms (e.g., “pro culture” officers X a patrol beat’s level of concentrated 
disadvantage) to assess whether/the degree to which the inclusion of this new variable 
modifies the relationship between patrol beat context and use of force.  The series of 
hierarchical multinomial logistic regressions were analyzed using the generalized linear 
latent and mixed models (GLAMM) program in STATA 13.   
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Chapter 4 
ANALYSES 
RQ #1: Does variation of structural characteristics at the patrol beat level, such as 
concentrated disadvantage, homicide rates, and the percentage of minority citizens, 
predict how an officer views his/her occupational outlook (i.e., culture)? 
Bivariate Correlations 
 Table 11 provides zero-order correlations for the variables of interest.  Focusing 
on the hypothesized relationships, the patrol beat’s level of concentrated disadvantage is 
correlated with officers in the “pro culture” (r = .09; p < .05) and the “con culture” (r = -
.13; p < .01) groups, but not the “mid-range culture” group (r = .03; p > .05).  Both 
statistically significant correlations are in the expected direction: officers currently 
working in patrol beats characterized by higher levels of concentrated disadvantage are 
more likely to be members of the “pro culture” cluster and less likely to be members of 
the “con culture” cluster.  Moving on to the second set of hypothesized relationships, the 
patrol beat’s homicide rate is negatively correlated with officers in the “con culture” 
group (r = -.14; p < .01) and approaches significance with officers in the “pro culture” 
group (r = .08; p < .10).  A patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents was only 
statistically significantly correlated with officers falling into the “con culture” group (r = 
-.09; p < .05).  As a patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents increases, officers are 
less likely to be members of the “con culture” cluster. 
 There are a few other bivariate correlations worth noting.  Less experienced 
officers are more likely to work in patrol beats characterized by higher levels of 
concentrated disadvantage (r = -.26; p < .01) and a higher percentage of minority  
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residents (r = -.33; p < .01).  While this relationship might stem from departmental policy 
that rewards seniority (i.e., more experienced officers getting first choice for which patrol 
areas they desire to work), it does raise some concern.  The data reveal that officers 
without much time on the job are more likely to be placed in the very neighborhoods 
where police-community relationships are already contentious.  A more in-depth 
discussion of this policy implication will be revisited in the discussion section.  Attention 
is now turned to the multivariate analyses for a more thorough and rigorous examination 
of the theoretical relationships.   
Multivariate Analyses 
Model Diagnostics 
 A number of model diagnostic procedures were performed to ensure that the 
parameter estimates were unbiased.  Looking first at the zero-order correlations in Table 
11, only one measure exceeded the traditional .70 threshold (Licht, 1995).  Logged 
concentrated disadvantage and logged percent minority are significantly correlated at a 
problematic level (r = .76; p < .01) and are, therefore, not included in the same model.  In 
addition, variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of the models were all below 1.23 (see 
Kennedy, 1992).  Last, Breusch–Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity for each of the models 
revealed that all error terms held constant variances.  Table 12 provides the results/output 
of the model diagnostics for each of the models. 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 Table 13 displays the results from the first set of logistic regression analyses.  In 
model 1 on the left side column of the table, the “pro culture” cluster was regressed on 
logged concentrated disadvantage.  The Wald chi square test (12.37) shows that the  
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Table 12 
 
Model Diagnostics for Research Question #1 
Model VIFs Below Breusch-Pagan Tests 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
       Pro Culture 
       Con Culture 
       Mid-Range Culture 
 
 
1.17 
1.17 
1.17 
 
χ2 = 2.69; p = .85 
χ2 = 10.46; p = .11 
χ2 = .82; p = .99 
Homicide Rate 
       Pro Culture 
       Con Culture 
       Mid-Range Culture 
 
 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
 
χ2 = 3.52; p = .74 
χ2 = 10.76; p = .10 
χ2 = 1.01; p = .99 
Percent Minority 
       Pro Culture 
       Con Culture 
       Mid-Range Culture 
 
1.23 
1.23 
1.23 
 
χ2 = 1.41; p = .97 
χ2 = 9.07; p = .17 
χ2 = .79; p = .99 
 
model fits the data well and performs better than the constant-only model (p < .05; 
McFadden’s R-squared = .02).  It is important to note that a logistic regression does not 
estimate a true R-squared but instead a pseudo R-squared; the McFadden’s R-squared is 
the most conservative measure, and it was reported simply because it is the “default” 
option in STATA.  The statistically significant, positive association between logged 
concentrated disadvantage and membership in the “pro culture” cluster persists in the 
saturated model (b = .51; p < .05).  Stated differently, officers currently working in patrol 
beats characterized by higher levels of concentrated disadvantage are more likely to 
adhere to elements of the “pro culture” group – net of relevant control variables for 
officers’ socio-demographic backgrounds.  The odds ratio is 1.05, meaning that each ten 
percent increase in concentrated disadvantage results in a 5% increase in the log odds of 
an officer being a member of the “pro culture” group.  In terms of the control variables, 
racial/ethnic minority officers (b = -.58; p < .05; odds ratio = .59) were significantly less  
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likely to fall into the “pro culture” category. 
 Model 2 in center column of Table 13 tests the influence of a patrol beat’s level of 
concentrated disadvantage on officers’ membership in the “con culture” group (Wald χ2 = 
13.02; p < .05; McFadden’s R-squared = .03).  Results from this logistic regression 
model find a marginally significant relationship at the .05 alpha level: officers currently 
working in patrol beats characterized by a high level of concentrated disadvantage are 
less likely to fall into the “con culture” cluster (b = -.59; p < .10).  These results appear to 
bolster the findings from model one, suggesting a more robust association between this 
particular patrol beat feature and officers’ attitudes/perceptions.  While officers currently 
working in economically disadvantaged areas are more likely to possess attitudinal 
characteristics of the traditional police culture, they are also less likely to adhere to 
elements that run counter to the traditional police culture.  The odds ratio is 0.95, 
meaning that each ten percent increase in concentrated disadvantage results in a 5% 
decrease in the log odds of an officer being a member of the “con culture” group.  Results 
from the control variables point to the importance of officers’ years of experience: those 
who have been on the job longer were more likely to fall into the “con culture” category 
(b = .04; p < .01), although the influence is modest (odds ratio = 1.04). 
 Model 3 in the right hand column of Table 13 shows the results testing 
membership in the third and final “mid-range culture” group.  There is no association 
between a patrol beat’s level of concentrated disadvantage and whether officers are more 
or less likely to fall into this group.  In fact, the Wald chi square statistic (6.37) is not 
statistically significant (p = .38), suggesting that the model does not fit the data well and 
does not perform better than the constant only model. More specifically, none of the 
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covariates in the model were statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.  Attention is 
next placed on the influence of a patrol beat’s homicide rate.  
Homicide Rate 
 Table 14 showcases the results from the second set of logistic regression analyses.  
In model 1 on the left side column of the table, the “pro culture” cluster was regressed on 
logged homicide rates.  The Wald chi square test (14.49) shows that the model fits the 
data well and performs better than the constant-only model (p < .05; McFadden’s R-
squared = .02).  The statistically significant, positive association between logged 
homicide rate and membership in the “pro culture” cluster persists in the saturated model 
(b = .03; p < .05).  Officers currently working in patrol beats characterized by higher 
levels of crime (i.e., more murders/non-negligent homicides per 1,000 residents) are more 
likely to adhere to elements of the “pro culture” group – net of relevant control variables 
for officers’ socio-demographic backgrounds.  The odds ratio is 1.003, meaning that each 
ten percent increase in the homicide rate results in a .3% increase in the log odds of an 
officer being a member of the “pro culture” group.  While statistically significant, the 
influence of the patrol beat’s homicide rate appears to be considerably weaker than that 
of a patrol beat’s level of concentrated disadvantage.  
 Model 2 in center column of Table 14 tests the influence of a patrol beat’s 
homicide rate on officers’ membership in the “con culture” group (Wald χ2 = 19.20; p < 
.01; McFadden’s R-squared = .05).  Results from this logistic regression model find a 
statistically significant relationship at the .05 alpha level: officers currently working in 
patrol beats characterized by a high crime (i.e., more murders/non-negligent homicides 
per 1,000 residents) are less likely to fall into the “con culture” cluster (b = -.04; p < .05).   
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Again, and similar to patterns found with concentrated disadvantage, these results appear  
to bolster the findings from model one, suggesting a more robust association between this 
particular patrol beat feature and officers’ attitudes/perceptions.  While officers currently 
working in high crime areas are more likely to possess attitudinal characteristics of the 
traditional police culture, they are also less likely to adhere to elements that run counter 
to the traditional police culture.  The odds ratio is 0.99, meaning that each ten percent 
increase in the homicide rate results in a 1% decrease in the log odds of an officer being a 
member of the “con culture” group.  Comparable patterns emerge for officers’ years of 
experience on the job and racial/ethnic background, suggesting the importance of both 
characteristics as significant correlates of individual officer culture.   
 Model 3 in the right side column of Table 14 shows the results testing  
membership in the “mid-range culture” group.  Like the pattern found for concentrated 
disadvantage, there is no association between a patrol beat’s homicide rate and whether 
officers are more or less likely to fall into this group.  The Wald chi square statistic (6.55) 
is not statistically significant (p = .36), which suggests that the model does not fit the data 
well and does not perform better than the constant only model.  Only one of the 
covariates in the model, the research site dummy variable  (1 = Indianapolis) was 
statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.  Attention is next placed on the influence of 
a patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents.  
Percent Minority 
 Table 15 presents the results from the third set of logistic regression analyses.  
Model 1 on the left side column tests the influence of a patrol beat’s percentage of 
minority residents on membership in the “pro culture” group, with model 2 in the center  
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column testing membership in the “con culture” group, and model 3 in the right side  
column testing membership in the “mid-range culture” group.  Among all three models, 
the Wald chi square statistics were not statistically significant at the .05 alpha level 
(Model 1: χ2 = 8.73; Model 2: χ2 = 12.03; Model 3: χ2 = 6.49).  Model 2 predicting 
membership in the “con culture” group, however, was statistically significant at the .10 
alpha level.  Still, the logged percent minority coefficient did nor emerge as statistically 
significant.  A patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents does not appear to associated 
with membership in any of the three officer groups.   
 These findings are, in a sense, promising.  The results essentially mean that 
officers’ attitudinal/perceptual outlooks of their occupational roles, the citizens, etc. are 
not meaningfully influenced by the racial/ethnic composition of residents of the patrol 
beat in which one currently works.  Officers are not, for instance, more likely to adhere to 
elements associated with the “traditional” police culture in patrol beats characterized by 
large percentages of minority residents.  Instead, officers’ occupational outlooks are more 
likely to be influenced by factors like concentrated disadvantage and, to a much lesser 
extent, homicide rates.  
Non-linear Effects 
 The impact of patrol beat characteristics on police culture was also tested as a 
non-linear function.  Hipp and Yates (2011) argue that a substantial portion of 
neighborhood and crime research, particularly studies examining the poverty-crime link, 
simply assume a linear relationship between the two.  They, among other scholars, 
encourage researchers to model other functional forms.  It is possible that the influence of 
a particular patrol beat characteristic, such as concentrated disadvantage, has a  
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diminishing positive effect (i.e., a plateau effect) or an exponentially increasing effect on  
the outcome variables of interest.   
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 A patrol beat’s logged concentrated disadvantage squared-term was created and 
inserted into the models, essentially mirroring the first set analyses in Table 13.  The 
additive logged concentrated disadvantage term was included as well.  Results are 
presented in Table 16.  Model 1 predicts membership in the “pro culture” group (Wald χ2 
= 15.80; p < .05; McFadden’s R-squared = .03).  The additive concentrated disadvantage 
coefficient remains statistically significant (b = 3.31; p < .05), net of the control 
variables.  Consistent with the findings from Mode1 1 in Table 13, as a patrol beat’s level 
of concentrated disadvantage increases, so too does the likelihood that an officer will fall 
into the “pro culture” group compared to not.  The concentrated disadvantage squared-
term also emerges as a significant predictor of membership in the “pro culture” group (b 
= -1.62; p < .05).   
 Given that the additive term’s coefficient is positive and the squared term’s 
coefficient is negative, it appears that relationship between concentrated disadvantage 
and traditional police culture is non-linear and has a diminishing positive effect more 
specifically.  Stated differently, a patrol beat’s degree of concentrated disadvantage 
increases the likelihood that an officer will fall into the “pro culture” group –but only up 
until a certain level of disadvantage.  The signs of the coefficients suggest that a plateau 
or threshold effect is taking place, whereby there comes a point when concentrated 
disadvantage no longer statistically predicts officer membership in the “pro culture” 
group.  It is important to highlight that the concentrated disadvantage additive coefficient  
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and subsequent odds ratio testing the non-linear function are substantially larger than that 
of the model testing the linear function (i.e., Model 1 in Table 13).  Moving from the 
linear relationship to the non-linear relationship, the unstandardized concentrated 
disadvantage coefficient increases from .51 to 3.31, and the odds ratio increases from 
1.05 to 1.37.   
 Model 2 in Table 16 predicts membership in the “con culture” group using the 
patrol beat’s concentrated disadvantage additive and squared term.  The Wald χ2  statistic 
(13.17) shows that the model is marginally significant at the .05 alpha level (p = .07).  
Neither the concentrated disadvantage additive (b = -.86; p = .61) nor the squared term (b 
= .16; p = .88) seems to significantly influence membership in this group.  Lastly, model 
3 predicts membership in the “mid-range culture” group.  It too borders on marginal 
significance at the .05 alpha level (Wald χ2 = 11.92; p = .10; McFadden’s R-squared = 
.01).  Both the additive and squared terms emerge as statistically significant.  Because the 
additive term’s coefficient is negative (b = -2.24; p < .05; odds ratio = 0.81) and the 
squared term’s coefficient is positive (b = 1.30; p < .05; odds ratio = 1.20), it appears as 
though officers are less likely to fall into the “mid-range culture” group as a patrol beat’s 
percentage of minority residents increases; however, at a certain point officers become 
more likely to fall into the “mid-range culture” group.  
Homicide Rate 
 A patrol beat’s logged homicide rate squared-term was also created and inserted 
into the models, essentially mirroring the second set analyses in Table 14.  The additive 
logged homicide rate term was included as well.  Results are presented in Table 17.  
Model 1 predicts membership in the “pro culture” group (Wald χ2 = 19.64; p < .05;  
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McFadden’s R-squared = .03).  The additive homicide rate coefficient remains  
 
Table 17 
 
Patrol Beat Homicide Rates Squared Term 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
     Logged Homicide Rate2 
 
-.19 (.10)+ [.98] 
-.02 (.01)* [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.03 (.01)* [.97] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.14 (.25) [.87] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.52 (.29)+ [.59] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.02 (.20) [.98] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) .01 (.19) [1.01] 
 
Wald Chi Square 
 
19.05** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
statistically significant; however, the sign of the coefficient is reversed from “positive” in 
the linear function model (Model 2, Table 14; b = .03) to “negative” in the non-linear 
function model (b = -.19; p < .05), net of the control variables.  Such a reversal from the 
original coefficient is certainly suspect and may be due to high levels of collinearity that 
were introduced with the addition of the squared term.  Variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
were examined, and the mean VIF with the homicide rate squared was 31 – highlighting a 
problematic level of collinearity.  Therefore, it was not possible to test the non-linear 
function for this model.  Given this problematic level of collinearity, models testing both 
the “con culture” and the “mid-range culture” groups were not performed.   
Percent Minority 
 Last, a patrol beat’s logged percentage of minority residents squared-term was  
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created and inserted into the models, mirroring the first set analyses in Table 15.  The 
additive logged percent minority term was included as well.  Results are presented in  
Table 18.  Among all three models, the Wald chi square statistics were not statistically 
significant at the .05 alpha level (Model 1-pro culture: χ2 = 8.97; Model 2-con culture: χ2 
= 12.62; Model 3-mid-range culture: χ2 = 6.93).  Model 2 predicting membership in the 
“con culture” group, however, was statistically significant at the .10 alpha level (p = .08).  
Still, neither the percent minority additive coefficient not the squared term emerges as 
significant predictors of membership in the “con culture” category.  A patrol beat’s 
percentage of minority residents squared term does not appear to associated with 
membership in any of the three officer groups.  As such, a patrol beat’s racial makeup of 
citizens does not exert a statistically significant linear or non-linear effect on officers’ 
cultural outlooks.   
RQ #2: Do officers who work in the same patrol beats share a similar occupational 
outlook (i.e., outlook) or is there variation? 
 As previously discussed, a preliminary step in the hierarchical/multi-level 
modeling process involves fitting an unconditional, random analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) model.  This first step fits a model with no predictors or control variables.  
Instead, only the dependent variable is included, along with a random effect placed on the 
level two patrol beat variable.  Three separate unconditional models were estimated, 
predicting membership in the “pro culture”, “con culture”, and “mid-range culture” 
groups.  A statistically significant variance component, or a 95% confidence interval that 
does not include “0” falling in between it, indicates that officer membership in a 
particular group (e.g., “pro culture”) varies significantly across patrol beats –meaning that 
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there is attributable between-patrol beat variation in police culture.  In addition, the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which represents the proportion of the total 
variance that is attributable to between-group differences, can be calculated after running 
the unconditional model (Johnson, 2010).  The ICC quantifies the ratio of the between 
group variance to the total group variance in the outcome; therefore, larger ICCs suggest 
that a greater proportion of total variance in the outcome variable is due to between-patrol 
beat differences.  Findings are presented in Table 19.  For each model, the analysis 
consists of a total of 556 officers nested within 98 patrol beats.  There was an average of 
5 officers per beat, ranging from 1 to 19 officers.   
 
Table 19 
 
Unconditional, Random ANOVAs of Officer Culture across Patrol Beats 
Model Estimate (SE) 95% CI Chibar2 (p value) ICC 
Pro Culture 
 
1.39e-10 (.33) 0 – . 1.00e-12 (1.00) 4.05 X 10-21 
Con Culture 
 
.55 (.19) .28 – 1.09 3.49 (.03)* .084 
Mid-Range Culture .10 (.46) .00 – 6.14 .01 (.45) .003 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 The top row in Table 19 displays the results from the first “pro culture” 
unconditional model.  The variance component is extremely small with a standard 
notation of 1.39 to negative tenth power.  Finding that the variance component is not 
statistically significant and that zero falls in between the 95% confidence interval, officer 
membership in the “pro culture” group does not significantly vary across patrol beats 
(level 2); there is no attributable between-patrol beat variation, as suggested by miniscule 
ICC (4.05 X 10-21).  Stated differently, there is little evidence of a patrol beat culture  
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consisting of certain beats with officers sharing similar attitudes/perceptions in line with  
“traditional” police culture.  It appears that patrol beat characteristics, specifically 
concentrated disadvantage and, to a lesser degree, homicide rates, are more likely to 
influence officers falling into the “pro culture” group at the individual level.     
 Results from “con culture” model in the middle row portray a different narrative.  
The variance component (.55) does emerge as statistically significant at the .05 alpha 
level and zero does not fall in between the 95% confidence interval (.28 – 1.09).  These 
indicators suggest that membership in the “con culture” group (i.e., anti “traditional” 
police culture) randomly varies across the patrol beats that officers are currently working 
in (level 2), and it provides support that between-patrol beat variation exists.  Moreover, 
the ICC was calculated in order to get a sense of the magnitude of inter-patrol beat 
variation.  The ICC is .084, meaning that 8.4% of the total variation in membership in the 
“con culture” group is attributable to between-patrol beat variation.  This number may 
seem trivial; however, it is common in multilevel analysis for between-group variation to 
represent a relatively small proportion of the total variance (Johnson, 2010).  Liska 
(1990) argues that this does not indicate that between-group variation is unimportant.  
Combining this finding with results from the first research question, evidence appears to 
show that a patrol beat culture is evident: officers working in beats characterized by 
lower levels of concentrated disadvantage and homicide rates tend to share membership 
in the “con culture” group.  Results from the third unconditional model in the third row 
indicate that membership in the “mid-range culture” group does not significantly vary 
across patrol beats (p = .45; 95% confidence interval = .00 – 6.14); there is no attributable 
between-patrol beat variation in membership in this group (ICC = .0033).  Overall, the 
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findings indicate mixed support for research question #2 and the notion of a patrol beat 
culture. 
RQ #3: Does the inclusion of police culture at the officer level moderate the relationship 
between patrol beat context and police use of physical force? 
 The analyses for this research question are contingent upon a few factors.  First, 
police use of force must significantly vary across patrol beats.  If it does not, then there is 
no reason to move forward with the analysis.  Using gllamm in STATA 13, I estimated 
two sets of preliminary hierarchical multinomial logistic regressions that only included 
the dependent variable: one for Terrill and Reisig’s operationalization and the other for 
my proposed measured of physical force.  Results from these preliminary models are 
presented in Tables 20 and 21, respectively.  Using “0” (no force; no physical force) as 
the reference category, each level of force significantly varied across patrol beats 
compared to the “no force” or “no physical force” categories.  As expected, all three 
levels of physical force are less likely to occur than no force or physical force.  The 
findings justify proceeding with the analyses with an attempt to replicate previous work  
 
Table 20 
 
Police Use of Force Across Beats (Replication) 
Use of Force (no force = reference) b (SE) 95% CI 
Verbal Force 
Restraint Techniques (with handcuffing) 
-5.20 (.30)*** 
-1.35 (.08)*** 
-5.78 – -4.62 
-1.50 – -1.20 
Pain Compliance Tech. & Impact Weapons -3.49 (.14)*** -3.76 – -3.22 
 
                         Level 1 units = 2,676 
                         Level 2 units = 97 
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 21 
 
Police Use of Force Across Beats (Proposed Measure) 
Use of Force (no physical force = reference) b (SE) 95% CI 
Restraint Techniques -3.31 (.13)*** -3.57 – -3.05 
Pain Compliance Techniques -4.58 (.20)*** -4.98 – -4.18 
Impact Weapons 
 
                         Level 1 units = 2,676 
                         Level 2 units = 97 
-4.36 (.19)*** -4.73 – -3.99 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
that has uncovered a relationship between patrol beat characteristics and use of force. 
 A series of hierarchical multinomial logistic regressions were estimated for each 
of the two use of force dependent variables –this time with the inclusion of the patrol beat 
characteristics.  The results are presented in Tables 22 and 23, respectively.  Table 22 
provides the replication of Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) operationalization.  The findings 
show partial support that patrol beat characteristics are associated with police use of force 
for this particular measure.  A patrol beat’s homicide rate appears to be marginally 
associated with restraint techniques (b = .02; p < .10) and significantly positively 
associated with the combination of pain compliance techniques and impact weapons (b = 
.05; p < .05) compared to the “no force” reference category.  I was unable to replicate 
Terrill and Reisig’s finding regarding the influence of a patrol beat’s level of 
concentrated disadvantage. 
 Table 23 provides the results from my proposed operationalization of use of force.  
There is little evidence that patrol beat characteristics significantly influence police use of 
force.  A patrol beat’s homicide rate is marginally associated with pain compliance 
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Table 22 
Patrol Beat Characteristics and Use of Force (Replication) 
 
Use of Force 
Model 1 
Con. Dis. 
Model 2 
Homicide Rate 
Model 3 
Percent Minority 
Verbal Force .82 (.75) .08 (.05) .17 (.31) 
Restraint Tech.  .24 (.19) .02 (.01)+ .06 (.07) 
Pain Comp. & 
Impact Weapons 
 
 
.62 (.38) 
 
Level 1 = 2,676 
Level 2 = 97 
.05 (.02)* 
 
Level 1 = 2,619 
Level 2 = 80 
.08 (.14) 
 
Level 1 = 2,676 
Level 2 = 97 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
“No force” = reference category 
 
 
 
Table 23 
 
Patrol Beat Characteristics and Use of Force (Proposed Measure) 
 
Use of Force 
Model 1 
Con. Dis. 
Model 2 
Homicide Rate 
Model 3 
Percent Minority 
Restraint Tech. .05 (.33) .01 (.02) .26 (.13)* 
Pain Compliance  .66 (.57) .06 (.03)+ .01 (.20) 
Impact Weapons 
 
 
.61 (.51) 
 
Level 1 = 2,676 
Level 2 = 97 
.03 (.03) 
 
Level 1 = 2,619 
Level 2 = 80 
.15 (.19) 
 
Level 1 = 2,676 
Level 2 = 97 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
“No physical force” = reference category 
 
 
techniques (b = .06; p = .052), and a patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents is 
significantly positively associated with the use of restraint techniques (b = .26; p < .05) 
relative to the “no physical force” reference category; however, no other relationship 
between patrol beat characteristics and categories of physical force emerged.  It is 
important to note that the relationships are all in the expected direction, as they were in 
Lawton’s (2007) analysis, but most fail to achieve statistical significance –even without 
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including any controls for situational as well as individual officer and suspect 
characteristics.  
 These findings certainly come as a surprise.  I was largely unable to replicate the 
relationship that I based my third research question around.  Despite the fact that I 
generally failed to find a relationship between the patrol beat characteristics and my 
proposed use of force variable, I still analyzed whether the addition of individual police 
culture measures moderated the relationship between the two.  It is possible, for example, 
that officers possessing a certain cultural outlook might interact with a patrol beat 
characteristic to predict police use of force (or the lack thereof).  Interaction terms were 
created by multiplying each of the three patrol beat characteristics by each of the three 
police culture variables, creating a total of 9 interactive terms.  For example, the patrol 
beat’s logged of level concentrated disadvantage was interacted with the “pro culture” 
dummy variable (concentrated disadvantage X pro culture).  A series of nine hierarchical 
multinomial logistic regressions were estimated for each use of force operationalization – 
one for each interaction term.  For each model, both the additive measures from the 
original patrol beat characteristic and police culture variable were included in addition to 
the interaction term; no control variables for situational or individual officer and suspect 
characteristics were added to the models just yet in an attempt to examine whether the 
interactive terms exerted a significant effect on police use of force in such basic model. 
 Tables 24 (concentrated disadvantage), 25 (homicide rates), and 26 (percent 
minority) present the results from the interactions based on Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) 
operationalization of police use of force.  Next, Tables 27 (concentrated disadvantage), 
28 (homicide rates), and 29 (percent minority) present the results from the interactions  
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based on my proposed operationalization. 
 
Table 24 
 
Patrol Beat Concentrated Disadvantage and Officer Culture Interactions 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Culture 
Verbal Force 
     Con. Dis. 
     Culture 
     Con. Dis. X Culture 
 
-1.25 (.91) 
-1.51 (1.72) 
1.20 (1.82) 
 
-.61 (1.06) 
1.58 (1.36) 
-.81 (1.61) 
 
-.97 (.96) 
-.39 (1.45) 
-.09 (1.71) 
Restraint Techniques 
     Con Dis. 
     Culture 
     Con. Dis. X Culture 
 
.18 (.22) 
.00 (.30) 
.02 (.30) 
 
.19 (.20) 
-.06 (.34) 
-.04 (.35) 
 
.19 (.22) 
.05 (.30) 
.01 (.30) 
Pain Compl. + Impact 
     Con Dis. 
     Culture 
     Con. Dis. X Culture 
 
.97 (.51)+ 
.36 (.86) 
-.60 (.82) 
 
.65 (.46) 
-.47 (1.03) 
.47 (.97) 
 
.64 (.53) 
-.01 (.84) 
.25 (.79) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no force”= ref categ. 
 
 
 
Table 25  
 
Patrol Beat Homicide Rates and Officer Culture Interactions 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Culture 
Verbal Force 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
 
.10 (.07) 
-.57 (.73) 
.20 (.38) 
 
.06 (.07) 
1.12 (.73) 
.35 (.43) 
 
.36 (.30) 
-.73 (.81) 
-.36 (.31) 
Restraint Techniques 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
 
.00 (.01) 
.05 (.13) 
.02 (.02) 
 
.01 (.01) 
.03 (.16) 
.02 (.02) 
 
.03 (.01)* 
-.07 (.13) 
-.04 (.02)* 
Pain Compl. & Impact 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
 
.06 (.03)* 
-.34 (.33) 
-.04 (.04) 
 
.04 (.02) 
.07 (.37) 
.03 (.05) 
 
.04 (.03) 
.27 (.31) 
.01 (.04) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no force”= ref categ. 
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Table 26  
 
Patrol Beat Percent Minority Residents and Officer Culture Interactions 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Culture 
Restraint Techniques 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
 
.12 (.37) 
-4.44 (4.47) 
.98 (1.07) 
 
.17 (.45) 
-.36 (2.69) 
.38 (.69) 
 
.64 (.47) 
3.07 (2.65) 
-.97 (.72) 
Pain Compliance 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
 
.07 (.08) 
.29 (.41) 
-.08 (.11) 
 
.02 (.08) 
-.33 (.46) 
.07 (.13) 
 
.03 (.08) 
-.01 (.42) 
.02 (.11) 
Impact Weapons 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
 
.18 (.18) 
1.07 (1.07) 
-.37 (.29) 
 
.01 (.17) 
-.65 (1.23) 
.18 (.33) 
 
-.04 (.19) 
-.49 (1.08) 
.20 (.29) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no force”= ref categ. 
 
 
Table 27 
 
Patrol Beat Concentrated Disadvantage and Officer Culture Interactions 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Culture 
Restraint Techniques 
     Con. Dis. 
     Culture 
     Con. Dis. X Culture 
 
.22 (.42) 
.79 (.59) 
-.78 (.61) 
 
-.42 (.38) 
-.80 (.70) 
.22 (.69) 
 
-.04 (.39) 
-.19 (.63) 
-.21 (.65) 
Pain Compliance 
     Con. Dis. 
     Culture 
     Con. Dis. X Culture 
 
1.29 (.90) 
1.44 (1.32) 
-1.12 (1.23) 
 
.43 (.67) 
-2.51 (2.17) 
2.05 (1.86) 
 
.74 (.78) 
-.12 (1.36) 
.04 (1.28) 
Impact Weapons 
     Con. Dis. 
     Culture 
     Con. Dis. X Culture 
 
.79 (.62) 
-.42 (1.25) 
-.29 (1.19) 
 
.73 (63) 
.37 (1.19) 
-.09 (1.15) 
 
.51 (.72) 
.04 (1.10) 
.38 (1.04) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no phys. force”= ref categ. 
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Table 28 
 
Patrol Beat Homicide Rates and Officer Culture Interactions 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Culture 
Restraint Techniques 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
 
-.01 (.02) 
-.07 (.30) 
-.03 (.03) 
 
-.03 (.02) 
.17 (.31) 
.05 (.03) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
-.43 (.32) 
-.02 (.03) 
Pain Compliance 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
 
.08 (.05) 
.18 (.46) 
-.05 (.07) 
 
.05 (.04) 
-.24 (.61) 
.02 (.09) 
 
.04 (.04) 
-.04 (.47) 
.04 (.08) 
Impact Weapons 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
 
.05 (.03) 
-.80 (.48)+ 
-.04 (.06) 
 
.03 (.03) 
.31 (.46) 
.04 (.07) 
 
.03 (.04) 
.46 (.41) 
.00 (.06) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no phys. force”= ref categ. 
 
 
 
Table 29 
 
Patrol Beat Minority Residents and Officer Culture Interactions 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Culture 
Restraint Techniques 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
 
.22 (.16) 
.13 (.93) 
-.01 (.24) 
 
.05 (.15) 
-1.94 (1.11)+ 
.39 (.21)+ 
 
.39 (.16)* 
1.45 (.93) 
-.15 (.17) 
Pain Compliance 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
 
.20 (.31) 
1.71 (1.57) 
-.40 (.43) 
 
-.20 (.23) 
-6.37 (3.88) 
1.56 (.91)+ 
 
.13 (.28) 
1.05 (1.58) 
-.32 (.44) 
Impact Weapons 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
 
.15 (.22) 
.29 (1.51) 
-.28 (.42) 
 
.17 (.24) 
1.17 (1.41) 
-.26 (.40) 
 
-.15 (.24) 
-1.31 (1.46) 
.48 (.39) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no phys. force”= ref categ. 
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In general, I found very little evidence of individual level police culture moderating the 
relationship between patrol beat characteristics and use of force for both sets of 
dependent variable operationalizations.  
 In the final set of analyses, I included the situational and individual-level citizen 
and officer control variables that were outlined in the methodology section.  Similar to 
the preceding analyses, separate models were estimated for each interaction term.  Table 
30 presents the results examining patrol beat levels of concentrated disadvantage, the 
police culture groups, the interactions between the two, and relevant control variables.  
Table 31 and Table 32 perform similar functions for the patrol beats’ homicide rate and 
percentage of minority residents, respectively.   
 Overall, the patrol beat characteristics, the officer culture group measures, and 
their interaction terms performed poorly compared to some of the controls.  This should  
not come as a surprise considering the lack of statistically significant findings from the 
unsaturated models in Tables 27 through 29.  A few coefficients emerge as significant; 
however, this may be due to a suppression effect taking place as a result of introducing an 
additional 11 control variables.  Turning attention to the control variables, officers, as 
expected, are more likely to employ each category of physical force on suspects who are 
arrested; each category of physical force is also consistently significantly associated with 
suspects who appear to be in an emotional state characterized by fear or anger at the 
beginning of the encounter.  A suspect in the possession of a weapon significantly 
increases the likelihood that officers will use restraint techniques compared to no physical 
force; however, this relationship does not emerge for the use of pain compliance 
techniques or impact weapons.  Suspects exhibiting signs of being under the influence of 
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Table 30: Patrol Beat Concentrated Disadvantage and Officer Culture Full Models 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Cul. 
Restraint Techniques 
     Concentrated Disadvantage 
     Culture 
     Concentrated Dis. X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
-.46 (.33) 
-.03 (.47) 
-.13 (.46) 
.90 (.36)* 
.55 (.19)** 
.64 (.20)** 
.63 (.22)** 
.37 (.18)* 
-.62 (.55) 
.69 (.18)*** 
-.35 (.23) 
.68 (.32)* 
-.12 (.18) 
-.04 (.02)* 
 
-.30 (.31) 
-.57 (.57) 
.86 (.56) 
.92 (.36)** 
.56 (.19)** 
.67 (.20)** 
.64 (.22)** 
.39 (.18)* 
-.65 (.55) 
.67 (.17)*** 
-.39 (.23)+ 
.65 (.32)* 
-.10 (.18) 
-.04 (.02)* 
 
.07 (.34) 
.41 (.46) 
-.44 (.46) 
.90 (.36)* 
.55 (.19)** 
.65 (.20)*** 
.64 (.22)** 
.39 (.18)* 
-.65 (.55) 
.66 (.18)*** 
-.36 (.23) 
.71 (.32)* 
-.12 (.18) 
-.04 (.02)* 
Pain Compliance Techniques 
     Concentrated Disadvantage 
     Culture 
     Concentrated Dis. X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
1.96 (1.00)* 
1.53 (1.38) 
-1.50 (1.29) 
-.05 (1.09) 
2.68 (.54)*** 
-.36 (.50) 
.68 (.60) 
1.41 (.48)** 
1.40 (.83)+ 
1.91 (.48)*** 
-1.05 (.79) 
.95 (1.06) 
.07 (.49) 
.03 (.04) 
 
.74 (.72) 
-3.87 (2.42) 
3.46 (2.10) 
-.03 (1.09) 
2.74 (.55)*** 
-.42 (.50) 
.64 (.60) 
1.45 (.48)** 
1.37 (.83)+ 
1.94 (.49)*** 
-1.12 (.80) 
1.01 (1.06) 
.11 (.50) 
.02 (.04) 
 
1.28 (.84) 
.33 (1.37) 
-.15 (1.29) 
-.06 (1.08) 
2.67 (.54)*** 
-.41 (.50) 
.72 (.61) 
1.39 (.48)** 
1.43 (.83)+ 
1.89 (.48)*** 
-1.04 (.80) 
1.09 (1.06) 
.01 (.49) 
.02 (.04) 
Impact Weapons 
     Concentrated Disadvantage 
     Culture 
     Concentrated Dis. X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.70 (.74) 
-.60 (1.32) 
-.35 (1.25) 
-.05 (1.08) 
3.77 (.63)*** 
.21 (.47) 
1.72 (.78)* 
.68 (.41)+ 
1.66 (.85)+ 
1.90 (.42)*** 
.27 (.47) 
.68 (.79) 
-.13 (.45) 
-.03 (.04) 
 
.41 (.71) 
.20 (1.39) 
.47 (1.36) 
-.06 (1.07) 
3.76 (.63)*** 
.37 (.48) 
1.80 (.79)* 
.71 (.41)+ 
1.49 (.87)+ 
1.87 (.41)*** 
.17 (.47) 
.67 (.78) 
-.14 (.45) 
-.05 (.04) 
 
.49 (.80) 
.31 (1.19) 
.14 (1.13) 
-.07 (1.07) 
3.71 (.63)*** 
.14 (.48) 
1.77 (.78)* 
.68 (.41)+ 
1.47 (.86)+ 
1.86 (.41)*** 
.30 (.47) 
.72 (.78) 
-.16 (.45) 
-.03 (.04) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no phys. force”= ref categ. 
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Table 31: Patrol Beat Homicide Rates and Officer Culture Full Models 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Cult. 
Restraint Techniques 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.02 (.02) 
-.23 (.20) 
-.02 (.02) 
.90 (.36)* 
.58 (.19)** 
.57 (.20)** 
.65 (.22)** 
.33 (.18)+ 
-.55 (.55) 
.71 (.18)*** 
-.32 (.23) 
.77 (.33)* 
-.13 (.18) 
-.03 (.02)+ 
 
.01 (.02) 
.32 (.24) 
.02 (.03) 
.91 (.36)* 
.57 (.19)** 
.59 (.20)** 
.65 (.22)** 
.34 (.18)+ 
-.56 (.55) 
.69 (.18)*** 
-.34 (.23) 
.79 (.33)* 
-.13 (.18) 
-.04 (.02)* 
 
.01 (.02) 
.02 (.21) 
.00 (.03) 
.90 (36)* 
.57 (.19)** 
.59 (.20)** 
.66 (.22)** 
.34 (.18)+ 
-.57 (.55) 
.69 (.18)*** 
-.32 (.23) 
.78 (.33)* 
-.14 (.18) 
-.03 (.02)+ 
Pain Compliance Techniques 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.12 (.06)* 
-.32 (.51) 
-.12 (.08) 
-.24 (1.12) 
2.74 (.55)*** 
-.39 (.48) 
.69 (.61) 
1.32 (.48)** 
1.43 (.84)+ 
1.97 (.49)*** 
-.98 (.80) 
.89 (1.06) 
.29 (.50) 
.02 (.04) 
 
.05 (.04) 
-.08 (.67) 
.05 (.10) 
-.32 (1.11) 
2.69 (.54)*** 
-.36 (.48) 
.61 (.60) 
1.36 (.48)** 
1.38 (.83)+ 
1.91 (.48)*** 
-1.05 (.80) 
.98 (1.07) 
.21 (.50) 
.02 (.04) 
 
.04 (.04) 
.38 (.53) 
.08 (.08) 
-.22 (1.11) 
2.70 (.55)*** 
-.33 (.49) 
.70 (.60) 
1.31 (.48)** 
1.39 (.83)+ 
1.95 (.48)*** 
-1.02 (.80) 
.84 (1.06) 
.23 (.49) 
.03 (.04) 
Impact Weapons 
     Homicide Rate 
     Culture 
     Homicide Rate X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.08 (.04)* 
-1.32 (.53)* 
-.12 (.07)+ 
.08 (1.08) 
3.87 (.65)*** 
.19 (.48) 
1.79 (.78)* 
.54 (.42) 
1.72 (.87)* 
1.99 (.43)*** 
.41 (.47) 
.47 (.79) 
-.02 (.46) 
-.04 (.04) 
 
.02 (.04) 
.84 (.54) 
.08 (.07) 
-.09 (1.08) 
3.75 (.63)*** 
.37 (.48) 
1.74 (.79)* 
.63 (.42) 
1.46 (.87)+ 
1.86 (.42)*** 
.27 (.47) 
.68 (.78) 
-.13 (.45) 
-.06 (.04) 
 
.01 (.04) 
.72 (.48) 
.05 (.06) 
-.05 (1.08) 
3.76 (.64)*** 
.20 (.49) 
1.79 (.78)* 
.54 (.42) 
1.52 (.86)+ 
1.89 (.42)*** 
.40 (.47) 
.51 (.79) 
-.12 (.45) 
-.03 (.04) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no phys. force”= ref categ. 
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Table 32:  Patrol Beat Percent Minority and Officer Culture Full Models 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Pro Culture 
Model 2 
Con Culture 
Model 3 
Mid-Range Cult. 
Restraint Techniques 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.07 (.13) 
.43 (.68) 
-.16 (.18) 
.90 (.36)* 
.55 (.19)** 
.63 (.21)** 
.63 (.22)** 
.38 (.18)* 
-.62 (.55) 
.70 (.18)*** 
-.37 (.23)+ 
.67 (.32)* 
-.13 (.18) 
-.04 (.02)* 
 
-.07 (.12) 
-.98 (.82) 
.33 (.22) 
.91 (36)** 
.56 (.19)** 
.63 (.21)** 
.62 (.22)** 
.39 (.18)* 
-.64 (.55) 
.68 (.18)*** 
-.39 (.23)+ 
.66 (.32)* 
-.12 (.18) 
-.04 (.02)* 
 
.03 (.13) 
.24 (.67) 
-.06 (.18) 
.90 (.36)* 
.55 (.19)** 
.62 (.21)** 
.63 (.22)** 
.38 (.18)* 
-.61 (.55) 
.67 (.18)*** 
-.36 (.23) 
.71 (.32)* 
-.14 (.18) 
-04 (.02)* 
Pain Compliance Techniques 
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.55 (.37) 
2.39 (1.70) 
-.67 (.46) 
-.07 (1.09) 
2.70 (.55)*** 
-.35 (.53) 
.58 (.59) 
1.42 (.48)** 
1.34 (.84) 
1.88 (.48)*** 
-1.04 (.79) 
1.05 (1.06) 
.15 (.49) 
.02 (.04) 
 
.01 (.27) 
-8.59 (4.26)* 
2.19 (1.01)* 
.03 (1.10) 
2.81 (.55)*** 
-.48 (.52) 
.49 (.60) 
1.49 (.48)** 
1.31 (.84) 
1.88 (.48)*** 
-1.20 (.83) 
1.12 (1.07) 
.15 (.50) 
.02 (.04) 
 
.33 (.34) 
.98 (1.65) 
-.23 (.45) 
-.09 (1.08) 
2.71 (.55)*** 
-.36 (.53) 
.64 (.59) 
1.37 (.48)** 
1.43 (.83)+ 
1.81 (.48)*** 
-1.00 (.80) 
1.24 (1.06) 
.09 (.49) 
.02 (.04) 
Impact Weapons  
     Percent Minority 
     Culture 
     Percent Minority X Culture 
     Suspect Weapon 
     Suspect Arrest 
     Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
     Suspect Sex 
     Drugs/Alcohol 
     Mental Illness 
     Suspect Emotional State 
     Officer Race/Ethnicity 
     Officer Sex 
     Officer Education 
     Officer Years Experience 
 
.05 (.28) 
.24 (1.65) 
-.33 (.45) 
-.13 (1.09) 
3.76 (.64)*** 
.33 (.51) 
1.66 (.77)* 
.66 (.41) 
1.54 (.87)+ 
1.88 (.41)*** 
.32 (.47) 
.70 (.79) 
-.02 (.45) 
-.04 (.04) 
 
-.01 (.28) 
1.76 (1.71) 
-.33 (.48) 
-.13 (1.08) 
3.74 (.63)*** 
.57 (.52) 
1.81 (.78)* 
.67 (.41) 
1.43 (.87)+ 
1.88 (.41)*** 
.24 (.46) 
.76 (.79) 
-.06 (.45) 
-.06 (.04) 
 
-.31 (.31) 
-1.60 (1.61) 
.56 (.42) 
-.15 (1.08) 
3.69 (.63)*** 
.30 (.52) 
1.71 (.77)* 
.68 (.41)+ 
1.31 (.89) 
1.88 (.41)*** 
.33 (.46) 
.72 (.78) 
.00 (.46) 
-.04 (.04) 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test); “no phys. force”= ref categ. 
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drugs or alcohol were generally more likely to have force used against them, particularly 
restraint and pain compliance techniques.  Such findings, largely mirroring those of 
previous work, should add confidence to the results of the current analyses.    
  A few other results are worth pointing out.  It appears as though certain suspect 
and officer characteristics matter differently depending on the type of physical force that 
is being used.  More specifically, officer and suspect demographic characteristics are 
more likely to be significantly associated with, arguably, lower levels of physical force: 
restraint techniques.  Racial/ethnic minority suspects are more likely to have restraint 
techniques used against them relative to no physical force but this relationship does not 
persist for pain compliance techniques or impact weapons.  This same pattern emerges 
for officer characteristics such as sex, years experience, and, to a less consistent extent, 
race/ethnicity.  Officers who were female, older, and racial/ethnic minorities were 
significantly less likely to employ restraint techniques compared to no physical force; yet, 
these effects did not hold up for the pain compliance techniques or impact weapons 
categories.  The fact that both suspect and officer demographics were more likely to 
influence lower levels of physical force might speak to the idea that more discretion is 
involved here compared to higher levels of physical force severity. 
Supplemental Analyses  
 The nature of the police culture variables presents an opportunity to conduct a 
number of supplemental analyses.  After all, the trichotomized police culture groups were 
constructed using seven officer clusters, which were comprised of ten individual 
dimensions of officer perceptions.  The trichomotized officer culture groups were 
disaggregated by cluster type (e.g., “law enforcers”, “lay lows”) as well as the individual 
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dimensions of culture (e.g., “aggressive patrol”, “citizen cooperation”) to examine 
whether any key findings were masked from the aggregate culture measures.  While 
culture is viewed as a confluence of ideational components that are best explained by the 
unique mix of these themes, a thorough attempt was made to assess each specific 
component of officers’ attitudes/perceptions individually.  The tables for all of the 
supplemental analyses are presented in Appendix A (research question #1) and B 
(research question #2).  
RQ #1 
 Results from the supplemental analyses are presented in the same order as the 
primary findings: starting with concentrated disadvantage followed by homicide rate and 
finally percent minority citizens.  For each patrol beat characteristic, analyses are 
performed on membership in each of the seven officer clusters and then on ten individual  
dimensions of officer culture. 
Concentrated Disadvantage  
Testing Patrol Beat Influence on Individual Clusters 
 A series of logistic regression analyses (1 = membership in the cluster) are 
exhibited in Appendix A-Tables 1 through 7.  Out of the seven officer clusters, a patrol 
beat’s level of concentrated disadvantage is associated with membership in two: cluster 6 
(“Law Enforcers”) and cluster 7 (“Lay Lows”).  Officers currently working in patrol 
beats characterized by high levels of concentrated disadvantage are statistically 
significantly more likely to be categorized as “Law Enforcers” (b = .77; p < .05).  The 
odds ratio is 1.23, so officers are 23% more likely to fall into the “Law Enforcers” cluster 
for each unit ten percent increase in concentrated disadvantage.  On the other hand, 
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officer currently working in beats with low levels of concentrated disadvantage are more 
likely to fall into the “Lay Low” cluster (b = -1.26; p < .01; odds ratio = .89).  Each ten 
percent increase in concentrated disadvantage results in an 11% decrease in the log odds 
of an officer falling into the “Lay Low” cluster. 
Testing Patrol Beat Influence on Individual Dimensions of Culture 
 Appendix A-Tables 8 through 17 display a series of logistic regression analyses, 
which assess the impact of the patrol beat’s degree of concentrated disadvantage on each 
dimension of culture.  Each of the ten dimensions were dichotomized by first calculating 
the mean and then assigning all of those cases falling above the mean as “1” (cases 
falling below the mean were assigned a “0”).  Out of each of the ten dimensions, 
concentrated disadvantage only influenced officers’ perceptions of “citizen cooperation” 
(Wald χ2 = 102.61; p < .001; McFadden’s R-squared = .18).   Officers currently working 
in patrol beats characterized by higher levels of concentrated disadvantage are less likely 
to perceive citizens as cooperative (i.e., fall into the dichotomized group scoring below 
the mean) (b = -2.44; p < .001) – net of relevant control variables for officers’ socio-
demographic backgrounds.  Stated differently, officers working in economically 
disadvantaged areas are more likely to view the residents living there as uncooperative 
(i.e., less likely to call the police if they saw something suspicious, less likely to provide 
information about a crime if they knew something and were asked about it by police, and 
less willing to work with the police to try to solve neighborhood problems).  The odds 
ratio is 0.79, meaning that each ten percent increase in concentrated disadvantage results 
in a 21% decrease in the log odds of an officer scoring somewhere above the mean in 
regard to perceptions of citizen cooperation. 
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Homicide Rate 
Testing Patrol Beat Influence on Individual Clusters 
 A series of logistic regression analyses (1 = membership in the cluster) are 
presented in Appendix A-Tables 18 through 24.  Similar to the pattern found for 
concentrated disadvantage, a patrol beat’s homicide rate is only associated with 
membership in two clusters: cluster 6 (“Law Enforcers”) and cluster 7 (“Lay Lows”).  
Officers currently working in patrol beats characterized with high homicide rates are 
statistically significantly more likely to be categorized as “Law Enforcers” (b = .04; p < 
.05).  The odds ratio is very small (1.004); therefore, each ten percent increase in a patrol 
beat’s homicide rate results in a .4% increase in the log odds of an officer falling into the 
“Law Enforcers” cluster.  Again, officers currently working in beats with low homicide 
rates are more likely to fall into the “Lay Low” cluster (b = -.05; p < .01; odds ratio = 
.99). 
Testing Patrol Beat Influence on Individual Dimensions of Culture 
 Appendix A-Tables 25 through 34 display a series of logistic regression analyses 
using the patrol beat’s homicide rate as the independent variable.  The beat’s homicide 
rate appears to influence individual dimensions of culture more than the beat’s level of 
concentrated disadvantage.  The patrol beat’s homicide rate exerted a statistically 
significant impact (.05 alpha level) on officers’ perceptions of citizen cooperation (b = -
.04; p < .05), citizen distrust (b = .04; p < .01), and the importance attached to the law 
enforcement function of the job (b = .04; p < .05) as well as a marginally significant 
impact on perceptions of selective enforcement (b = -.03; p < .10).  More specifically, 
officers currently working in patrol beats characterized by higher homicide rates are less 
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likely to view citizens as cooperative, more likely to be distrustful of citizens, more likely 
attach importance to the role of law enforcement, and more likely to view sufficient 
reason for arresting people for minor crimes.  All of the statistically significant odds 
ratios are substantively small: citizen cooperation (odds ratio = .99), citizen distrust (odds 
ratio = 1.004), law enforcement (odds ratio = 1.004), and selective enforcement (odds 
ratio = .99). 
Percent Minority  
Testing Patrol Beat Influence on Individual Clusters 
 A series of logistic regression analyses (1 = membership in the cluster) are 
provided in Appendix A-Tables 35 through 41.  A patrol beat’s percentage of minority 
residents is associated with membership in two clusters: cluster 2 (“Dirty Harry 
Enforcers”) and cluster 6 (“Law Enforcers”).  The results from the former are a bit 
counterintuitive, especially considering the work by Kane (2002) on the social ecology of 
police misconduct.   Officers currently working in patrol beats with lower percentages of 
minority residents are statistically significantly more likely to be fall into the “Dirty 
Harry Enforcer” cluster (b = -.27; p < .05; odds ratio = .97).  Consistent with the patterns 
found for concentrated disadvantage and homicide rate, officers currently working in 
beats with higher percentages of minority residents are more likely to be categorized as 
“Law Enforcers” (b = .33; p < .01).  Each ten percent increase in a patrol beat’s 
percentage of minority residents results in a 3% increase in the log odds of falling into the 
“Law Enforcers” cluster. 
Testing Patrol Beat Influence on Individual Dimensions of Culture 
 Appendix A-Tables 42 through 51 display a series of logistic regression analyses  
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using the patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents as the independent variable.  
Similar to the findings for concentrated disadvantage, the patrol beat’s percentage of 
minority residents had little influence on the individual dimensions of police culture.  Out 
of ten dimensions, a patrol beat’s percentage of minority residents was only statistically 
significantly associated with officers’ perceptions of citizen cooperation (b = -.77; p < 
.001; odds ratio = .93) and marginally associated with officers’ perceptions of community 
policing (b = .15; p < .10; odds ratio = 1.01).  Officers currently working in patrol beats 
characterized by higher percentages of minority residents are less likely to perceive 
citizens as cooperative (i.e., fall into the dichotomized group scoring below the mean) 
and more likely to attach importance to community policing  – controlling for relevant 
officer socio-demographic variables. 
RQ #2 
Testing Significant Variation of Individual Clusters by Patrol Beat 
 A series of unconditional, random analysis of variance (ANOVA) models are 
displayed in Appendix B-Table 1.  Using the aforementioned criteria (statistically 
significant variance component and/or 95% confidence interval that does not include zero 
falling in between), six out of seven clusters randomly vary across patrol beats.  
“Peacekeepers” is the only cluster of officers that does not satisfy the criteria, meaning 
that there is evidence of between-patrol beat variation in membership in all six other 
cluster groups.  The “Anti-Organizational Street Cops” cluster has a statistically 
significant variance component (4.18; p < .05) and a 95% confidence interval that does 
not include zero (ICC = .14), while the other five clusters simply exhibit a 95% 
confidence interval that does not include zero falling in between (although 3 clusters’ 
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variance components are statistically significant at the .10 alpha level).  These three 
include the “Old Pros” (1.97; p = .08; ICC = .053), the “Law Enforcers” (1.74; p = .09; 
ICC = .066), and the “Lay Lows” (2.03; p = .08; ICC = .096) clusters.  Taken together, 
there is ample evidence that different officer clusters tend to significantly vary across 
patrol beats.   
 Some of these findings can be integrated with the supplemental results from the 
first research question to draw conclusions about patrol beat culture.  Officers currently 
working in beats characterized by higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, higher 
homicide rates, and more minority residents are more likely to be “Law Enforcers.”  
Meanwhile, membership in this particular cluster significantly varies, suggesting that 
officers share membership in the “Law Enforcers” cluster in high crime, economically 
disadvantaged patrol beats with large percentages of minority residents.  The same 
connection can be made for a patrol beat culture of officers falling into the “Lay Low” 
cluster.  Officers working in patrol beats with low levels of concentrated disadvantage  
and low rates of homicide tend to share membership in the “Lay Low” cluster. 
Testing Significant Variation of Individual Dimensions of Culture by Patrol Beat 
 Appendix B-Table 2 presents a series of unconditional, random analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) models examining the ten individual dimensions of officer culture.  
Eight out of ten of the individual dimensions exhibit evidence of attributable between 
patrol-beat variation.  This list includes officers’ perceptions of the functions of law 
enforcement and community policing, aggressive patrol, selective enforcement, 
procedural guidelines, citizen distrust and cooperation, and sergeants.  Six out of eight of 
these dimensions did not have a statistically significant variance component, but only a 
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95% confidence interval that did not include zero.  Two dimensions in particular, 
perceptions of citizen cooperation and perceptions of sergeants, stand out because both 
criteria were satisfied.  Combining this citizen cooperation finding with supplemental 
results from the first research question, evidence appears to show that a patrol beat 
culture exists: officers working in beats characterized by higher levels of concentrated 
disadvantage and homicide rates tend to share the belief that the residents in those beats 
are uncooperative.  The ICC is .33, meaning that meaning that 33% of the total variation 
in falling above/below the mean is attributable to between-patrol beat variation –which is 
quite substantial. A patrol beat culture regarding how officers view their sergeants also 
emerges (ICC = .074), although these particular officer perceptions are not influenced by 
the patrol beat characteristics that were examined.   
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION 
 This concluding chapter is divided into three broad sections: methodological, 
theoretical, and policy, and implications.  Findings from the research questions are 
contextualized in terms of how they relate to theory, practice, and research design 
elements.  Breaking the discussion down into these three separate categories is difficult 
since many of this dissertation’s topics span categories, so there is some overlap at times.  
However, every effort was made to review the findings (or the lack thereof) and relevant 
concepts as they relate specifically to theory, policy, and methods.  As a result, certain 
topics, such as “neighborhood influence” and police use of force, are covered in multiple 
sections.  Limitations and directions for future research are also included where they are 
applicable. 
Research Design and Methodological Implications 
Differences Between “Beats” and “Tracts” 
 
 Ultimately, the patrol beat variables were employed as proxy measures for 
neighborhoods.  While it would be easy to echo past research that has used the terms 
“beat” and “neighborhood” interchangeably, I believe this distinction warrants further 
elaboration.  This discussion is especially important considering the fact that future 
scholars will continue to examine “neighborhood” (i.e., the larger social context) 
influence on police officers and their behavior.  As contradictory studies (Lawton, 2007; 
Lee et al., 2014; Terrill & Reisig, 2003) as well as the results from the third research 
question suggest, the notion of “neighborhood effects” on police use force is far from 
conclusive.  Policing scholars’ use of patrol beats as a proxy for neighborhoods is similar 
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to the limitation in the broader criminological literature that uses census tracts as a proxy 
for neighborhoods (Weitzer, 2000b).  Just as census tracts rarely fit perfectly with 
socially defined neighborhoods, so too will patrol beats and census-designated tracts ever 
be a complete match.  The challenge, which this dissertation was unable to address, is to 
quantitatively assess and uncover the extent to which patrol beats and census tracts do 
overlap in a given department.  Figure 5 displays the inherent issues with the proxy 
measures.  Although there is a substantial portion of agreement between the hypothetical 
patrol beat and census tract, a non-trivial section of the census tract will be omitted from 
the analyses when this patrol beat is used as a proxy.  This problem may be exacerbated 
as the number of beats and tracts increases, and parts of a single census tract comprise 
multiple patrol beats and vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
Patrol Beat versus Census Tract  
 	
 
	 	
Patrol Beat 
Census Tract 
	 172 
 Future research should pay more attention to this issue.  A simple first step would 
be to gather shape files for both department-designated beats/sectors and census-
designated tracts.  These shape files could then be overlaid in mapping software 
programs, such as ArcGIS, to test and determine the degree of overlap/agreement 
between the two.  If, hypothetically, there is available data on characteristics of both 
department-designated police beats and census-designated neighborhoods (i.e., tracts) as 
well as geo-coded locations of use of force incidents, one could analyze a cross-classified 
model.  Figure 6 provides an illustration of the two hypothetical hierarchical structures, 
using use of force incidents as the level 1 dependent variable.  In this case, we are 
interested in separating the potential effects arising from influences at these different 
level 2 variables: beats and tracts.  This may be particularly important if there is a degree 
of association between beats and tracts (see Fielding & Goldstein, 2006).  The cross-
classified model would allow for the simultaneous estimation of both beats and tracts in 
order to discover which level 2 context explains more variance (i.e., has more of an 
impact) on police use of force instances. 
Figure 6 
 
Cross Classified Model with Patrol Beats and Census Tracts 
 	
Department 
Defined Patrol 
Beats 
Census 
Designated 
Neighborhoods  
Use of Force 
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Challenges to Analyzing Multi-Level Data 
 The current effort in this dissertation illustrates the challenges to analyzing the 
police in a multi-level context.  While Indianapolis (416 officers assigned to patrol) and 
St. Petersburg (246 officers assigned to patrol) were two relatively large police 
departments, I was prohibited from conducting a number of hierarchical models.  This 
was due to the fact that too few officers (less than 10) were staffed in a majority of the 
patrol beats.  Scholars designing research projects, those looking to collaborate with 
participating departments, and funding agencies should be mindful of this issue.   
Researchers who desire to study police officers at the patrol beat unit of analysis may be 
limited by the number departments that they could potentially work with.  Very large 
departments, such as those with a few thousand officers, will likely have sufficient officer 
nesting within patrol beats (e.g., New York Police Department, Los Angeles Police 
Department, Chicago Police Department).  Yet, there are so few of these types of 
departments across the country; only 49 local police departments (0.4%) employed more 
than 1,000 sworn officers in 2013 (Reaves, 2015).  Working with an agency of that size 
and trying to collect individual officer data presents a completely different set of 
challenges.  
 This problem raises questions about the most appropriate unit of analysis in which 
to study officers and policing outcomes (e.g., use of force, racial/ethnic disparities in 
traffic stops).  Patrol beats are, arguably, the most similar in geographic size and they are 
designated to conform most closely with existing neighborhood boundaries (i.e., census 
tracts) (Mastrofski et al., 2002; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Smith, 1986; Terrill & Reisig, 
2003).  After discovering the nesting issue of officers within patrol beats in the POPN 
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data, I inquired about the next highest-order level of analysis that could possibly be used.  
In this case, it was the police precinct; the Indianapolis PD was made up of four 
precincts, which averaged 100 patrol officers per precinct, and the St. Petersburg PD had 
three precincts with an average of 80 patrol officers per precinct.  Obviously nesting was 
not an issue at this unit of analyses; however, choosing to examine the police at the 
precinct-level means moving away from the ability to study “neighborhood” influence.  
Precincts comprise much larger geographic areas, and there is more variation in 
neighborhood characteristics (i.e., census tracts) across a precinct than there is for a patrol 
beat.  Studying officers at the precinct level, and even larger units of analysis, makes it 
more difficult to isolate potential neighborhood/environmental influence on police culture 
and behavior.  On the other hand, a majority of departments might not divide its officers 
into patrol beats, particularly those smaller agencies serving large rural areas.  
Approximately 6,000 local police departments, or about one-half of all local agencies in 
the U.S. (48%), employed less than ten sworn officers in 2013 (Reaves, 2015).   
 Policing scholars should pay closer attention to different department-designated 
levels of aggregation among those agencies that do divide manpower and service delivery 
by geographic areas.  Early evidence suggests that policing outcomes, specifically use of 
force, vary based on the unit of analysis being investigated (Lee et al., 2014).  From 
smaller to larger units of analysis, officers are assigned to sectors/beats/quadrants within 
precincts/districts/divisions (names tend to vary based on the agency) –depending on the 
number of a department’s officers and the geographic size of a jurisdiction.  Hipp (2007) 
illustrates the importance of considering the proper level of aggregation when estimating 
neighborhood effects on broader criminological concepts like crime and disorder.  Using 
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a subsample from the American Housing Survey, Hipp tested impact of various structural 
characteristics (e.g., racial/ethnic heterogeneity, average income) on crime and disorder 
using both the census block and the census tract as different units of analysis.  Results 
displayed disparate neighborhood effects according to how the “neighborhood” was 
measured.  For example, the influence of racial/ethnic heterogeneity on crime and 
disorder was stronger at the census tract level than the census block level.  The influence 
of average income, by contrast, significantly predicted crime and disorder at the block 
level but not the tract level, suggesting more of a localized effect for this particular 
structural characteristic.  Policing scholars should start to follow this approach outlined 
by Hipp (2007): moving beyond simple research questions like, “Do neighborhood 
characteristics influence police use of force?” and instead asking, “At which levels of 
aggregation might specific neighborhood characteristics influence police use of force?” 
 There is sufficient reason to believe that issues of determining the appropriate 
neighborhood aggregation require the same amount of empirical examination and 
specification as issues of use of force measurement.  Hipp (2007) makes a similar 
argument for the study of neighborhood effects on crime and disorder.  Questions of 
using “tracts” versus “beats” versus “precincts” confront all studies, regardless of how 
policing dependent variables (e.g., use of force) are measured.  Certainly replicating 
Hipp’s study with tests of neighborhood effects across multiple units of analysis would 
be a worthwhile endeavor, even on a purely exploratory level.  Or perhaps scholars can 
rely on some type of theoretical justification for hypothesizing why a certain level of 
aggregation is more appropriate than another.  Again, this decision would be contingent 
on the particular structural characteristic being examined.  Take violent crime as an 
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example.  Given emerging research on the strong variability of crime at “micro places” 
(i.e., street corners and/or block faces) (Weisburd et al., 2012) as well as the findings 
regarding the tremendous stability of hot spots at those micro places over time (Braga, 
Hureau, & Papachristos, 2011; Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2010), it might make 
more sense to hypothesize that violent crime should have the greatest impact on police 
use of force at the block level.  An initial test by Lee and colleagues (2014) of violent 
crime at the micro-level, street blocks with 500-foot buffer more specifically, has found 
this to be case.     
Conceptualization and Operationalization of Police Use of Force 
 Scholars continue to face significant challenges in “making sense” of the 
available studies examining neighborhood influence on police use of force.  Despite the 
fact that there are so few studies to make sense of, the tests that do exist have produced 
contradictory results.  Some suggest that characteristics of the broader social context 
impact police use of force (Lee et al., 2014; Smith, 1986; Terrill & Reisig, 2003), while 
others do not (Lawton, 2007).  Similar to Lawton (2007), I too did not find much 
evidence that characteristics of an area’s broader social context, operationalized as the 
patrol beat, influenced use of physical force.  Upon closer examination, however, these 
tests do not provide an opportunity for a true “apples to apples” comparison of the 
dependent variables.  A fair amount of variation exists in how scholars have categorized 
force, which is sometimes contingent on how departments collect and officially record 
use of force incidents.  Terrill and Reisig (2003), using systematic social observations, 
were able to capture a broader range of police coercion from low levels of use of force 
(e.g., verbal force) to more severe actions (e.g., pain compliance techniques and impact 
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weapons), whereas Lawton’s (2007) measure, which was derived from official records 
from the Philadelphia Police Department, focuses primarily on the upper end of the use 
of force continuum (e.g., strikes, OC spray, Taser, baton).  This problem plagues use of 
force research in general and is not necessarily specific to tests on neighborhood effects.  
Still, according to Lawton (2007), it is plausible that neighborhood characteristics are 
more likely to impact particular levels of force; neighborhood factors might be more 
likely to affect use of force at lower ends of the use of force continuum where officers 
have more discretion.  The results from this dissertation, however, did not generally find 
a significant relationship between the patrol beat characteristics and lower levels of 
physical force, such as restraint techniques (e.g., grabs/holds).  The findings, thus far, 
suggest moving beyond asking whether or not neighborhood characteristics influence 
police use of force in general and instead provide the impetus to start examining if 
neighborhood characteristics affect certain levels of police use of force more specifically.   
 Neither data limitations nor disparities in how scholars operationalize a  
neighborhood’s level of aggregation should be blamed as the sole contributors to the 
complexity and challenges of use of force research.  Klahm, Frank, and Liederbach 
(2014) speak to complications in the fundamental conceptualization and 
operationalization of police use of force.  Synthesizing 53 peer-reviewed empirical 
studies on the topic from 1996 to 2011, Klahm and colleagues found that only 28% 
actually cite a conceptual definition of police use of force.  The remaining 72% of the 
studies neglected to provide meaningful conceptual definitions that guided 
operationalization, and these studies simply identify behaviors/police actions that were 
measured as force.  According to Klahm et al. (2014), scholars need to first and foremost 
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dedicate more attention to actually defining/conceptualizing use of force before 
attempting to construct measures.  For example, should commands and threats be 
included in the conceptual definition of “use of force” or do these actions better reflect a 
broader phenomenon of police “coercion” (Terrill, 2014)?  Klahm et al. (2014) found that 
verbal threats/commands were included in 39.6% of studies; 60.4% of studies did not 
include threats/commands in their operationalization of use of force.  There is still a 
substantial amount of disagreement on these very basic issues, and perhaps this is due, in 
part, to the majority of recent studies that have not pondered what police use of force 
constitutes on a theoretical level –as evidenced by the lack of studies that provide a 
conceptual definition. 
 Klahm and colleagues (2014) also identify inconsistencies in the way scholars 
conceptualize use of force but then operationalize it.  They take issue with Terrill and 
Mastrofski’s (2002: 228) conceptualization of force, which is defined as “acts that 
threaten or inflict physical harm on suspects.”  Yet, Terrill and Mastrofski (2002: 230) 
operationalize verbal commands, such as “wait right here” and “leave that now” as force.  
According to Klahm and colleagues (2014):  
 “Clearly, these verbal commands do not threaten or inflict physical harm upon 
 suspects, and this exemplifies the issue addressed here. The disjuncture between 
 conceptual definitions and operationalizations like this has blurred the meaning of 
 findings in regard to the correlates of police use of force.” (pg. 562) 
Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) conceptualization of use of force is identical to that of Terrill 
and Mastrofski (2002); however, Terrill and Reisig’s operationalization then goes on to 
include commands, handcuffing, and pat downs, among other behaviors.  Klahm and  
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colleauges (2014) continue to criticize the discrepancies: 
 “The question remains, does a command, handcuffing, or patting down a suspect 
 really inflict or threaten physical harm? Are these the types of police behavior 
 police use of force literature is most concerned about explaining? And, does 
 including these behaviors lead to problems when interpreting results of studies 
 using such an inclusive measure? From our perspective, the answer to the first 
 question is no, and the latter, yes.” (pg. 564) 
 Moving on to issues of operationalization per se, the role of handcuffing warrants 
additional attention.  Klahm et al. (2014) found that handcuffing was operationalized as 
force in 32% of empirical studies from 1996 to 2011, but not included in use of force 
measures in 68% of studies during this 16-year period.  In the current dissertation, I made 
an adjustment to how handcuffing was considered and included in the measurement of 
use of force, which deviated from prior work that has used the same data (Terrill et al., 
2003; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  More specifically, I made a determination that 
handcuffing should not be operationalized as a “restraint technique.”  This adjustment 
drastically altered the outcome variable of interest.  It even changed the basic frequency 
with which use of force was employed.  Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) analysis concluded 
that 58.4% of the observed police-suspect encounters resulted in some type of police use 
of force; this figure is at odds with most other research that has found that police use of 
force is a statistically rare event (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Hickman et al., 2008; Pate & 
Fridell, 1993).  Excluding handcuffing in the restraint technique category, I found that 
some type of physical force was used in only 6.3% of the observed police-suspect 
encounters.  I hope the above discussion spurs future debate about the proper 
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conceptualization and operationalization of police use of force.  Future research might 
include multiple measures of police of force to examine how small changes, like those 
discussed here, might alter findings.     
Theoretical Implications 
 Results from the first research question suggest that structural characteristics of 
the patrol beat are associated with officers’ cultural outlooks at the individual level.  A 
patrol beat’s measure of concentrated disadvantage and its homicide rate were shown to 
influence how officers perceive collective job-related factors, such as the importance 
attached to different occupational roles (i.e., law enforcement versus order maintenance 
versus community policing), policing tactics (e.g., aggressive patrol, selective 
enforcement), and the citizens that they serve.  Officers working in beats characterized by 
high degrees of concentrated disadvantage and crime were more likely to adhere to 
elements of the “traditional” police culture.  Prior literature and classic policing scholars 
often describe these officers as being positively oriented to aggressive patrol tactics and 
law enforcement functions while holding unfavorable views of citizens.  Alternatively, 
officers working in beats characterized by low degrees of concentrated disadvantage and 
crime were less likely to adhere to elements of the “traditional” police culture (i.e., 
members of the “con culture” group).  These officers were more likely to attach 
significance to the community policing and order maintenance functions of the job and 
had more positive perceptions of citizens.  While there may be other factors that might 
influence officers’ cultural orientations that the data and analyses were not able to 
capture, controls for a number of individual officer characteristics, particularly years 
experience, were included; the impact of the patrol beat characteristics still persisted 
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while holding basic demographics, higher education, and years on the job constant.  
There is also evidence to suggest that the impact of a patrol beat’s degree of economic 
disadvantage on individual officer culture is non-linear. 
 The results here add generalizability to concepts from the broader criminological 
literature, specifically the integration of structural and cultural elements regarding legal 
cynicism and “codes of the street” among members of the general public.  In both of 
these bodies of work, research continues to mount showing that cultural orientations 
develop as an adaptation to neighborhood structural factors, specifically concentrated 
disadvantage.  This dissertation applied the integration of structure and culture to the 
study of police officers, finding evidence that officers’ occupational outlooks are 
associated with patrol beat characteristics.  One conclusion to be drawn is that the 
examination of officers’ cultural orientations cannot be divorced from their broader social 
context(s).  The areas in which officers are assigned to work must be considered in future 
research on police culture.   
 Moving past officer culture at the individual-level, this dissertation investigated 
culture at a larger unit of analysis: the patrol beat.  Results from the second research 
question are mixed.  There is evidence of attributable between-patrol beat variation in 
membership in the “con culture” group (i.e., the opposite of “traditional” police culture), 
meaning that officers working together in beats are more likely to share similar 
occupational outlooks.  Officers falling into the “pro culture” and “mid-range culture” 
groups did not follow this pattern.  There was, however, more support for the concept of 
a “patrol beat culture” exhibited from the findings from the supplemental analyses, which 
assessed membership in the seven officer clusters as well as whether officers scored 
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above or below the mean for each of the ten individual dimensions of police culture.  
Scholars should continue to examine the presence of a patrol beat culture.  If officers 
working in the same beats do, indeed, share similar outlooks (e.g., attaching a high value 
on aggressive patrol tactics, negative opinions of citizens), then it is important to 
understand how this occupational setting might reinforce the beliefs of individual 
officers.  Perhaps law enforcement executives could strategically place a few “con 
culture” officers into those patrol beats that have a majority of “pro culture” officers in 
order to break up or counterbalance the existing beat culture. 
 Future work on the social ecology of policing should study the potential influence 
that patrol beat-culture might have on policing outcomes like use of force.  This work 
would move beyond the idea that objective structural characteristics (e.g., concentrated 
disadvantage) of the beat simply influences officer culture at the individual level.  
Instead, research should examine whether patrol beat culture impacts outcomes –net of 
individual-level officer culture and objective structural characteristics.  Research should 
also investigate whether patrol beat culture moderates individual-level officer culture on 
policing outcomes, although there was little evidence that individual-level officer culture 
influenced police use of physical force here.  Both questions essentially ask if patrol beat 
culture takes on a “life of its own”, influencing violence above and beyond individual 
officer culture as well as other compositional factors of the larger social context.   
 The aforementioned research agenda is an extension of Anderson’s (1999) “code 
of street”, and it presents a set of hypotheses to test how similar concepts might apply to 
police culture at the beat-level.  Anderson (1994) originally proposed that “street codes” 
were a neighborhood component, which served as a feature of the broader social context 
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to structure behavior during public encounters (e.g., the use of and justification of 
physical violence) (Anderson, 1999; Matsueda, Drakulich, & Kubrin, 2006; Stewart & 
Simons, 2010).  Stated differently, Anderson viewed “codes of the street” as a 
neighborhood property and not necessarily an exclusive characteristic of individual 
citizens.  Over the last decade, research has begun to examine neighborhood-level street 
culture.  While early studies uncovered that neighborhoods with high levels of structural 
disadvantage and violence led adolescents to adopt street code values (e.g., Stewart & 
Simons (2006), it is more recent examinations that truly test Elijah Anderson’s 
hypotheses as originally proposed.  Stewart and Simons (2010), for example, found that 
neighborhood street culture was predictive of violent offending, even after controlling for 
individual-level commitment to street codes.  Neighborhood street culture had a direct 
effect on violence above the effect of individual-level street code values. 
 I was unable to test those same concepts of patrol beat police culture in this 
dissertation, and instead was relegated to examining individual officer culture and its 
potential impact on use of physical force.  As previously discussed, there were many 
patrol beats that had less than ten officers.  A general rule suggests that data should not be 
aggregated up with fewer than ten observations, as this might contribute to unreliable 
estimates.  Therefore, I elected not to create measures of patrol beat officer culture based 
on aggregated individual-level observations (i.e., taking the mean of individual officer 
variables in a given beat).   
Renewed Focus on Officer Perceptions of Neighborhood Stereotyping  
 
 The findings from the structure plus culture integration also highlight the need for 
a renewed focus on officer perceptions, particularly as they relate to neighborhood 
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stereotyping and ecological contamination (Werthman & Piliavan, 1967) extended to the 
citizens who reside in those areas.  This dissertation, and the POPN data in general, was a 
good start in that the officer culture measures were perceptual in nature.  However, only 
two out of the ten individual dimensions of police culture –citizen cooperation and citizen 
distrust– asked officers about their perceptions of patrol beat residents.  Looking at the 
supplemental analyses, all three of the patrol beat characteristics that were examined 
(concentrated disadvantage, homicide rate, and percent minority residents) were 
significantly related to officer perceptions of how cooperative citizens are, whereas only 
the patrol beat’s homicide rate was associated with officers’ degree of distrust towards 
citizens.  The impact of patrol beat characteristics was more influential for perceptions of 
citizen cooperation, exhibited by substantively larger odds ratios.  In addition, both the 
citizen cooperation and citizen distrust dimensions were shown to significantly vary 
across patrol beats.  Scholars should continue to include questions about officer 
perceptions, particularly regarding attitudes/opinions toward the areas they serve and its 
residents, into research designs in future data collection efforts 
 Still, more thought and conceptualization must be directed towards understanding  
why objective structural characteristics of geographic areas influence officer perceptions.  
Policing scholars can build on neighborhood research in general.  For one, it is a 
statistical fact that neighborhoods in cities, towns, and municipalities across America are 
categorized by extreme levels of segregation –both in terms of race/ethnicity and 
concentrated poverty (Massey & Denton, 1993; Peterson, 2012; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; 
Sampson & Wilson, 1995).  These two factors are often highly correlated: the large 
majority of blacks and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics live in economically disadvantaged 
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neighborhoods, whereas whites are more likely to reside in neighborhoods with 
considerable affluence.  In fact, the bivariate correlation coefficient for a patrol beat’s 
level of concentrated disadvantage and its percentage of minority residents in this study 
was so large (r = .76; p < .001) that including both factors together in a statistical model 
would likely lead to harmful levels of collinearity (Licht, 1995).  That white and non-
white citizens live in “divergent social worlds” (Peterson & Krivo, 2010), or vastly 
different ecological contexts, makes it difficult to actually conduct research on the topic.  
The documented challenges date back to Shaw and McKay (1942), who struggled to find 
white neighborhoods with comparable levels of economic disadvantage as black 
neighborhoods and vice versa. 
 Neighborhood segregation, therefore, serves as an adequate starting point.  This 
segregation means that residents of disadvantaged communities are exposed to fewer 
economic opportunities, poorer quality institutions (e.g., schools), higher levels of crime, 
and less advantaged social networks (Besbris et al., 2015; Massey & Denton, 1993; 
Sampson, 2012; Sharkey & Faber, 2014; Wilson, 1987).  Thus, there are objective factors 
that contribute to the detriment of citizens who live in these areas; however, residents 
also face a subjective burden.  Finding neighborhood segregation to be such a salient 
factor, Elijah Anderson (2012) coined the term the “iconic ghetto” to symbolize the 
crime-prone, drug-invested, and violent areas of a city in the minds of many Americans.  
The iconic ghetto with its typically distinguishable boundaries, according to Anderson, 
serves as a powerful source of stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination; the stigmatized 
neighborhood serves as a reference point while making judgments about the people one 
may encounter there.  This process and way of thinking about segregated areas should, 
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theoretically, be no different for police officers.  Similar to members of the general 
population, officers might try to avoid certain areas altogether or they may proceed with 
caution –subjecting a neighborhood’s residents to increased scrutiny and treating them 
with a greater degree of suspicion.  On the other hand, people in these neighborhoods 
must work harder to overcome the stereotypes and negative presumptions during 
interactions with officers. 
 A temporal dimension of neighborhood effects (i.e., the timing and duration of 
poor and segregated neighborhoods) must also be considered.  Wilson (1987) and Massey 
and Denton (1993) both originally discussed the importance of generational exposure to 
poverty and segregation.  Wheaton and Clarke (2003) elaborated on this point, suggesting 
that neighborhood effects were not static but instead dynamic; neighborhood effects and 
its impact on citizens might vary depending on how long people reside in those areas (see 
also Sharkey & Faber, 2014).  A growing body of work has found that the impact of 
neighborhood disadvantage on individuals’ outcomes is more severe if the disadvantage 
is persistent and experienced over long periods of a family’s history (Sampson, Sharkey, 
& Raudenbush, 2008; Sharkey & Elwert, 2011; see also Sharkey & Faber, 2014 for a 
discussion).  This same idea might apply to police-citizen relations and officers’ 
perceptions of citizens and vice versa.  It is plausible that police-citizen relations and 
each group’s perceptions of the other would be more negative in neighborhoods that have 
historically been economically disadvantaged and segregated.  Traditional practices of 
over- or under-enforcement of the law (Kennedy, 1997) by police over the years is likely 
to influence residents’ legal socialization (Fagan & Tyler, 2005) through personal 
experiences as well as exposure to messages and anecdotes passed from others (i.e., 
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vicarious experiences).  On the other hand, a history of hostile interactions with citizens 
might be passed down from veterans to rookie officers, such as through the process of 
informal socialization through “war stories”. 
The Process of Neighborhood Influence on Perceptions 
 Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) dialogic model of legitimacy may provide some 
insight into why patrol beat characteristics might influence officers’ outlooks.  According 
to their framework, legitimacy is viewed as an ongoing, open dialogue between two 
parties: power-holders (e.g., the police) and audiences (e.g., citizens).  Power-holders 
initiate a claim to legitimacy with an audience, who can either accept/comply or 
contest/challenge the power-holder’s claim.  Power-holders then interpret the audience’s 
response to the initial claim, which affects the power-holder’s sense of self-legitimacy.  
Tankebe (2014: 5) defines self-legitimacy as “power-holders’ recognition of, or 
confidence in, their own individual entitlement to power.”  Stated differently, dialogues 
and interactions represent teachable moments for police as well as citizens.  The dialogic 
model represents a necessary extension since the majority of empirical research on the 
topic of legitimacy focuses primarily on citizens’ perceptions of police (see Nix & Wolfe,  
in press for a discussion).  
 Few empirical studies have applied the concept self-legitimacy to the police, as 
this research is still in a development stage (Bradford & Quinton, 2014; Nix, in press; 
Nix & Wolfe, in press; Tankebe & Meško, 2015; Wolfe & Nix, in press).  Even fewer 
have tested the dialogic model.  Using survey research, the studies attempt to uncover 
officers’ perceptions of citizen support and/or cooperation with police.  Bradford and 
Quinton (2014), for example, found officers who believed that the public is generally 
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supportive –operationalized by questions like “the public agree with the tactics we use” 
and “the public thinks we go about the job in the right way”– and cooperative with police 
had significantly higher degrees of self-legitimacy.  Similarly, Tankebe and Meško 
(2015) discovered that officers’ perceptions of audience legitimacy (i.e. the extent to 
which officers believe that citizens view the police as legitimate) were significantly 
associated with self-legitimacy. 
 Some of the findings from this dissertation are particularly relevant to Bottoms 
and Tankebe’s (2012) dialogic model as well as the concept of self-legitimacy.  Results 
from the supplemental analyses that disaggregated the individual dimensions of police 
culture consistently highlight the importance of officer perceptions of citizen cooperation.  
In terms of the first research question, both the patrol beat’s level of concentrated 
disadvantage and percentage of minority residents were associated with officers’ 
perceptions of citizen cooperation.  More specifically, officers currently working in 
geographic assignments characterized by high degrees of concentrated disadvantage and 
minority residents were significantly less likely to view the citizens as cooperative.  
While this first analysis focused on officers at the individual level, the second research 
question was interested in officers at the patrol beat level.  Again, the findings show that 
officers’ perceptions of citizen cooperation significantly vary across patrol beats.  These 
results exhibit evidence of a patrol beat culture, at least in regard to how officers view 
citizens.  Taken together, officers currently working together in more economically 
disadvantaged beats with more minorities tend to share similar beliefs that citizens are 
uncooperative, whereas officers working together in more economically advantaged beats 
with less minorities tend to share similar beliefs that citizens are cooperative. 
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 These findings have implications for extending Bottom and Tankebe’s (2012) 
dialogic model of legitimacy to include a patrol beat component that considers the 
broader social context of police-citizen interactions.  Variation in patrol beat context 
might help to determine the types of individuals, or “audience members”, that officers 
encounter in different patrol beats on a day-to-day basis.  Research, for example, has 
found that patrol beat characteristics such as concentrated disadvantage influence 
citizens’ perceptions of police in general and satisfaction with police more specifically 
(Reisig & Parks, 2000).  Moreover, Reisig and colleagues (2004) discovered that suspects 
encountered in economically disadvantaged patrol beats were more disrespectful to police 
and less likely to show officers deference.  These two studies, which also used the POPN 
data, help provide a more complete picture for the supplemental analyses regarding 
officers’ perceptions of citizen cooperation.  While this is a preliminary test and future 
work should continue to investigate these concepts, attempts to study self-legitimacy 
through the lens of dialogue/interactions with citizens that omits neighborhood or patrol 
beat context might risk misspecification.  It points to a need to examine police-citizen 
interactions from multiple levels of analysis. 
 The early empirical research detailing the correlates of self-legitimacy is also 
promising, placing even more emphasis on understanding the dialogic model with a 
neighborhood context component.  Studies have found a number of positive outcomes for 
officers possessing a high degree of self-legitimacy, and these findings may prove useful 
in explaining variation in officer behavior (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012).  Bradford and 
Quinton (2014) uncovered that officers with a greater sense of self-legitimacy were more 
likely to embrace concepts of procedural justice, specifically using fair procedures when 
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interacting with citizens.  Using vignettes to assess how officers would hypothetically 
react to situations, Tankebe and Meško (2015) found that officers possessing higher 
levels of self-legitimacy would be less quick to threaten citizens with physical force –
opting instead to issue verbal warnings.  Thus, initial studies suggest that those officers 
with greater sense of self-legitimacy, which may be shaped in part by patrol beat context, 
tend to engage in behaviors that are beneficial during interactions with citizens.   
Articulating Ecological Influence on Police Behavior 
 Much of the theoretical, ethnographic, and empirical work, both historic and 
contemporary, can be synthesized to explicitly articulate how ecological features might 
influence police behavior, specifically use of force.  Many of these of these concepts and 
findings have been scattered throughout this dissertation, but it is now time to take stock 
of what is known in order to, hopefully, move this body of work forward.  As previously 
stated, I believe that the objective factors of neighborhood context could serve as an 
appropriate starting point, with subjective/perceptual factors being added into the mix in 
order to arrive at a more complete picture.   
 There is a tremendous degree of variation in economic disadvantage across 
neighborhoods in America (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Peterson & Krivo, 2012; 
Sampson, 2012).  This variation in economic disadvantage is continually and strongly 
associated with race/ethnicity –with minorities and blacks, in particular, being more 
likely to live in disadvantaged areas– and high levels of segregation, resulting in a host of 
deleterious outcomes for the residents of these disadvantaged neighborhoods.  Such 
outcomes include fewer economic opportunities, poorer quality social institutions, and 
less advantaged social networks (Besbris et al., 2015; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 
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1987).  Yet, perhaps the most relevant manifestation of disadvantaged, segregated 
neighborhoods is the high level of crime and violence that comes to characterize these 
areas (Shaw & McKay, 1942).   
 Neighborhoods and their internal dynamics influence citizens’ perceptions of and 
attitudes/behavior toward police, which, in turn, contribute to influence officer use of 
force.  Kane (2002; 2005) discusses how the same antecedents of social disorganization 
that lead to increases in crime in certain neighborhoods also create contexts for 
differential police behavior.  Socially disorganized neighborhoods generally experience 
low levels of informal social control and collective efficacy, which results in higher crime 
(Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Sampson et al., 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942).  When 
neighborhoods are unable to exercise informal social control and collective efficacy, 
formal agents of social control, particularly the police, must step in to fill the void (Kane, 
2002; Manning, 1978).  It is the differential policing tactics and deployment of officers in 
socially disorganized, high-crime neighborhoods relative to the tactics and deployment 
used in advantaged neighborhoods that better contextualizes citizens’ perceptions of and 
attitudes/behavior toward police. 
 A wealth of research has shed light on the over deployment of officers and the 
aggressive policing tactics used in disadvantaged neighborhoods to address high levels of 
crime.  The rationale behind these tactics stem from the order maintenance/broken 
windows approach, which was popularized in the late 1980s/early 1990s.  During an era 
when scholars and practitioners believed that the police could do little to affect crime 
(Bayley, 1994), Wilson and Kelling (1982) provided the police with a blueprint, at least it 
was believed at the time, to reduce serious offending by targeting low-level offenses and 
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disorder.  Many police administrators and politicians were quick to adopt order 
maintenance/broken windows strategies.  Their intentions were noble: officers and 
departments aimed to help reduce crime by focusing resources on the very neighborhoods 
that experience a disproportionate share of offending and victimization.  Moreover, most 
residents, regardless of race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status, desire police protection 
and they want something to be done about local crime and disorder (Bobo & Johnson, 
2004; Brooks, 2010; Gau & Brunson, 2010).   
 However, the manner in which order maintenance/broken windows strategies are 
usually carried out in practice is detrimental to citizens’ perceptions of police, and the 
tactics play a substantial role in eroding police legitimacy.  Officers in economically 
disadvantaged, high crime neighborhoods utilize frequent vehicle and pedestrian stops 
(Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Gau, 2014; Gau & Brunson, 2010), summonses/citations for 
“quality of life” offenses, and misdemeanor arrests (Kane et al., 2013).  The New York 
Police Department’s overreliance on stop, question, and frisk (SQF), which has been 
adopted by other law enforcement agencies across the country (e.g., St. Louis 
Metropolitan Police Department; Brunson, 2007), is perhaps the most well known 
example of the controversial, aggressive tactics being used in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods; recurrent use of stop, question, and frisk is a staple of order 
maintenance/broken windows policing efforts (Braga et al., 1999; Gau & Brunson, 2010; 
Spitzer, 1999).  The brunt of these involuntary police contacts falls on young, black 
males who are disproportionately stopped, searched, and arrested by police (Hurst, Frank, 
& Browning, 2000).  In fact, research has uncovered evidence that police use race as a 
proxy for crime/violence when targeting suspicious persons (Fagan & Davies, 2000); this 
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approach is, at the very least, understandable given the difficulties in trying to disentangle 
the effects of race and place (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Sampson & Wilson, 1995) 
 The aggressive, punitive tactics in disadvantaged communities leads citizens to 
adopt negative attitudes of police –most directly through contentious personal and 
vicarious experiences with officers.  Research has consistently found that unfavorable 
citizen perceptions of police are formed from negative interactions with officers –most of 
which can be attributed to the nature of policing in certain areas (Brunson, 2007; Decker, 
1981; Webb & Marshall, 1995; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002).  More specifically, residents of 
disadvantaged neighborhoods cite frequent police harassment and unfair 
targeting/profiling because of their race/ethnicity and where they live (Brunson, 2007; 
Gau & Brunson, 2010; Weitzer, 2000b; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002).  Residents of these areas 
often describe officers’ demeanor as discourteous, hostile, and verbally abusive 
(Brunson, 2007; Gau & Brunson, 2010; Weitzer, 2000b); it is important to point out that 
police officers’ behavior has been shown to influence citizens’ demeanor (Wiley & 
Hudik, 1974).  This combative and threatening officer demeanor may stem from police 
culture (Westley, 1970) or it could be an unintended by-product of the legalistic-style of 
policing taking in these areas.  When officers are primarily expected to stop and question 
suspicious persons where they essentially perform zero tolerance functions, such as 
vigorously enforcing low level crimes and disorder, they likely view their occupational 
role as “warriors” (Balko, 2014; Kraska, 1996) rather than “guardians.”   
 The nature of policing in disadvantaged, high-crime neighborhoods also 
contributes to residents’ perceptions of distrust of the broader criminal justice system, 
legal cynicism, and police illegitimacy.  Sampson and Bartusch (1998), for example, 
	 194 
discovered that legal cynicism and dissatisfaction with the police were strongly 
associated with neighborhood levels of concentrated disadvantage.  In addition, racial 
differences in police satisfaction disappeared once neighborhood levels of concentrated 
disadvantage and violent crime were controlled for – again illustrating the salience of 
neighborhood context and ecological factors (see also Reisig & Parks, 2000).  Such 
negative perceptions reduce the likelihood of citizens in disadvantaged neighborhoods 
cooperating with police in any role, whether as victims or witnesses or when they are 
stopped and question (Anderson, 1999; Brunson, 2007; Weitzer, 2000b).  Neighborhoods 
and their internal dynamics, through the antecedents and correlates of social 
disorganization and policing tactics, better explain the process by which police-citizen 
conflict arises.   
 On the other hand, the variation in levels of crime and violence across 
neighborhoods also places differential burdens and stressors on the police –who already 
divide geographic territory into patrol beats in order to conform as closely as possible to 
existing neighborhood boundaries (Bittner, 1967; 1970; Klinger, 1997; Rubinstein, 1973; 
Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Smith, 1986).  As previously discussed, neighborhood context 
and levels of crime help to determine the style of policing and the specific 
tactics/strategies that officers employ.  Such variation in crime and violence impacts the 
nature and volume of calls for service and officers’ workloads (Geerken & Gove, 1977; 
Hassell, 2007; Klinger, 1997).  Picking up from the earlier discussion, neighborhood 
context also influences the type of individuals that officers come into contact with on a 
day-to-day basis.  Officers have been observed to experience more frequent instances of 
citizen disrespect and hostility in disadvantaged neighborhoods relative to police-citizen 
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interactions in affluent neighborhoods (Reisig et al., 2004) –which is, in part, the result of 
the perceived inequities of police treatment that colors citizens’ demeanor during 
encounters.  As such, policing disadvantaged, high-crime neighborhoods certainly 
presents officers with a unique set of challenges compared to their counterparts working 
in more economically advantageous, lower-crime neighborhoods.  In terms of the safety 
of working conditions, research has found that officers are more likely to be assaulted 
and killed in areas that have higher rates of violent crime (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; 
Kaminski, Jefferis, & Gu, 2003; Shjarback & White, 2016).   
 These factors certainly set the stage, so to speak, for why neighborhood context 
has been found to influence police use of force in past studies (Lee et al., 2014; Smith, 
1986; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  For one, there are more opportunities for use of force in 
disadvantaged, high-crime areas because there are simply more encounters.  Order 
maintenance/broken windows and hot spots strategies create a higher visibility of officers 
in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and these strategies mandate officers to be more 
proactive by making frequent involuntary investigatory stops.  More importantly, the 
aforementioned neighborhood dynamics create the potential for increased police-citizen 
conflict (Kane, 2002; 2005).  Citizens who enter into police encounters with negative 
perceptions of police and beliefs that the police are illegitimate might be less likely to 
cooperate with officers and less likely to show respect and deference.  Citizens harboring 
unfavorable views of police may be more likely to challenge the authority of an officer 
by failing to obey commands/directives or physically resisting, especially when they feel 
the very nature of an unwelcomed police contact to be inappropriate and unconstitutional.  
Indeed, it may be difficult to remain compliant when one feels like he/she is unjustly 
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stopped or targeted because of his/her race or neighborhood.  Citizens who challenge 
officers’ actions, even if they are acting lawfully, may increase their chances of having 
forced used against them.  Taken as a whole, a police-citizen encounter may be rife with 
tension and animosity from the beginning of the interaction. 
 Because of the transactional nature of police-citizen encounters (Binder & Scharf, 
1980), officers must respond to instances of citizen disrespect, hostility, noncompliance, 
and challenges to their authority.  Exactly how officers respond in these scenarios, both 
verbally and physically, will likely determine whether the situation escalates or 
deescalates.  Studies have consistently found that officers are more likely to use physical 
force when citizens are resistant (Reiss, 1971; Worden & Shepard, 1996; see also 
Mastrofski et al., 2002).  Additionally, qualitative research suggests that officers often 
used or threatened to use violence against citizens in order to gain compliance as well as 
used force as an investigative tool, as alluded to by the young black males who were 
interviewed in disadvantaged St. Louis neighborhoods (Brunson, 2007).  Taking it a step 
further, officers working in areas with high-levels of police-citizen conflict might 
anticipate citizen disrespect, hostility, noncompliance, and violence –influencing the 
direction of the encounter where officers might be quicker to take physical action in an 
effort “maintain the edge” with their authority (Kappeler et al., 1998).  Citizen 
noncompliance and challenges to authority, whether real or simply anticipated, coupled 
with perceptions of safety and the desire to avoid injury, might cause officers to use more 
serious levels of force earlier on during an interaction rather than employing a linear 
progression up the use of force continuum.  For example, an officer who anticipates that a 
particular citizen will not comply with commands/directives might by-pass verbal force 
	 197 
and lower levels of coercion and instead use physical pain compliance techniques, such 
as grabs or holds. 
 Such processes create the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948).   
Neither citizens nor officers enter into interactions as blank slates.  Werthman and 
Piliavan (1967) discussed how officers develop a set of internalized expectations, which 
are usually derived, in part, from past experiences.  These past experiences can be either 
direct and personal or vicarious.  Officers may come to expect disrespect and 
noncompliance from people encountered in certain neighborhoods, because it is more 
common in disadvantaged areas, and they change their approach and behavior 
accordingly.  The same goes for citizens’ expectations of officers, and both parties might 
become hyper-vigilant and suspicious of the other.  As a result, both parties are playing a 
role in escalating the situation.  
 Research should continue to build on classic works, as early pieces of scholarship 
provide rich details about officers’ perceptions how they might be influenced by 
ecological characteristics.  Disadvantaged, high-crime neighborhoods, as well as its 
citizens, are often segregated from large parts of the city.  Officers working in these 
neighborhoods probably do not come from these areas and are not likely to currently 
reside in them.  As a result, there is sound reason believe that this level of segregation 
increases the social distance between officers and citizens.  Traditional policing scholars 
(Baton, 1964; Bayley & Mendelson, 1969; Black, 1976; Reiss & Bordua, 1967), in fact, 
observed higher levels of social distance between officers and the residents of poor 
minority neighborhoods.  Increased social distance, it is argued by the aforementioned 
scholars, may lead to a more aggressive/punitive police response as well as a lower 
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likelihood that officers will adopt a helping orientation in encounters with citizens.  
Given the impact that officer demeanor has on citizens’ demeanor (Wiley & Hudik, 
1974) and how a lack of empathy may escalate interactions and make it more difficult to 
obtain compliance, this is one potential reason why police use of force might be higher in 
quantity and severity in disadvantaged neighborhoods.   
 In addition to social distance, structural characteristics of neighborhoods also 
influence a range of other officer perceptions, which in turn impacts officer behavior and 
use of force.  Werthman and Piliavan’s (1967) concept of “ecological contamination” is a 
prime example of the impact neighborhood characteristics has on officer behavior.  They 
hypothesize that neighborhood characteristics, such as high crime or violence, are 
attached to all persons encountered and residing in those areas; both neighborhoods and 
their citizens are stereotyped and stigmatized by officers who are already engaged in 
dividing physical territory into more meaningful and interpretable categories (Foucault, 
1970).  In other words, individuals encountered in disadvantaged, high-crime 
neighborhoods may be viewed by the police as possessing the moral liabilities associated 
with the area itself (Smith, 1986; Werthman & Piliavan, 1967).  This concept of 
“ecological contamination” has the potential to compound the impact of individual-level 
stereotypes of minorities as crime-prone and dangerous in addition to racial/ethnic 
implicit biases (see James, Klinger, & Vila, 2014).  According to Brunson and Gau 
(2014), police officers’ preconceived notions about race and place, which are inextricably 
linked, converge; thus, affirming officers views of urban young black males as symbolic 
assailants (Skolnick, 1966).   
 Additionally, high crime areas may blur the line between victims and offenders,  
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contributing to officer cynicism (Klinger, 1997).  Other research has found that 
neighborhood factors, specifically economic disadvantage and high crime, influence 
officers’ perceptions of citizen attitudes toward police, citizen demeanor and hostility, 
citizen levels of compliance/resistance as well as perceptions of officer risk/safety 
(Crawford, 1974; Hassell, 2007; Kephart, 1954).  Thus, the combination of social 
distance, ecological contamination, and implicit biases may lead officers to be more 
suspicious during encounters with residents in certain neighborhoods –affecting their 
demeanor and approach during citizen interactions in disadvantaged, high-crime areas.  It 
is the interplay of both citizen and officer perceptions that are dependent on the 
neighborhood context that colors the transactional process of the police-citizen 
interaction (Binder & Scharf, 1980), and potentially the likelihood of use of force, or the 
level of force used. 
Policy Implications 
Continued Efforts Toward Community Policing 
 Policing scholars have long discussed the disconnect between community 
policing in theory versus how community policing has actually played out in practice.  
Departments across America, at least on paper, were quick to “adopt” community 
policing.  By 1997, a Police Foundation survey reported that 85% of responding law 
enforcement agencies had either adopted or were in the process of adopting community 
policing (Skogan, 2004).  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2003), more than 
90% of departments serving populations over 250,000 had full-time trained community 
policing officers in the field by 2000.  This large-scale diffusion can be attributed, in part, 
to the massive financial incentives to adopt community policing strategies.  Established 
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by the 1994 Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act, the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS) allocated billions of dollars in federal funding to local 
departments that made a commitment to implement community policing.   
 However, scholars have been critical of the “true” impact community policing has  
had on changes in departmental philosophy, strategy, tactics, and organizational structure 
(see Mastrofski, 2006 for a review).  Perhaps one of the largest impediments to the 
successful adoption and implementation of community policing is resistance and lack of 
“buy in” among officers.  In a survey of the Chicago Police Department, for example, 
more than 70% of officers expressed disinterest in addressing “non-crime problems” in 
their respective beats, and these officers felt that community policing would place an 
increased burden and a greater demand on their services (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).  
Community policing requires a problem-solving approach, whereby officers must be 
trained in identifying issues and then devising strategies/tactics to combat their 
underlying causes (i.e., utilizing the “SARA” model); this approach takes patience and 
discipline on the part of front-line officers and mid-level managers compared to the 
largely reactive, “traditional” model of policing.  Since community policing is more of a 
philosophy than a tactic, it is difficult to assess whether a department is actually 
practicing it –let alone whether it is successful in achieving its desired aims (National 
Research Council, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004).  The preoccupation with the “numbers 
game” (i.e., statistics on outcomes like stops and arrests; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993) might 
preclude departments from dedicating time and effort towards community policing 
activities since these indicators are rarely documented in police information systems (e.g., 
Compstat).  Research has also shown that community policing is particularly challenging 
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to achieve in the disadvantaged neighborhoods where both the officers and community 
members in those areas would most benefit; Skogan’s (1990) evaluation of the Houston 
Police Department’s implementation found that white and middle-class residents were 
most likely to attend community policing meetings, but working class minorities 
remained uninvolved (see also Skogan, 1988).  According to Mastrofski (2006), there is 
reason to believe that many, if not most, American police departments fall far short of 
enacting the kinds of department-wide reforms that demonstrate a genuine commitment 
to a community-oriented policing philosophy. 
 With that said, a true organizational commitment to community-oriented policing, 
as opposed to simply paying “lip service” to the idea, could greatly benefit departments 
and police-citizen relations.  Most relevant to this dissertation is the impact community 
policing might have on transforming the philosophy and culture of front-line officers 
(i.e., an ideational influence).  Two central components of community policing include 1) 
extending to citizens/residents a “seat at the table”, so to speak, in defining problems and 
setting priorities (i.e., citizen involvement) and 2) broadening the mission/mandate of the 
police beyond just crime fighting and law enforcement.  Research has examined changes 
in officer outlooks after the implementation of community policing.  Synthesizing the 
results from 12 different studies, Lurigio and Rosenbaum (1994) discovered a number of 
positive findings with respect to officers’ perceptions of job satisfaction, improved 
relations with community residents, and more optimistic expectations about community 
involvement in problem solving.  Additionally, Skogan and Hartnett (1997) uncovered 
growing support for the tenets of community-oriented policing among those officers 
working in Chicago police districts experimenting with community policing compared to 
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officers who worked in districts continuing with “business as usual” strategies/tactics.  
These studies are promising in that they show that changes in officer culture are, indeed, 
possible.  An authentic community policing “buy in” may help to alleviate officer distrust 
of citizens and improve officers’ overall perceptions of an area’s residents.  At the same 
time, community policing might facilitate officers’ self-concept as “guardians”, while 
simultaneously reducing the likelihood that officers view themselves as “warriors”, 
exclusively interested in crime control functions.   
 A true organizational commitment to specific community policing 
strategies/tactics could assist in facilitating beneficial changes in officer culture.  The 
majority of these tactics revolve around citizen involvement.  Foot patrol, door-to-door 
canvassing, conducting citizen police academies, community/beat meetings, and 
storefront substations, among others, all represent opportunities to increase “face time” 
and interactions between officers and community residents (Mastrofski, 2006; Skogan, 
2006).  Officers and agencies must value non-adversarial, positive contacts with citizens 
as an outcome.  Such exchanges and engagements create, at the very least, the potential to 
foster police-citizen relationships/partnerships.  They present officers with a chance to get 
to know and become familiar with citizens and vice versa.  Increasing interaction with 
more of an area’s residents, especially in places with high levels of crime and poverty 
(i.e., the “ghetto”), might help officers alleviate perceptions of “ecological 
contamination” (Werthman & Piliavan, 1967) or the “over exaggeration of anti-police 
hostility” (Crawford, 1974; Groves & Rossi, 1970) that may be attributed to the citizens 
of those disadvantaged neighborhoods.  While research has shown that community 
engagement is least likely to occur in the areas that need it most (see Skogan, 1990 
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above), Skogan and colleagues’ (2004) evaluation of Chicago’s police-sponsored beat 
meetings found that these activities eventually became as popular in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods as they were in advantaged neighborhoods. 
 Police executives could proactively take steps to better ensure that their  
departments adhere to community policing principles.  A first step would be to promote 
mid-level managers who are receptive to community policing ideals to supervisory 
positions.  Leaders could alter the organization’s rewards/incentive system and how they 
evaluate employees, moving away from or placing less emphasis on traditional officer 
output such as stops and arrests.  Instead, more weight could be placed on measures like 
community initiative/outreach and problem-solving skills.  Agencies could also keep 
track of their performance by systematically surveying community members, measuring 
satisfaction and the perceived legitimacy of police.    
Experienced versus Inexperienced Officers  
 
 The data from the Indianapolis and St. Petersburg Police Departments show that 
less experienced officers are more likely to currently work in patrol beats characterized 
by higher levels of concentrated disadvantage and higher percentages of minority 
residents (these two contextual characteristics are very highly correlated).  This 
relationship certainly stems, at least in part, from department policy.  It is difficult to 
deny the common practice of seniority: rewarding more experienced officers with “first 
choice” or preference over which areas they desire to work in.  A sound argument can be 
made that these officers have paid their dues, earning them the ability to choose to patrol 
the more advantageous areas in a jurisdiction (e.g., lower levels of crime and economic 
disadvantage).  Furthermore, placing young, inexperienced officers in geographic 
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assignments characterized by a high volume of calls for service, more crime, and greater 
degrees of concentrated disadvantage might speed up the learning process for new 
recruits.  Working in these types of environments, arguably, exposes officers to a wide 
range of experiences much quicker compared to areas with lower call volume, less crime, 
and lower levels of economic disadvantage.  This practice, however, raises some concern, 
especially in terms of potential unintended, negative consequences.  Departments appear 
to be assigning the least experienced officers in those very patrol beats where police-
community relations are already tenuous. 
 The NYPD’s “Operation Impact” is prime example of this type of departmental 
policy being carried out in practice (Smith & Purtell, 2007; see also Weisburd et al., 
2014).  Starting in 2003, the department decided to focus increased attention on 24 
“impact zones”: high crime areas (i.e., “hot spots”) within precincts identified by precinct 
commanders and crime analysts, although the department has recently stopped doing this.  
Upon graduation from the police academy, the majority of the recruits have traditionally 
been immediately assigned to an impact zone.  The rookie officers, once assigned, take 
part in saturated foot patrol –walking some of the highest crime beats in the city.  The 
academy graduates provide continuous manpower for the 1,800 officers per year needed 
to patrol these hot spot areas.   
 Policing scholars have long theorized about the importance of officer experience 
and its subsequent impact on behavior (Brown, 1981; Muir, 1977; Rubenstein, 1973).  
Central to this proposition is the notion that police work is a “craft” (Bayley & Bittner, 
1984), with which officers must learn through their experiences on the job.  Over time, it 
is believed that officers become more skilled at resolving situations, which should 
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decreases the chances of officers resorting to coercive or physical force.  On the other 
hand, observations of police suggest that officers’ activity levels, in terms of stops and 
arrests, decline over time (Crank, 1993; Friedrich, 1977; Van Maanen, 1974; Worden, 
1989; Worden et al., 2013).  This has led many policing scholars to believe that rookie 
officers are more “gung ho” in using their authority, which would put them in more 
frequent situations that have the potential to end in physical force being used against a 
citizen. 
 Harris (2009), in perhaps one of the more rigorous empirical examinations to date, 
used longitudinal data from a large cohort of police officers to explore the relationship 
between experience and “problem behaviors.”  Employing citizen complaints as the 
outcome variable of interest, he found evidence that officer experience and problem 
behavior are, indeed, related.  Citizen complaints are higher earlier on in officers’ careers, 
peaking during the second and third year of experience.  After the peak, patterns of 
citizen complaints generally exhibit a steady decline thereafter (see also Harris, 2011).  It 
unclear what this observed trend might mean.  Is the decline in citizen complaints due to 
less officer productivity, suggesting that officers are more likely to engage in avoidance 
behavior (Muir, 1977), or could it be due to officers increasing their skills and mastering 
their craft over time?  
 Officer experience was found to be particularly important in this dissertation.  
Although it was only examined as a control variable, more experienced officers were 
more likely to fall into the “con culture” group whereas less experienced officers were 
more likely to be members of the “pro culture” group.  More experienced officers, in 
addition, were less likely to use restraint techniques – even after controlling for a host of 
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relevant variables including characteristics of the patrol beat with a hierarchical modeling 
strategy.  Police executives and mid-level managers should pay more attention to officer 
experience levels, particularly when it comes to department-designated geographic 
assignments.  Perhaps placing the least experienced officers into the most disadvantage 
areas is not the smartest option for both parties involved: officers/departments as a whole 
as well as citizens.  Police executives may take steps to alleviate the problem if academy 
training has prepared rookie officers and they are assigned to the “right” field-training 
officers.  Union rules will likely continue to determine seniority preferences and 
advantages. 
Importance of Sergeants/Supervisors 
 Although it was beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine the influence of 
supervisors on front-line officer culture, findings from the supplemental analyses shed 
light on officers’ perceptions of their sergeants.  While patrol beat characteristics –
concentrated disadvantage, homicide rate, and percent minority– were not found to 
impact officer perceptions of sergeants at the individual level, the results from the second 
research question do support the notion of a collective beat culture regarding how officers 
view their sergeants (i.e., perceptions significantly vary across beats).  Officers currently 
working in the same patrol beats tended to share similar attitudes toward their 
supervisors.  This finding provides indirect evidence for the salience of sergeants. 
 Until relatively recently, few studies had explored police sergeants and their  
potential influence on the front-line officers under their command.  Most of what we 
know from that time period stems from the work of Robin Engel.  Engel (2001), using a 
battery of items and scales directed toward sergeants, discovered four distinct supervisory 
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styles: “traditional”, “innovative”, “supportive”, and “active.”  Furthermore, a sergeant’s 
supervisory style was shown to influence patrol officer behavior.  “Active” sergeants 
were the most influential: front-line officers working under their supervision were more 
likely to use coercive force (Engel, 2000) and spent more time engaging in self-initiated 
and community-policing/problem-solving activities (Engel, 2002); patrol officers with 
“innovative” sergeants spent more time engaging in administrative tasks. 
 Borrowing from the management and social psychology literatures, criminologists 
have recently applied the theory of organizational justice to the police.  The perspective 
proposes that higher levels of distributive justice (i.e., perceived fairness of outcomes), 
procedural justice (i.e., perceived fairness of the process through which an outcome is 
decided), and interactional justice (i.e., politeness, honesty, and respect during the 
interpersonal communication with and treatment of employees) on the part of the 
organization will result in positive outcomes for both employees and the organization 
itself (Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, 
Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988).  These beneficial outcomes 
include increased employee performance, productivity, and overall commitment to one’s 
organization.  Empirical studies applying organizational justice to law enforcement have 
been more popular among European policing scholars, although interest among American 
policing scholars is growing.  Thus far, research has found that positive officer 
perceptions of organizational justice were associated with more favorable attitudes 
toward the public (Myhill & Bradford, 2013) and community policing (Bradford, 
Quinton, Myhill, & Porter, 2014; Wolfe & Nix, in press), commitment to procedural 
justice during citizen interactions (Tankebe, 2014), commitment to agency goals 
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(Bradford & Quinton, 2014), higher degrees of self-legitimacy (Bradford & Quinton, 
2014; Tankebe, 2014; Tankebe & Meško, 2015), and even lower levels of police 
misconduct (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011).   
 More specifically, scholars have also focused their attention on the role that 
sergeants/supervisors play in fostering organizational justice and Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
(2012) concept of self-legitimacy (see above discussion).  In terms of organizational 
justice, officers who experienced fair procedures from their supervisors were more likely 
to identify with their respective agencies (Bradford et al., 2014).  Tankebe (2014) found 
that fair treatment by supervisors impacted Ghanian officers’ perceptions of self-
legitimacy, even after controlling for attitudes towards citizens and colleagues.  Tankebe 
and Meško (2015) also discovered that supervisors who treated their subordinates in a 
procedurally just manner were influential in improving front-line officers’ beliefs in their 
self-legitimacy.  Given the results of these studies as well as the early research on the 
correlates of self-legitimacy (see above discussion), officers’ perceptions of their 
sergeants/supervisors appears to be a fruitful avenue for future work. 
Police Use of Force-Policy 
 While there is much to learned at the theoretical level, the examination use of 
force on a practical or policy level requires a number of transformations.  These 
transformations must come from within, through police executives themselves as well as 
the guidance of leading law enforcement organizations across the country, such as 
International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Sheriffs Association.  
External organizations and individuals, such as National Institute of Justice and academic 
researchers, can also contribute in the effort towards basic issues.  Data collection is a 
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perfect example; limitations in national or state-level use of force data, deadly or 
otherwise, are perhaps the biggest impediment to policy-relevant research (Alpert, 2016; 
Klinger, 2008; Klinger et al., 2016; White, 2016).  Many scholars have called for national 
data collection effects and a central location/database for police use of force incident, and 
these calls are certainly not new (White, 2016).  However, any data collection effort 
would be meaningless unless there is a consistent and agreed upon definition of use of 
force and its subsequent measurement (see above discussion) for basic comparative 
research purposes.  Even estimates of rates of police use vary considerably based on the 
method of data collection and the measurement of use of force.  Synthesizing the results 
from 36 studies, Hickman and colleagues (2008) found that rates of nonlethal use of force 
ranged from 0.1% to 31.8% of police-citizen encounters.  The field has since arrived at, 
what we believe to be, a more precise estimate of national rates of nonlethal police use of 
force: 1.7% of all police-citizen contacts and in 20.0% of all arrests (Hickman et al., 
2008); yet, more work needs to be done.  To use a football analogy, policing scholars and 
law enforcement professionals are still wearing leather helmets in regard to the 
collection, dissemination, and examination of use of force data. 
 The diffusion of officer body-worn cameras (BWCs) presents an opportunity for 
scholars to build a larger knowledge base on police use of force for policy-relevant 
research.  While the technology is novel and few rigorous evaluations have been 
completed, initial findings display promise for a “civilizing effect,” with most of the 
evaluations showing reductions in police use of force in addition to reductions in citizen 
complaints against police after the deployment of BWCs (White, 2014).  If research 
continues to find such beneficial outcomes, then BWCs should, theoretically, translate 
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into improved police-community relations and citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy 
as well as increased accountability and transparency.  But perhaps the most important 
policy-relevant implication is the creation of permanent visual and audio records of the 
full transactional process of the police-citizen encounter (Binder & Scharf, 1980) as 
opposed to the final frame decision, which has been found to justify the “split-second 
syndrome” (Fyfe, 1986).  Both scholars and police professionals can view the videos 
captured by BWCs in order to arrive at a better understanding of the process of use of 
force, similar to systematic social observation methods without needing to be physically 
present during the encounter – but equipped with the ability to rewind and rewatch.  
BWCs would be particularly important during sentinel events.  Law enforcement 
professionals can use the videos for training purposes as a tool to instruct officers what to 
do and what to avoid, including what are and what are not appropriate responses to 
citizen behavior.   
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Table 1 
 
Cluster 1-Anti-Organizational Street Cops 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
-.04 (.51) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.02) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) .72 (.43)+ [2.06] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.37 (.42) [.69] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .25 (.26) [1.28] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.61 (.32)+ [1.84] 
 
9.65 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Cluster 2-Dirty Harry Enforcers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
-.03 (.35) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .02 (.02) [1.02] 
     Sex (1 = male) .22 (.35) [1.24] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.51 (.32) [.60] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.06 (.26) [.94] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.56 (.27)* [1.75] 
 
7.91 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 3 
 
Cluster 3-Traditionalists 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
-.09 (.54) [.99] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.03) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.56 (44) [.57] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .16 (.49) [1.18] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.28 (.48) [.75] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.23 (.49) [1.26] 
 
4.73 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Cluster 4-Peacekeepers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.48 (.35) [1.05] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .05 (.02)* [1.05] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.03 (.40) [.97] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .37 (.33) [1.45] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.19 (.27) [.83] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.49 (.28) [.61] 
 
12.45* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 5 
 
Cluster 5-Old Pros 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.03 (.31) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.02) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.07 (.27) [.93] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .41 (.25) [1.50] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.39 (.22)+ [.68] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.03 (.24) [1.03] 
 
6.27 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Cluster 6-Law Enforcers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.77 (.33)* [1.08] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.06 (.02)** [.94] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.14 (.31) [.87] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.50 (.35) [.61] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .12 (.23) [1.13] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.57 (.24)* [.57] 
 
28.46*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 7 
 
Cluster 7-Lay Lows 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
-1.26 (.40)** [.89] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.21 (.32) [.81] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .35 (.34) [1.41] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .47 (.26)+ [1.60] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.02 (.28) [1.02] 
 
15.37* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Law Enforcement 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
-.08 (.27) [.99] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.02 (.01) [.98] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.06 (.25) [.94] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .26 (.23) [1.29] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.41 (.15)** [.66] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.57 (.20)** [.57] 
 
16.90** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 9 
 
Citizen Cooperation 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
-2.44 (.32)*** [.79] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .05 (.02)** [1.05] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.05 (.27) [.96] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.10 (.25) [.91] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .09 (.18) [1.09] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.38 (.24) [.68] 
 
102.61*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Citizen Distrust 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.19 (.24) [1.02] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.01) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.35 (.25) [.70] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.45 (.26) [.64] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .02 (.19) [1.02] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.22 (.18) [1.25] 
 
12.12+ 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 11 
 
Procedural Guidelines 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.06 (.25) [1.01] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) .18 (.25) [1.20] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.34 (.24) [.71] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .24 (.22) [1.27] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.77 (.19)*** [2.16] 
 
25.08*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
 
 Order Maintenance 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.13 (.25) [1.01] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) .34 (.22) [1.41] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .56 (.20)** [1.75] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .01 (.20) [1.01] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.03 (.16) [.97] 
 
12.35+ 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 13 
 
Community Policing 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.34 (.23) [1.03] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .02 (.01)+ [1.02] 
     Sex (1 = male) .12 (.24) [1.13] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .53 (.21)* [1.71] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.21 (.20) [.81] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.36 (.19)+ [.70] 
 
14.00* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 
 
Aggressive Patrol 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.00 (.31) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.08 (.01)*** [.93] 
     Sex (1 = male) .30 (.29) [1.36] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -1.04 (.21)*** [.35] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.44 (.21)* [.64] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.23 (.23) [.80] 
 
52.29*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 15 
 
Selective Enforcement 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.24 (.31) [1.02] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .10 (.02)*** [1.10] 
     Sex (1 = male) .02 (.30) [1.02] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.33 (.31) [.72] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .44 (.28) [1.55] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.70 (.28)* [2.02] 
 
21.57** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 
 
Perceptions of Management 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.24 (.31) [1.02] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.17 (.24) [.84] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .01 (.21) [1.01] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.41 (.17)* [.67] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.52 (.16)** [1.68] 
 
19.08** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 17 
 
Perceptions of Sergeant 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.06 (.31) [1.01] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.02 (.01)+ [.98] 
     Sex (1 = male) .08 (.26) [1.08] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .10 (.22) [1.10] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.44 (.20)* [.64] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.20 (.22) [1.22] 
 
9.24 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
 
Cluster 1-Anti-Organizational Street Cops 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rates 
 
.02 (.02) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.02) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) .79 (.47)+ [2.21] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.53 (.47) [.59] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .31 (.29) [1.37] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.89 (.36)* [2.44] 
 
12.59* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 19 
 
Cluster 2-Dirty Harry Enforcers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rates 
 
.00 (.02) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.02) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) .08 (.35) [1.08] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.82 (.37)* [.44] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.13 (.26) [.88] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.74 (.32)* [2.09] 
 
11.32+ 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20 
 
Cluster 3-Traditionalists 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rates 
 
.00 (.04) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.03) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.37 (.47) [.69] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .31 (.50) [1.36] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.22 (.55) [.80] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.22 (.56) [1.24] 
 
1.98 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 21 
 
Cluster 4-Peacekeepers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
-.01 (.02) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .06 (.02)* [1.06] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.09 (.44) [.91] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .72 (.38)+ [2.06] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.26 (.32) [.77] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.53 (.33) [.59] 
 
13.61* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
Table 22 
 
Cluster 5-Old Pros 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rates 
 
-.01 (.02) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.02) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.20 (.27) [.81] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .36 (.28) [1.44] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.25 (.23) [.78] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.03 (.25) [1.03] 
 
3.59 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 23 
 
Cluster 6-Law Enforcers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rates 
 
.04 (.02)* [1.004] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.07 (.02)*** [.94] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.13 (.32) [.88] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.39 (.35) [.67] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .12 (.25) [1.13] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.82 (.27)** [.44] 
 
23.86*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 
 
Cluster 7-Lay Lows 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Homicide Rates 
 
-.05 (.02)** [.995] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .03 (.02)+ [1.03] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.06 (.36) [.94] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .35 (.34) [1.41] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .35 (.28) [1.42] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.12 (26) [.89] 
 
11.40+ 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 25 
 
Citizen Cooperation 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
-.04 (.02)* [.996] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .07 (.01)*** [1.07] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.02 (.27) [.98] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.35 (.25) [.71] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .23 (.18) [1.26] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.44 (.29) [.64] 
 
38.81*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26 
 
Citizen Distrust 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.04 (.01)** [1.004] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.01) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.35 (.26) [.71] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.65 (.31)* [.52] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .04 (.21) [1.04] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.19 (.20) [1.21] 
 
18.57** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 27 
 
Procedural Guidelines 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.01 (.01) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) .09 (.25) [1.10] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.43 (.25)+ [.65] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .18 (.23) [1.20] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.85 (.19)*** [2.33] 
 
26.87*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 
 
Law Enforcement 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.04 (.02)* [1.004] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.02 (.01) [.98] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.24 (.26) [.79] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.03 (.25) [.97] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.34 (.16)* [.71] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.83 (.21)*** [.43] 
 
22.63*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 253 
Table 29 
 
Order Maintenance 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.00 (.01) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .02 (.01) [1.02] 
     Sex (1 = male) .29 (.24) [1.33] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .71 (.21)*** [2.04] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .01 (.23) [1.01] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.05 (.18) [.95] 
 
14.73* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 30 
 
Community Policing 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.00 (.02) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .03 (.02)* [1.03] 
     Sex (1 = male) .03 (.25) [1.03] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .61 (.22)** [1.84] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.13 (21) [.87] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.32 (.20) [.72] 
 
14.88* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 31 
 
Aggressive Patrol 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.01 (.02) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.08 (.01)*** [.92] 
     Sex (1 = male) .32 (.30) [1.38] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -1.06 (.23)*** [.35] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.34 (.23) [.71] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.34 (.25) [.71] 
 
51.89*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32 
 
Selective Enforcement 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
-.03 (.02)+ [.997] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .09 (.03)*** [1.09] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.09 (.32) [.91] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.22 (.31) [.80] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .32 (.30) [1.38] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.81 (.28)** [2.24] 
 
21.86** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 33 
 
Perceptions of Sergeants 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
.00 (.01) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.01) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.06 (.27) [.95] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .15 (.24) [1.16] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.35 (.21)+ [.71] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.08 (.21) [1.08] 
 
5.17 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34 
 
Perceptions of Management 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Homicide Rate 
 
-.02 (.01) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.17 (.26) [.84] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.06 (.21) [.94] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.34 (.19)+ [.71] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.60 (.18)*** [1.82] 
 
16.58** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 35 
 
Cluster 1-Anti-Organizational Street Cops 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
.10 (.17) [1.01] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.02) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) .71 (.43)+ [2.04] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.44 (.45) [.64] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .26 (.27) [1.30] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.58 (.33)+ [1.79] 
 
8.87 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 36 
 
Cluster 2-Dirty Harry Enforcers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.27 (.13)* [.97] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .00 (.02) [1.00] 
     Sex (1 = male) .23 (.36) [1.26] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.32 (.34) [.73] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.10 (.26) [.90] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.63 (.28)* [1.87] 
 
12.74* 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 37 
 
Cluster 3-Traditionalists 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
.21 (.23) [1.02] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .02 (.03) [1.02] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.56 (.45) [.57] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .01 (.46) [1.01] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.25 (.49) [.78] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.18 (.48) [1.19] 
 
10.07 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38 
 
Cluster 4-Peacekeepers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
.04 (.13) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .05 (.02)* [1.05] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.04 (.41) [.96] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .43 (.34) [1.53] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.21 (.27) [.81] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.42 (.28) [.66] 
 
10.24 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 39 
 
Cluster 5-Old Pros 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.03 (.11) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.01 (.02) [.99] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.07 (.27) [.93] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .43 (.26)+ [1.54] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.39 (.22)+ [.67] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.04 (.23) [1.05] 
 
6.29 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40 
 
Cluster 6-Law Enforcers 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
.33 (.12)** [1.03] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.05 (.02)** [.95] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.15 (.31) [.86] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.56 (.34)+ [.57] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .15 (.23) [1.16] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.52 (.23)* [.60] 
 
30.25*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 41 
 
Cluster 7-Lay Lows 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variable 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.21 (.12)+ [.98] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .02 (.02) [1.02] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.21 (.32) [.81] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .28 (.35) [1.32] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .46 (.26)+ [1.59] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.20 (.25) [.82] 
 
9.21 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 42 
 
Citizen Cooperation 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.77 (.12)*** [.93] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .04 (.02)** [1.04] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.03 (.27) [.97] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .06 (.25) [1.06] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .02 (.17) [1.02 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.60 (.24)** [.55] 
 
77.02*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 43 
 
Citizen Distrust 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.05 (.09) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.02 (.01) [.98] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.34 (.25) [.71] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.39 (.26) [.68] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .01 (.19) [1.01] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.28 (.19) [1.32] 
 
10.91+ 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 44 
 
Procedural Guidelines 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.06 (.09) [.99] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .00 (.01) [1.00] 
     Sex (1 = male) .18 (.25) [1.20] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.30 (.24) [.74] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .23 (.22) [1.26] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.80 (.18)*** [2.22] 
 
24.35*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 45 
 
Law Enforcement 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.07 (.09) [.99] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.02 (.01)+ [.98] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.06 (.25) [.94] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .28 (.23) [1.33] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.42 (.15)** [.66] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.56 (.20)** [.57] 
 
16.82** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 46 
 
Order Maintenance 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.05 (.09) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .01 (.01) [1.01] 
     Sex (1 = male) .35 (.22) [1.42] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .60 (.21)** [1.83] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .00 (.20) [1.00] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.02 (.16) [1.02] 
 
11.99+ 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 47 
 
Community Policing 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
.15 (.08)+ [1.01] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .03 (.01)+ [1.03] 
     Sex (1 = male) .12 (.24) [1.12] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .50 (.22)* [1.64] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.20 (.19) [.82] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.34 (.18)+ [.71] 
 
17.81** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 48 
 
Aggressive Patrol 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.01 (.11) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.08 (.01)*** [.93] 
     Sex (1 = male) .30 (.29) [1.36] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -1.04 (.22)*** [.35] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.44 (.21)* [.64] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
-.22 (.22) [.80] 
 
52.64*** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 49 
 
Selective Enforcement 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
.13 (.13) [1.01] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .10 (.03)*** [1.11] 
     Sex (1 = male) .02 (.30) [1.02] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) -.37 (.31) [.69] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) .45 (.28) [1.57] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.71 (.27)** [2.03] 
 
21.48** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 50 
 
Perception of Management 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.04 (.08) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience .00 (.01) [1.00] 
     Sex (1 = male) -.17 (.24) [.84] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .05 (.22) [1.06] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.41 (.17)* [.66] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.55 (.16)*** [1.74] 
 
18.55** 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 51 
 
Perception of Sergeants 
Variables b (SE) [OR] 
Independent Variables 
     Logged Percent Minority 
 
-.04 (.10) [1.00] 
Controls  
     Years Experience -.02 (.01)* [.98] 
     Sex (1 = male) .08 (.26) [1.08] 
     Race/Ethnicity (1 = minority) .13 (.22) [1.14] 
     Edu. Level (1 = Associates or higher) -.45 (.20)* [.64] 
     Site (1 = Indianapolis) 
 
Wald Chi Square 
.22 (.21) [1.24] 
 
9.40 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (b) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses and odds ratios in brackets. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; + p < .10 (two-tailed test) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #2 
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Table 1 
 
Unconditional, Random ANOVAs of Individual Clusters Across Beats 
 
Model 
 
Estimate (SE) 
 
95% CI 
Chibar2 (p-
value) 
 
ICC 
Anti-Org. 
Street Cops 
 
.73 (.25) .38 – 1.42 4.18 (.02)* .14 
Dirty Harry 
Enforcers 
 
.31 (.31) .04 – 2.23 .29 (.30) .03 
Traditionalists 
 
.67 (.48) .17 – 2.74 .66 (.21) .12 
Peacekeepers 
 
2.38e-7 0 – . 6.3e-13 (1.00) 2.06 X 10-14 
Old Pros 
 
.43 (.19) .18 – 1.02 1.97 (.08) .05 
Law Enforcers 
 
.48 (.23) .19 – 1.24 1.74 (.09) .07 
Lay Lows .59 (.26) .25 – 1.40 2.03 (.08) .10 
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Table 2 
 
Unconditional, Random ANOVAs of Individual Dimensions Across Beats 
 
Model  
 
Estimate (SE) 
 
95% CI 
Chibar2 (p- 
value) 
 
ICC 
Law Enforcement 
 
.35 (.19) .12 – 1.04 1.17 (.14) .04 
Order Maintenance 
 
.13 (.35) .00 – 2.33 .04 (.42) .01 
Community 
Policing 
 
.30 (.19) .09 – 1.05 .80 (.18) .03 
Aggressive Patrol 
 
.30 (.23) .07 – 1.34 .55 (.23) .03 
Selective 
Enforcement 
 
.55 (.23) .24 – 1.26 2.17 (.07) .08 
Citizen Distrust 
 
.24 (.23) .04 – 1.62 .03 (.29) .02 
Citizen 
Cooperation 
 
1.28 (.18) .97 – 1.69 73.81 (.00)*** .33 
Percep. Sergeants 
 
.51 (.16) .28 – .94 4.80 (.01)** .07 
Percep. 
Management 
 
1.13e-6 0 - . .00 (1.00) 3.26 X 10-13 
Procedural 
Guidelines 
.27 (.21) .06 – 1.24 .51 (.24) .02 
 
